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# Demand Effects of the Internet-of-Things Sales Channel: Evidence from Automating the Purchase Process

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# Abstract

The "Internet of Things" (IoT) is rapidly becoming one of the most popular emerging technologies in business and society. One of the major verticals that has recently begun to effectively utilize IoT technologies is the retail industry. Given the unprecedented opportunities IoT generates for brands and retailers, it is important to glean timely insights regarding the business value of IoT and understand whether the introduction of an IoT technology as an alternative purchase channel for consumers affects the sales of physical products. In this paper, using empirical data from a multi-national online retailer who adopted an IoT technology that largely automates the consumers' purchases and utilizing a quasi-experimental framework, we study the effect of the introduction of IoT on product sales. Our analyses reveal a statistically and economically significant increase in sales as the result of adopting an IoT technology and demonstrate the business value of the IoT channel for retailers and brands. Besides, we conduct additional analyses of the IoT effect to also delve into the effect heterogeneity and empirically validate the underlying mechanism by examining the impact of IoT for products in different price ranges, levels of substitutability, and different product categories (e.g., search versus experience goods and hedonic versus utilitarian), drawing on mental accounting and automaticity theory. For instance, our analyses reveal that less expensive and more differentiated products as well as experience and utilitarian goods can accrue higher benefits leveraging more effectively novel IoT technologies. We validate the robustness of our findings using an extensive set of robustness checks and falsification tests. This is the first paper to study the impact of an IoT technology on product sales, drawing important theoretical and managerial implications and seeding new future research directions for devices and technologies largely automating the purchase process.

Keywords: Internet of Things, Electronic commerce, Sales growth, Retailing, Econometrics

# 1. Introduction

The "Internet of Things" (IoT) is rapidly becoming one of the most popular emerging technologies in business and society. The IoT refers to uniquely identifiable physical objects embedded with electronics, sensors/actuators, software, and wireless network connectivity that enables these objects to exchange data over the Internet with low energy consumption (e.g., (IEEE 2014; ITU 2015; Minerva et al. 2015; Venkataramani et al. 2018)). It has been projected that by 2020, the world will see 30-50 billion Internet-connected objects (Ericsson 2017; Evans 2009) while business IoT spending is forecasted to reach almost \$3 trillion (Gartner 2017). These remarkable projections position the IoT technology as potentially one of the biggest IT evolutions of our time. As a result, it is expected that IoT will have a great impact on the economy by transforming many enterprises into digital businesses and facilitating new business models as well as improving efficiency and generating new forms of revenue (Al-Fuqaha et al. 2015).

One way IoT might generate additional revenue for businesses is by creating opportunities for more direct integration of human actions and the physical world into computer-based systems (Da Xu et al. 2014). Such an interconnection of devices is expected to facilitate automation and reduce human intervention in many business verticals. One of the fastest growing verticals that has recently begun to utilize IoT to catalyze automation is the retail industry (Drinkwater 2016; Gregory 2015). For instance, the retail industry has begun to utilize IoT in order to accomplish efficient commercial transactions. In such an IoT-enabled shopping future, Internet-connected devices could largely automate the purchase of everyday items on behalf of consumers with reduced human interaction. While some retailers and brands devise strategies to adopt IoT technologies, others have already begun to leverage IoT in order to minimize consumer interactions and enhance customer experience (Evans 2017). Amazon is an example of utilizing IoT technologies in retail for product purchases and efficient transactions (Greenfield 2017). Such largely automated consumerism can generate tremendous opportunities for brands and retailers as it makes the purchasing process more frictionless and convenient, integrating human actions and the physical world into computer-based purchase systems.

Despite the promising opportunities of IoT technologies for retailers and brands, currently there also exist significant barriers to the adoption and deployment of such technologies. In particular, a survey conducted

by Gartner cites the lack of clarity about the corresponding business benefits as the top overall challenge to the adoption of IoT technologies; 50% of all respondents ranked it a top challenge while 70% of those not planning to implement IoT solutions cited it as a major challenge (Brand and Geschickter 2016). Similarly, a survey by eMarketer indicates that 37% of all the respondents cite the difficulty of showing the business value of IoT as the second most significant challenge to the adoption of IoT technologies (eMarketer 2017). Given these significant barriers hindering the seemingly unprecedented opportunities IoT has to offer brands and retailers, it is important to understand whether the introduction of an IoT technology into the consumers' purchase channel sets affects product sales. This importance is buttressed by the multiple competing arguments regarding the potential effect of IoT. For instance, there may be no effect on product sales from such an adoption if consumers simply continue purchasing the same products with the same frequency as before but potentially from different purchase channels (Hand et al. 2009). Alternatively, the introduction of the IoT technology as an alternative purchase channel could decrease product sales due to the choice overload consumers may experience from the increased number of shopping channels (Schwartz 2004). A decline in product sales for products offered via the IoT channel could also result from reduced over-purchasing or stockpiling behavior of consumers. That is, allowing consumers to order products with minimum interaction through IoT technologies might result in a reduction in presently purchased quantities due to lower expected future transaction costs. Another concern of IoT is a decline in ability to upsell or cross-sell that results from habituation. Similarly, a reduction in product sales might occur due to reduced shopping enjoyment; consumers might face a less gratifying shopping experience because of their minimized interactions in this new purchase channel (Devaraj et al. 2002). On the contrary, it is also possible that the introduction of IoT technologies in the purchase process may positively impact product sales. An increase in product sales could occur due to the convenience of this purchase channel for consumers or potential changes in the consumers' path to purchase. For instance, making payments less salient and reducing intangible acquisition and replacement costs increases transaction utility and can make products "easier to consume" and weaken the aversive impact of payments while minimizing any rationing. Similarly, introducing IoT technologies that enable product purchases with minimum human interaction might result in increased automaticity leading to consumer inertia and reduced variety-seeking behaviors;

consumers might not reevaluate their product and brand choices in future orders, leading to increased consumer loyalty towards the corresponding brands and retailers (Chintagunta 1998) as well as increased product demand for the products offered via the IoT technologies. Hence, the significance and directionality of the effect of the IoT channel on product sales remains an empirical question. Apart from unveiling the directionality of the potential effect, it is also important to identify the magnitude of the effect in order to better assess the added business value of such IoT technologies.

Beyond examining whether the introduction of the IoT-enabled channel into the consumers' purchase channel sets affects product sales, it is of paramount importance for managers and retailers to also understand what types of products accrue the highest benefits, if any. The literature has demonstrated that different sales channels can be more beneficial for different types of products. For instance, the introduction of the desktop PC shopping channel to the channel mix have benefited hedonic products more than experience goods (Girard et al. 2003; Kushwaha and Shankar 2013). Hence, we conduct additional analyses and also delve into the heterogeneity of the IoT-channel effect for different product taxonomies and characteristics further enhancing the theoretical and managerial implications of our study while also empirically verifying the underlying mechanism of the observed effect. Delving into the differences in the impact of the IoT channel and conducting in-depth analyses of the IoT effect can provide richer theoretical insights while helping businesses and practitioners make better technology investments and efficiently leverage the Internet of Things as a sales channel.

Using empirical data from an online retailer who adopted an IoT technology that largely automates the consumers' purchases minimizing human interaction and utilizing a quasi-experimental design, this paper studies the effect of the introduction of an IoT technology as a purchase channel on product sales and demonstrates the business value of IoT for retailers and brands. We also deepen understanding of the effectiveness of IoT technologies on sales growth by conducting additional analyses to examine important moderating effects of this relationship and validate the underlying mechanism. For instance, we investigate whether the degree of product substitutability as well as whether a product is more a search or an experience good moderate the effectiveness of the introduction of the IoT technology on product sales. This is the first paper to study the impact of an IoT technology on product sales and, thus, this paper contributes, among

others, to literature that examines how the adoption of Information Systems artifacts and Internet technologies affect product sales as well as to the emerging literature on IoT technologies.

Our analyses reveal that when a product becomes eligible for purchase also through the IoT channel, product sales experience a statistically and economically significant increase, highlighting the business value of IoT technologies for retailers and brands. The results remain robust across multiple identification strategies and model specifications. The underlying mechanism is also explained and empirically verified based on behavioral and economic theories. Delving into the heterogeneity of the IoT effect, our analyses also unveil that less expensive products can benefit more from the introduction of the IoT channel. Moreover, our findings reveal that experience goods, rather than search goods, benefit more from this introduction. Similarly, utilitarian goods, rather than hedonic goods, benefit more from the introduction of the IoT channel. In addition, more substitutable products benefit less from the IoT channel. The heterogeneity bolsters the overall contribution of the paper as it further empirically verifies the underlying mechanism and enhances the generalizability of the results. Interestingly, our findings also show that the increase in demand for treated products is not simply due to new customers in the marketplace or a decrease in demand for competitive products or sales of alternative retailers, suggesting that it is mainly because of an increased demand from the existing customer base of the retailer in the marketplace. These findings further verify empirically the underlying mechanism drawing on mental accounting and automaticity theory, as discussed in the sections titled "Underlying Mechanism" and "Heterogeneity of IoT Effects". These findings also inform, among others, future literature on sales channels as well as retailer and platform competition.

Beyond the above contributions to the literature, our findings have also important managerial implications as we demonstrate the demand effects of the Internet-of-Things sales channel. Besides, managers can now further understand which products would accrue higher benefits leveraging more effectively the novel IoT technologies and which would benefit less. These findings, apart from statistically and economically significant, are also timely and generate interesting insights. Despite the promising opportunities of IoT for retailers and brands, currently there also exist significant barriers to the adoption and deployment of such technologies. We hope our research paves the way toward further exploring the business value of IoT and contributes to the adoption of devices and technologies largely automating the purchase funnel and enhancing the convenience for consumers.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the relevant streams of literature and highlights the contributions this paper makes to the related work. Then, Section 3 describes the data, the IoT devices, and the relevant purchasing process as well as the differences from other sales channels. Section 4 outlines the empirical methodology and main identification strategy. Section 5 discusses the results of the proposed empirical models and specifications: Section 5.1 describes the main empirical results as well as the additional identification strategies; Section 5.2 presents further analyses of the main IoT effect and discusses various heterogeneity effects helping us empirically verify the identified mechanism; Section 5.3 presents extensive robustness checks including additional identification strategies and alternative explanations; Section 5.4 conducts multiple falsification tests. Finally, Section 6 makes conclusions and discusses the implications of our study.

## 2. Literature Review

The emergence of the Internet and the advent of new digital devices has instigated the introduction of additional sales channels offered by retailers over the last decades. A relevant stream of literature has examined the effect of adding certain sales channels, such as a desktop PC (hereafter electronic) or a mobile channel, into an existing channel mix on product sales and other firm performance metrics. The corresponding literature has shown that the introduction of these additional shopping channels can lead to different outcomes depending on their characteristics, ranging from the cannibalization of overall sales to generating significant incremental product demand (e.g., (Ansari et al. 2008; Brynjolfsson et al. 2009; Forman et al. 2009; Goolsbee 2001; Xia and Zhang 2010)).

More specifically, some of the aforementioned studies have documented that the addition of such a sales channel can enhance product sales and generate synergy effects. For instance, Xia and Zhang (2010) find that the adoption of an electronic channel in addition to traditional sales channels yields significant improvements in sales while Deleersnyder et al. (2002) find that when the impact on sales was significant in the information-goods industry, it was likely to be positive. Examining an alternative order of channel

entries, Avery et al. (2012) study the impact of adding an offline store to the current channel mix and find that in the long-run both catalog and electronic channels benefit from brick-and-mortar store presence. Likewise, Wang and Goldfarb (2017) provide empirical evidence that when an offline store opens, there is a positive impact on sales. Supplementing existing shopping channels with a new electronic channel can, however, also pose threats to firms. For instance, Van Nierop et al. (2011) find a decrease in sales due to the electronic channel and Forman et al. (2009) find that when a store opens locally people substitute away from online purchasing while Brynjolfsson et al. (2009) find that an increase in local stores decreases demand from the Internet and catalog sales channels.

Recently, the proliferation of new digital devices for consumers, such as smartphones and tablets, has led to the introduction of the respective new sales channels (Todri and Adamopoulos 2014). The corresponding literature has started to investigate whether the adoption of such channels affects product sales. For instance, Wang et al. (2015) find that the introduction of a mobile channel increases product sales. Likewise, Liu et al. (2016) find that such an introduction of a mobile channel increases consumers' demand for digital services. Finally, delving into the introduction of a tablet sales channel, Xu et al. (2016) find that the introduction of a retailer's e-commerce sales.

Besides, extant literature on Marketing and Information Systems has also examined the different dimensions and characteristics of sales channels (e.g., (Alba et al. 1997; Verhoef et al. 2007)). These dimensions and characteristics include the price level, purchase effort, purchase convenience, service quality, and after sales service of sales channels (Alba et al. 1997; Verhoef et al. 2007). As we discuss in the next section, the IoT sales channel lowers the purchase effort and increases the purchase convenience as it alters the efficiency, ease, and speed at which products can be purchased reducing difficulty and time costs for consumers. The importance of these characteristics of the IoT sales channel is also demonstrated by the classical 4Cs marketing model that includes the dimensions of cost and convenience (Verhoef et al. 2007). Apart from the customer transaction costs and convenience (Verhoef et al. 2007), another sales channel dimension of relevance (Lauterborn 1990) is altering the consideration set information availability (Alba et al. 1997; Verhoef et al. 2007) as the IoT sales channel shortens the

purchase funnel and more directly integrates human actions and the physical world into computer-based systems, as further discussed in the following section.

To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to study the impact of the IoT-enabled sales channel on product sales and, thus, this paper contributes to the streams of literature that examine how shopping channels based on Information Systems artifacts and Internet technologies affect product sales as well as the emerging literature on IoT technologies. Conducting additional analyses of the IoT effect and examining important moderating effects of the relationship of IoT technologies with sales growth further validates the identified mechanism and enhances the contribution of this paper. Besides, such analyses strengthen our understanding around which products would accrue the highest benefits leveraging more effectively the novel IoT technologies yielding incremental product demand. These findings highlight the business value of the IoT technology for retailers and brands while offering timely implications for future research.

## **3. Empirical Background and Data Description**

In the following section, we describe the empirical setting of this study and the product purchase process through the novel IoT sales channel. We also describe the distinguishing IoT characteristics embodied in the corresponding IoT devices and we further elaborate on the differences from other sales channels. Then, Section 3.2 describes the dataset used to study the effect of the IoT channel on product sales.

### **3.1. IoT Devices and Product Purchase Process**

The newly adopted IoT channel enables customers and retailers to transform the traditional product purchase process reducing human interaction during the shopping process. Thanks to the introduction of the IoT channel, orders for product purchases can be placed on the online retailer marketplace by IoT devices. The IoT devices -owned by the consumers and designed by the marketplace- constitute the relevant "things" from a user and application perspective in the corresponding IoT system. These IoT devices are connected to the Internet, the second component in the "Internet of Things" system, through a required Wi-Fi connection that gives the devices the necessary online access to connect to the retailer marketplace and place product orders utilizing their programmable embedded intelligence and the corresponding cloud IoT infrastructure of the online marketplace. In detail, apart from a Wi-Fi module designed specifically for IoT devices that provides to the "things" access to the "Internet", these IoT devices also embed several other modules that are essential for the "Internet of Things" (Minerva et al. 2015) and the purchase process in our empirical setting. More specifically, as illustrated in figure A2, the IoT devices also include as fallback mechanisms low energy Bluetooth and ultrasound microphone and sensor modules (in addition to a few other chips) connected on the circuit board and powered by an embedded battery, in order to ensure the connectivity of the IoT device and the successful completion of the product orders and other functions. Thanks to the IoT-centric design of the low energy connectivity modules and fallback mechanisms embedded in the devices, the connections to the online marketplace are ubiquitous since they are available when and where needed according to our empirical setting. In particular, the manufacturing of the IoT devices is centered on this principle (i.e., energy usage, connectivity modules, etc.) embedding modules that allow these devices to be functional for about 15-20 years without any maintenance. In addition to the aforementioned connectivity modules, the IoT devices also embed a sensor/actuator that can be triggered by consumers and, thus, the devices possess a sensing/actuating capability that is essential for IoT systems (Minerva et al. 2015). When the sensor/actuator is triggered, the IoT device utilizes the aforementioned ubiquitous connectivity as well as the embedded intelligence and knowledge functions as tools in order to make requests/calls directly to the marketplace APIs<sup>1</sup> to place an order based on the standard and interoperable communication protocols (Minerva et al. 2015), provide the consumer's username and password to the marketplace, the unique identifier of the IoT device, and the corresponding product identifier, accept the purchase terms on behalf of the consumer, offer security intelligence, etc. Such orders placed by the IoT devices for the consumers are then fulfilled by the marketplace retailer without the need for the consumer to take any further actions such as inspecting the purchase terms and conditions, providing credit card information, delivery address, explicitly confirming the purchase, etc. Similar to other sales channels, consumers receive a notification e-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Apart from designing the IoT devices, the marketplace has also designed and configured the corresponding APIs and the backend infrastructure required for the IoT channel. For instance, the marketplace also provides end-to-end encryption and device certificates.

mail confirming the purchase<sup>2</sup> and the products are then shipped to the corresponding delivery address of the consumer. Overall, all the terms and conditions and policies regarding consumer purchases are the same across all shopping channels of the retailer marketplace, including shipping times and product replacements and returns. Finally, after an order has been placed through any one of the purchase channels, consumers can track their product orders through a mobile app and/or the corresponding website of the platform. Figure A1 in the online appendix offers a schematic representation of the product purchase process via the IoT channel described above and Figure A2 illustrates the main components of an IoT device chip.

Beyond the aforementioned components that were described as part of the purchasing process in the IoT channel (e.g., connectivity, ubiquity, actuation, etc.), the IoT devices thanks to their design also encompass several other distinguishing characteristics of IoT (Minerva et al. 2015). For instance, using the embedded modules, the devices are also able to self-configure themselves and their resources. The IoT devices also self-manage the wireless connections, reserve energy whenever it is appropriate, and run diagnostics too. Besides, the IoT devices are also programmed by consumers during the initial set up allowing them to order different products for different consumers, without the need of physical changes in the IoT devices.<sup>3</sup> The devices can also be reprogrammed at a later stage too. Briefly, after the initial setup of the IoT devices by the consumers, when the sensor/actuator of the devices is triggered, the knowledge functions of the device and the relevant infrastructure of the marketplace are automatically utilized in order to submit the product order to the online marketplace, which is then fulfilled by the retailer with the delivery of the product to the consumer, as illustrated in Figure A1 and described in detail above.

 $<sup>^{2}</sup>$  An additional policy to prevent any potential accidental purchases is that the marketplace allows one order per product and customer at a time to be out for delivery.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> During this initial setup of the IoT devices by the consumers, each IoT device is also registered to the consumer's account in the platform through the IoT device uniquely identifiable serial number and obtains access to the consumer's username and password, credit card information, delivery address, etc. This initial setup of the IoT devices mainly entails simply connecting to the Wi-Fi and providing the username and password and is completed through a connection based on one of the aforementioned modules (i.e., Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, or ultrasound) and the mobile app of the marketplace. Put simply, the initial setup consists of a few simple steps and can be completed by consumers in just a few seconds, as described in this section. The consumers can also directly get partially preconfigured IoT devices from the online marketplace. Such preconfigured devices are already configured to purchase certain products. After their configuration, all IoT devices purchase a single (eligible) product.

### **3.2. Underlying Mechanism**

As depicted in the above process, the IoT channel exhibits several differences from existing sales channels as it reduces human interaction in the purchasing process and more directly integrates human actions and the physical world into the computer-based systems. In particular, the IoT channel greatly enhances the convenience and reduces the effort of making a purchase as it alters the efficiency, ease, and speed at which products can be purchased reducing the time as well as the cognitive and physical effort involved in the process. Hence, consumers who use the IoT sales channel face lower intangible (non-monetary) transaction costs. This reduction in intangible acquisition and/or replacement costs -due to increased purchase convenience and reduced effort- is a main mechanism that could increase the quantity consumers use (in total and per consumption incidence) and minimize rationing as supported by both economic and mental accounting frameworks (Chandon and Wansink 2002; Schary 1971; Wansink 1996; Wertenbroch 1998). More specifically, economic and *mental accounting theory* studies demonstrate that consumers alter their consumption of a product to mentally recover its acquisition and replacement costs, including non-monetary costs related to time utilization, handiness, appropriateness, accessibility, unpleasantness, etc. (Chandon and Wansink 2002; Gehrt and Yale 1993; Gourville and Soman 1998; Prelec and Loewenstein 1998). Hence, the reduction in such intangible acquisition costs makes IoT eligible products "easier to consume" and positively influences the perceived value for consumers and, therefore, increases the quantity of these products the consumers use (Gupta and Kim 2010). This is also in accordance with the transaction utility theory (Thaler 1985) and prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 2013) illustrating that transaction utility can increase product demand even when acquisition utility remains constant (Thaler 1985), as transaction costs and inconvenience can be seen as economic losses (Thaler 1980) and transaction utility is a direct determinant of total utility (Gupta and Kim 2010). Part of this reduction in intangible costs and increased ease of purchasing is also the decoupling of ordering a product and paying for it (Prelec and Loewenstein 1998; Thaler 1999). That is, the previously described purchase process -including the automated acceptance of all purchase terms and the automated credit card payment- enables mental accounting advantages of decoupling purchases and payments making payments less salient, which can enhance the pleasure derived from consumption and increase transaction utility and product sales as thoughts of past and current

payments can undermine the pleasures of consumption (Borgida and Howard-Pitney 1983; Gupta and Kim 2010; Prelec and Loewenstein 1998; Soman 2001; Soman and Gourville 2001). Similarly, reducing such imminent costs increases the quantity consumers use as it avoids lessening consumption when supplies diminish thanks to the reduction in intangible replacement costs (Folkes et al. 1993), increases consumption desires (Chandon and Wansink 2002; Wansink 1996) and leads to perceptions of lower unit costs (Folkes et al. 1993). These effects can be accentuated for the IoT as the ease, convenience, and efficiency are salient (Chandon and Wansink 2002; Gehrt and Yale 1993; Reilly 1982) due to the more direct integration of the physical world and the consumer actions at the time of consumption into computer-based purchase systems. The increased salience of the ease and convenience further accentuates the impact of the IoT sales channel contributing to the demand increase as it provides seamless access to purchasing operations and hence products (e.g., (Chandon and Wansink 2002; Gehrt and Yale 1993; Reilly 1982)), creating a perception of a virtually endless supply according to the mental accounting theory (Chandon and Wansink 2002; Schary 1971; Wansink 1996; Wertenbroch 1998). Additionally, literature on mental accounting theory has demonstrated product demand effects for a variety of products (e.g., (Chandon and Wansink 2002; Folkes et al. 1993; Wansink 1996)). According to the mental accounting theory mechanism, such an increase in product demand due to lowering the purchase effort and increasing the purchase convenience would be higher for cheaper products as transaction costs are proportionally higher for low cost products and, hence, the reduction in total acquisition cost is larger for such products. This is also in accordance with the prospect theory and the Weber-Fechner law of psychophysics as consumer perceptions are more attuned to percentage rather than absolute changes and magnitudes and, hence, such effects are accentuated for cheaper products (Stigler 1965; Thaler 1980; Thaler 1985). This is also supported by behavioral research showing that both added shopping convenience and higher product stock availability at home increase consumption quantities more for cheaper products (Chandon and Wansink 2002) as well as that consumers regard time as more important than money particularly for low-cost products (Eggert and Ulaga 2002; Gupta and Kim 2010). The demand increase would also be higher for utilitarian goods as consumers have higher willingness to pay in time for hedonic products and consider more important the reduction of intangible transaction costs for utilitarian goods (Burke 2002; Okada 2005). Similarly, the demand effect

would also be higher for experience goods as consumers consider more important the reduction of intangible transaction costs, such as time, when shopping for experience goods (Burke 2002) and are willing to spend more time when shopping for search goods (Huang et al. 2009). This is also supported by the theories of Nelson (1970); Nelson (1974) as well as extant empirical research showing that consumers prioritize website and physical-store features that reduce the shopping time for experience goods rather than search ones (Burke 2002). In addition, the demand increase would be higher for more differentiated products as transaction costs are higher for such products (Dick and Basu 1994). Besides, such a reduction in transaction costs and an increase in time-efficiency and ease of use would be expected to have larger impact on existing users rather than new users (Avery et al. 2012; Chiu et al. 2009) as existing users desire convenience and are looking for more time-efficient ways to purchase (Alba and Hutchinson 1987; Avery et al. 2012). Moreover, in addition to lowering the purchase effort and increasing the purchase convenience, the IoT sales channel enhances the automaticity of the purchase process as purchases can now be conducted in a largely automated way and without much conscious control (Alba and Hutchinson 1987) due to the more direct integration of human actions and the physical world into computer-based purchase systems. This enhanced automaticity is the second mechanism as it can further increase consumers' switching costs to other alternative products by intensifying the mental processing costs of determining and evaluating a consideration set. Hence, shortening the traditional purchase funnel path coupled with reducing the consideration set information availability (Alba et al. 1997; Verhoef et al. 2007), the IoT sales channel can increase product demand for IoT eligible products. Such an increase in product demand due to automaticity would be higher for cheaper products as well as experience and differentiated goods for which consumers exhibit higher loyalty levels and switching costs are relatively higher (Bharadwaj et al. 1993; Dick and Basu 1994).

However, at the same time, the IoT channel can also reduce consumers' potential enjoyment and pleasure derived from the shopping process, compared to other traditional channels utilized by retailers. Hence, if consumers experience such a reduction in shopping pleasure, the transaction utility of consumer purchases might be reduced affecting, in turn, product demand. In addition, another difference of the IoT channel from other purchase channels is the higher risk and uncertainty the IoT channel entails for consumers. Even

though all the terms and conditions and policies regarding consumer purchases are the same across all shopping channels of the retailer, consumers face higher uncertainty through the IoT channel due to the lower information intensity as, for instance, they do not have direct access to recent product reviews, new product releases, etc. Hence, such uncertainty can affect the product purchase likelihoods accordingly and this will be reflected in consumers' current and future product demand, as previously discussed. Similarly, there are additional theoretical arguments why product sales could remain constant, as previously discussed. Therefore, the significance and directionality of the effect of the IoT channel on product sales remains an interesting empirical question, as discussed in Section 1.

### **3.3. Data Description**

Our dataset contains information across several markets (i.e., countries) for a period of over two years –from January 2015 until May 2017– for both all the products that became eligible for purchase via the IoT channel of the online retail marketplace (i.e., treated products) in some market and products that did not become available in this channel. In particular, our dataset includes information for all the IoT-eligible products in the markets of USA, United Kingdom, Germany, and France; at the time of conducting this study, the IoT channel was adopted for specific products in USA, United Kingdom, Germany, and France but not Canada or other markets (see Table 1). Our dataset also includes information about these products (i.e., products that were treated in at least one market at some time period) in the markets of USA, Canada, United Kingdom, Germany, and France even if they were not IoT eligible in the specific market (e.g., Canada), as they were available for purchase through the rest of the sales channels; our dataset includes information about these products for the complete observation window. Table 1 shows the number of distinct products that became available for purchase through the channel of IoT (i.e., IoT eligible) by each market (i.e., country) and calendar year; all the products that became IoT eligible were already available for purchase through the rest of the sales channel of 6,393 unique products that became available through the IoT purchase channel during 2016-2017 in four different markets where

the online marketplace operates.<sup>4</sup> The available products for purchase through the IoT channel correspond to a wide range of categories including grocery, personal care, household and office products, etc. The price of the products is the same across all the available selling channels of the platform and there is no additional cost to the consumers for utilizing the IoT infrastructure.

Market	2015	2016	2017	Total
Canada	0	0	0	0
Germany	0	671	164	835
France	0	0	522	522
United Kingdom	0	566	42	608
USA	0	3402	1165	4567
Distinct count:	0	4578	1887	6393

Table 1: IoT Eligible Products by Market and Year

Notes: The counts correspond to the number of distinct products that first became eligible for purchase via the IoT channel in the corresponding calendar year for each market. The information for 2017 corresponds to products that became eligible for purchase via the IoT channel until May 2017.

Moreover, our dataset is further complemented with information about additional similar products that were not eligible for purchase through the IoT channel (i.e., non-treated products) in any market but could be purchased through the rest of the purchase channels. That is, our dataset also includes the non-treated (substitute) products that belong to the same product category and consumers frequently view online when viewing one of the treated products in the same market (McAuley et al. 2015). Hence, our complete dataset contains information from several markets for both treated and non-treated control products for the complete observation window. This information for each product in each market includes the product rating, number of user-generated reviews, product price, brand of the product, product category, sales rank, seller of the product, etc. In summary, our dataset includes information from USA, Canada, United Kingdom, Germany, and France about i) treated products before and after the treatment, ii) non-treated products that were treated in other countries, and iii) non-treated products that are similar to treated products in the same market. Figure A3 in the appendix illustrates these different types of observations in our dataset. Our unique dataset enhances the identification of the causal effect of the IoT channel introduction as well as the implementation of several alternative identification strategies as robustness checks. More

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> The online marketplace also operates in the market of Canada but IoT technologies were not adopted yet in this market at the time of conducting this study.

specifically, our dataset enhances the identification strategies described in the following sections based on the variation in both the availability of the IoT devices across countries (i.e., the same product in different markets does not become IoT eligible at the same time, if at all) and the eligibility of the products (i.e., not all products become eligible at the same time, if at all) due to the experimental nature of the introduction of the IoT technology as a direct sales channel. For instance, a dishwasher detergent by 'Finish' brand became available in USA, United Kingdom, Germany, and France in different months of 2016, whereas a similar dishwasher detergent by 'Cascade' became available only in USA, and a similar dishwasher detergent by 'Method' did not become available for purchase through this channel in any market during our observation window.

Table 2 contains summary statistics that describe the main variables of our empirical model presented in Section 4. The data –apart from the IoT-eligibility information– comes from a marketing company in Germany affiliated with the online marketplace of Amazon.com. The information of whether, in which market, and what time period each product became eligible for purchase via the IoT channel was collected from the online marketplace according to the terms and conditions of the corresponding marketplace APIs. Furthermore, additional information comes from Alexa Internet, Inc. (see Section 5.2.5). Finally, as discussed in Section 5.3, we also complement our dataset with advertising data that comes from the ad intelligence company Kantar Media, data from the analytics company Comscore about sales of other retailers, and other additional sources as described in Section 5.

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics						
Variable	Ν	Mean	SD	Min	Max	
Sales rank (log)	13,680,370	9.59	2.08	0	16.07	
Treatment (IoT eligible)	13,680,370	0.04	0.19	0	1	
Rating	13,680,370	3.33	1.89	0	5	
Number of reviews (log)	13,680,370	3.04	2.39	0	9.95	
Price (log)	13,680,370	2.91	0.79	-4.60	9.87	
Fraction of solicited reviews	13,680,370	0.02	0.10	0	1	
Bank holiday	13,680,370	0.30	0.46	0	1	

**Table 2: Descriptive Statistics** 

## 4. Empirical Methodology

To formally characterize our econometric model, we model product sales before and after the products become eligible for the IoT sales channel, if they become eligible at all. We undertake several robustness specifications and alternative identification strategies in the following sections, but we first describe our primary identification strategy and econometric specification. Our primary identification scheme relies on panel data and a *difference-in-differences (DiD)* methodology to measure the causal effect of IoT. Our main estimating equation for product i in market (i.e., country) c and time period (i.e., day) t is:

$$log(s_{ict}) = \mathbf{a}_{ic} + Treatment_{ict}\beta^{T} + \mathbf{X}_{ict}\beta^{X} + \mathbf{Z}_{ict}\beta^{Z} + \tau_{t} + \varepsilon_{ict}$$

where  $s_{ict}$  is the sales rank of the product *i* in market *c* in time period *t* within the corresponding product category, and  $Treatment_{ict}$  is a binary variable indicating whether product *i* was treated in market *c* in time period t (i.e., if product i was available for purchase via the IoT channel at the corresponding market and time period). The coefficient of main interest,  $\beta^T$ , captures the effect of IoT on product sales. In our main specifications, we also control for observed time-varying covariates,  $X_{ict}$ , including the (log of the) daily product price, product rating, the (log of the) number of user-generated reviews for the product, and the fraction of solicited reviews for the product, as well as additional controls,  $Z_{ict}$ , such as the seller of the product and public holidays; log denotes the natural logarithm. We also include linear and non-linear (quadratic) time trends (Anagol and Kim 2012; Goldfarb et al. 2015),  $\tau_t$ , and product-market-level fixed effects,  $a_{ic}$ , controlling for observed and unobserved heterogeneity. Finally,  $\varepsilon_{ict}$  is an error term. We also examine several alternative econometric model specifications as well as alternative identification strategies and robustness checks, including a difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) methodology (Wooldridge 2010), as described in the following paragraphs; Table 3 presents a summary of the multiple employed identification strategies. Following the extant literature, sales rank for each product is used as a proxy for demand (e.g., (Archak et al. 2011; Brynjolfsson et al. 2003; Carmi et al. 2017; Chevalier and Goolsbee 2003; Ghose et al. 2006; Ghose and Sundararajan 2006; Gu et al. 2012)). The model estimation can be performed directly on sales ranks, and the marginal coefficients can be interpreted in terms of changes in sales ranks. The reason for the log specification rather than levels is that the log specification estimates the effect of a change in the independent variables on the percentage change in the dependent

variable. This is appropriate because, in our case, as in prior research, there are scale effects (e.g., (Adamopoulos and Tuzhilin 2015a; Archak et al. 2011; Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006; Kokkodis and Lappas 2020)).

The aforementioned identification strategy enables us to overcome several potential endogeneity challenges. Apart from employing panel data and the difference-in-differences methodology for causal inference while controlling for observed and unobserved heterogeneity at the product-market level as described in the previous paragraphs, our identification strategy is further enhanced based on the quasi-experiment induced by the randomness in both the availability of the IoT devices across countries (i.e., the same product in different markets does not become IoT eligible at the same time, if at all) and the randomness in the timing of the eligibility of the products for the IoT channel (i.e., not all products become eligible at the same time, if at all) due to the experimental nature of the introduction of the IoT technology. Beyond the utilized quasi-experiment and the panel structure of our dataset incorporating several sources of variation (see Section 3.2 and Figure A3), we also tap into similar (non-treated) control products. More specifically, we utilize as controls similar non-treated products as these products are perceived as similar and comparable choice alternatives by the consumers in accordance with the information processing theory of consumer search (Bettman 1970). Such controls are based on the products that belong to the same product category and consumers frequently view online when viewing one of the IoT-eligible products in the same market (McAuley et al. 2015) (see Section 5.1).

In addition, as part of our alternative identification strategies (see Table 3), we utilize as controls the same (IoT-eligible) products in different markets where they are not IoT eligible (e.g., Canada). That is, we extend the identification strategy from the difference-in-differences (DiD) framework to the *difference-in-differences (DDD)* framework and, instead of simply using similar products as controls, we also employ as controls exactly the same products (as the treated products) in different markets where they have not been treated (e.g., Canada); this further alleviates concerns regarding any potential differences among IoT-eligible and (non-IoT-eligible) control products (see Section 5.1.2). In particular, this enhanced identification strategy utilizes: the treated products before and after the treatment, these exact products in other markets where they have not been treated, and non-treated products (in the same market) that are

similar to treated products. Nevertheless, the validity of the employed identification strategies is further enhanced by several tests. For instance, we have confirmed the credibility of the standard common trends assumption using testing procedures based on a t-test (t=0.6437) (Callaway and Sant'Anna 2018) as well as group specific trends ( $\beta$ =.0000165, p-value=0.473) (Angrist and Pischke 2008) and also validated it based on additional graphical model-free evidence (see Figures A4 and A5 in the appendix). Finally, we conduct an extensive set of robustness checks, including additional alternative identification strategies, and multiple falsification tests to further enhance our empirical analyses (see Sections 5.3-5.4).

	Table 5. Employed Identification Strategies for Causar Interence				
Table	Section	Identification Strategy	Estimation Sample		
Table 4	Main Results (5.1.1)	DiD (with similar products)	Treated products before and after the treatment and similar non-treated products.		
Table 5	Main Results (5.1.2)	DDD	Treated products before and after the treatment, the same products in other markets, and non-treated similar products.		
Table 12	Robustness Checks (5.3.1)	DDD with PSM	Treated products before and after the treatment, the same products in other markets, and non-treated (matched) products with the same propensity for treatment.		
Table 13	Robustness Checks (5.3.1)	DiD (with the same products)	Treated products before and after the treatment and the same products in other markets.		

**Table 3: Employed Identification Strategies for Causal Inference** 

Notes: The products utilized as similar controls correspond to non-treated products that are similar to the treated products as they belong to the same product category, they are available in the same market, and consumers frequently also view them online when viewing one of the treated products. The same products utilized as controls correspond to products in markets where they are not treated but the exact products are treated in some other market. DiD stands for difference-in-differences, DDD for difference-in-differences, and PSM for propensity-score matching. Please see the corresponding sections for additional details.

# 5. Results

In the following section, we describe the main results of our study and discuss the impact of the introduction of the IoT channel on product sales. Then, in Section 5.1.2, we present the results of the DDD alternative identification strategy. In Section 5.2, we investigate various moderating effects examining the heterogeneity of the effect under study and conduct additional analyses that allow us to further understand the IoT demand effects and empirically validate the underlying mechanism. In addition, in Section 5.3, we assess the robustness of our findings by conducting an extensive set of tests and ruling out numerous alternative explanations based on various alternative specifications and identification strategies. Finally, in Section 5.4, we present multiple falsification tests to further validate our findings.

### 5.1. Main Results

### 5.1.1 Primary Identification Strategy (DiD)

In the following paragraphs, we discuss the estimation results of our empirical model examining the impact of the IoT channel on product sales. The estimation results presented in this section correspond to the first identification strategy utilizing both treated products –before and after the treatment– and non-treated that are similar to treated products in the same market as discussed in Sections 3.2 and 4. That is, our main identification strategy is based on the difference-in-differences framework (see Table 3); additional identification strategies are presented in the next section. In total, this identification strategy employs daily observations from January 2015 to May 2017 corresponding to 15,877 unique products in four different markets (i.e., Germany, France, United Kingdom, USA). Table 4 provides estimates of our main model specifications; the standard errors are clustered at the product-market level to ensure that the estimators are robust to cross-sectional heteroscedasticity and within-panel (serial) correlation (Arellano 1987). In particular, Model (1) examines the impact of IoT introduction on product sales while accounting for the product rating, (log of) the number of user-generated reviews, (log of) the price of the product and the product seller as well as product-market fixed effects and non-linear time trends. Then, Model (2) also controls for user-generated reviews solicited by the seller of the product and Model (3), in addition to the aforementioned variables, controls for holidays too in order to capture additional seasonality effects.

Based on the results presented in Table 4, we find that the coefficient of the variable capturing the IoT channel introduction is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that when a product is becoming eligible for IoT purchases, the product's sales increase (i.e., lower sales rank); all the models provide very good fit to the data. Apart from being statistically significant at the 0.1% level, this effect is also economically significant as the introduction of the IoT technology leads on average to an improvement of about 13.92% in sales ranking (i.e.,  $100 * (e^{-0.1499} - 1)$ ). Moreover, note that the coefficients of all the other variables are in accordance with what one would expect and in compliance with the extant literature. Specifically, the coefficient of price is positive and significant, implying that higher product prices increase the sales rank and, therefore, decrease product sales; if a product price is increased by 1%, the sales rank increases by about 0.64%. The product price in these model specifications is log-transformed because of

the wide range of product prices; the results are robust to using the price level or other transformations (e.g., see Section 5.3.4). The estimated coefficient is also in compliance with prior literature (e.g., (Chen et al. 2004; Oestreicher-Singer and Sundararajan 2012b)). Regarding the average product rating, consistent with Chevalier and Mayzlin (2006), we find a positive effect of the average review rating on the product sales. Specifically, if the average rating is increased by one unit (star) (i.e., an increase of about 30% for a product of average rating), the sales rank decreases by 3.28% (i.e.,  $100 * (e^{-0.0333} - 1)$ ). In Section 5.3, we conduct robustness checks allowing for a non-linear effect of product rating; the results are robust to accounting for non-linear product rating effects. Evaluating the rest of the variables in Table 4, we notice that the volume of reviews has a positive effect on product sales as well. In particular, if the number of reviews is increased by 1%, the sales rank improves by about 0.43%. This is consistent with classical models of risk aversion according to which given two similar products with similar average review ratings, consumers will prefer the product that was reviewed more (Archak et al. 2011). The magnitude of the estimated coefficient is also in compliance with prior literature (e.g., (Chen et al. 2004)). Interestingly, we also find that a larger fraction of solicited reviews has a negative impact on sales. If the proportion of solicited reviews is increased by 1%, the sales rank deteriorates by almost 0.75% (i.e., 0.01 \* 100 \* $(e^{0.5621} - 1)).$ 

Table 4. Estimation results of fixed-effect models - DiD					
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3		
Rating	-0.0323 ***	-0.0333 ***	-0.0333 ***		
Kaung	(0.0047)	(0.0047)	(0.0047)		
Number of reviews (loc)	-0.4237 ***	-0.4321 ***	-0.4328 ***		
Number of reviews (log)	(0.0109)	(0.0110)	(0.0110)		
$\mathbf{Price}(1,\mathbf{r})$	0.6394 ***	0.6381 ***	0.6381 ***		
Price (log)	(0.0260)	(0.0259)	(0.0259)		
Treatment (IoT eligible)	-0.1493 ***	-0.1492 ***	-0.1499 ***		
	(0.0070)	(0.0070)	(0.0070)		
		0.5610 ***	0.5621 ***		
Fraction of solicited reviews		(0.0818)	(0.0818)		
Constant	8.9969 ***	9.0141 ***	9.0141 ***		
Constant	(0.0810)	(0.0810)	(0.0810)		
Product-market fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Additional product controls	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Time trends	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Additional controls	No	No	Yes		
R-squared	0.2058	0.208	0 0.2081		

Table 4: Estimation results of fixed-effect models - DiD

# N. of observations 10,357,470 10,357,470 10,357,470 10,357,470 Notes: Panel data analysis with product-market fixed effects and (linear and non-linear) time trends. The estimation sample

Notes: Panel data analysis with product-market fixed effects and (linear and non-linear) time trends. The estimation sample includes observations about treated products before and after the treatment in the market they were treated and non-treated products (in the same market) that are similar to treated products as they belong to the same product category and consumers frequently also view them online when viewing one of the treated products. Negative coefficients correspond to increase in sales (i.e., lower sales rank). The number of reviews variable corresponds to the log of the number of user-generated reviews for each product and the price variable corresponds to the log of the product. The product controls include the brand of the product, the product category, and the seller of the product. The additional controls include controls for bank holidays. Robust standard errors are reported. Significance levels: \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01

Focusing on the emerging IoT technologies, our paper is the first to study the effect of the introduction of the IoT as an additional sales channel and demonstrate that such a technology adoption enhances the sales of products. While the extant literature that has examined the effect of the adoption of other sales channel has provided conflicting evidence, our paper reveals that the introduction of IoT in particular as an additional sales channel increases the product sales; the effect is statistically and economically significant and survives an extensive set of robustness and falsification tests (see Sections 5.3 and 5.4). These findings highlight the business value IoT technologies can have for retailers and brands while they offer timely implications for future research.

In addition to aforementioned findings, in Section 5.2, we delve into the heterogeneity of the effect of IoT channel and also conduct additional analyses that allow us to better understand this effect and empirically validate the underlying mechanism.

### 5.1.2 Additional Identification Strategy (DDD)

In this subsection, we further enhance our previous identification strategy by extending our analysis to include observations for (control) products that were not treated in the corresponding market but were treated in one of the other markets (i.e., countries). That is, we extend the identification strategy from the difference-in-differences framework to the difference-in-differences framework (see Table 3), as discussed in the empirical methodology section. As before, we also control for various time-varying confounders as well as observed and unobserved heterogeneity at the product-market level.

Table 5 shows the corresponding results for this additional identification strategy. As before, Model (1) examines the impact of IoT channel on the sales of the products while accounting for various time-varying and time-invariant variables. Then, Model (2) also controls for user-generated reviews solicited by the seller of the product and Model (3), in addition to the aforementioned variables, controls for holidays. The results

presented in Table 5 corroborate our previous findings (see Table 4) since they remain qualitatively and quantitatively the same. This additional identification strategy reveals that the introduction of the IoT technology as a sales channel leads to an improvement of about 13.28% in sales ranking; recall that the estimated effect based on the first identification strategy (difference-in-differences vs difference-in-differences) we employed in Section 5.1.1 was estimated to be 13.92%.

It is noteworthy that the magnitude of the coefficients of interest is almost the same across the different models and identification strategies demonstrating the robustness of the findings (see Tables 4 and 5).

Model 1     Model 2     Model 3					
Rating	-0.0236 ***	-0.0248 ***	-0.0248 ***		
Truting	(0.0041)	(0.0041)	(0.0040)		
Number of reviews (loc)	-0.4098 ***	-0.4171 ***	-0.4176 ***		
Number of reviews (log)	(0.0099)	(0.0100)	(0.0100)		
	0.5428 ***	0.5420 ***	0.5420 ***		
Price (log)	(0.0205)	(0.0205)	(0.0205)		
Treatment (IoT eligible)	-0.1428 ***	-0.1420 ***	-0.1425 ***		
	(0.0070)	(0.0070)	(0.0070)		
		0.5374 ***	0.5380 ***		
Fraction of solicited reviews		(0.0781)	(0.0782)		
	9.0895 ***	9.0989 ***	9.1008 ***		
Constant	(0.0647)	(0.0647)	(0.0647)		
Product-market fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Additional product controls	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Time trends	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Additional controls	No	No	Yes		
R-squared	0.2545	0.2563	0.2563		
N. of observations	13,680,370	13,680,370	13,680,370		

 Table 5: Estimation results of fixed-effect models - DDD

Notes: Panel data analysis with product-market fixed effects and (linear and non-linear) time trends. The estimation sample includes observations about treated products before and after the treatment in the market they were treated, these products in other markets where they have not been treated, and non-treated products (in the same market) that are similar to treated products as they belong to the same product category and consumers frequently also view them online when viewing one of the treated products. Negative coefficients correspond to increase in sales (i.e., lower sales rank). The number of reviews variable corresponds to the log of the number of user-generated reviews for each product and the price variable corresponds to the log of the product. The product controls include the brand of the product, the product category, and the seller of the product. The additional controls include controls for bank holidays. Robust standard errors are reported. Significance levels: \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

In addition to the identification strategies presented in Sections 5.1.1 and 5.1.2, we present additional

alternative identification strategies as robustness checks in Section 5.3.

### 5.2 Heterogeneity of IoT Effects

So far, the preceding analyses have demonstrated that the introduction of IoT as a sales channel leads to a significant improvement in product sales. Focusing on the emerging IoT technologies, our paper is the first to study the effect of the introduction of the IoT as a sales channel and demonstrate that such a technology affects consumers' behavior enhancing the sales of products. While the extant literature that has examined the effect of other sales channels has provided conflicting evidence, our paper extends the current literature making important contributions and yielding timely implications for future research as it is the first study to reveal that the IoT as a sales channel increases the product sales; the effect is statistically and economically significant and survives an extensive set of robustness and falsification tests. This contribution is also extended by informing future literature on the heterogeneity of the demand effect of IoT sales channel introduction. The heterogeneity of the effect of IoT has not been examined in prior literature, similarly to the main effect; certain dimensions of heterogeneity have not been examined in prior literature on other sales channels too. Importantly, the following heterogeneity effect analysis also bolsters the overall contribution of the paper as it further empirically verifies the main identified mechanism and enhances the generalizability of the results. Besides, apart from seeding new future research directions, these analyses and the corresponding findings also highlight the business value of the IoT technology for retailers and brands while they offer timely implications too. In order to leverage the Internet of Things as a sales channel, businesses and practitioners will need to develop sufficient knowledge to make such technology investments.

More specifically, in this section, we delve into the differences in the impact of the IoT channel introduction and conduct an in-depth analysis of the aforementioned effect of the IoT channel on sales growth providing greater insights into the effectiveness of IoT technologies and assessing the underlying mechanism. Such insights can help us better understand which products will accrue the highest benefits from the introduction of IoT. In particular, we examine the heterogeneity of the effect based on the product price (Section 5.2.1), product taxonomies (Sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3), degree of product substitutability / differentiation (Section 5.2.4), and new versus existing users (Section 5.2.5) as well as level of adoption from competitive products (Section 5.2.6).

### **5.2.1 Product Price**

We first examine the moderating effect of price on the effect of the introduction of the IoT channel on product sales. The products that became available for purchase via the IoT infrastructure cover a wide range of price points and, hence, it is important to examine whether more or less expensive products benefit the most from the IoT channel. Moreover, if less expensive products benefit more from IoT, then this would further confirm the identified mechanism, as described in detail in Section 3.1. Alternatively, if more expensive products benefit more, then this would nullify this identified mechanism. Table 6 examines this moderating effect of price on the effect of the introduction of the IoT channel on product sales. Based on these results, we find a positive and significant moderating effect of product price on the effectiveness of IoT technologies. This finding indicates that less expensive products can more effectively leverage the IoT channel; that is, not only alternatives that are less expensive are more appealing to the consumers but, ceteris paribus, they also can more effectively leverage the additional IoT infrastructure to accomplish efficient commercial transactions while reducing human intervention and largely automating purchase transactions. This finding is in accordance with the main identified mechanism based on the mental accounting theory (see Section 3.1) as transaction costs are proportionally higher for low cost products and, hence, would have a higher impact on cheaper products (Kahneman and Tversky 2013; Thaler 1985). Beyond the mental accounting theory and the prospect theory, this finding also finds support from the extant behavioral research showing that both added shopping convenience and higher product stock availability at home increase consumption quantities more for cheaper products (Chandon and Wansink 2002) as consumer regard time as more important for such products (Eggert and Ulaga 2002; Gupta and Kim 2010). Overall, this finding provides additional empirical support for the underlying mechanism and generates actionable insights for managers.

Table 6: Heterogeneity of IoT Effect – Product Price				
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	
Dating	-0.0236 ***	-0.0248 ***	-0.0248 ***	
Rating	(0.0041)	(0.0040)	(0.0040)	
Number of reviews (log)	-0.4096 ***	-0.4169 ***	-0.4174 ***	
	(0.0099)	(0.0100)	(0.0100)	
	0.5418 ***	0.5411 ***	0.5411 ***	
Price (log)	(0.0205)	(0.0205)	(0.0205)	
Treatment (IoT eligible)	-0.3069 ***	-0.3008 ***	-0.3030 ***	

	(0.0320)	(0.0320)	(0.0320)
Treastment (IoT aligible) y Drive (log)	0.0572 ***	0.0553 ***	0.0559 ***
Treatment (IoT eligible) x Price (log)	(0.0105)	(0.0105)	(0.0105)
Fraction of solicited reviews		0.5351 ***	0.5357 ***
Fraction of solicited reviews		(0.0781)	(0.0781)
Constant	9.0920 ***	9.1012 ***	9.1033 ***
Constant	(0.0647)	(0.0646)	(0.0646)
Product-market fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional product controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time trends	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional controls	No	No	Yes
R-squared	0.2545	0.2563	0.2563
N. of observations	13,680,370	13,680,370	13,680,370

Notes: Panel data analysis with product-market fixed effects and (linear and non-linear) time trends. The estimation sample includes observations about treated products before and after the treatment in the market they were treated, these products in other markets where they have not been treated, and non-treated products (in the same market) that are similar to treated products as they belong to the same product category and consumers frequently also view them online when viewing one of the treated products. Negative coefficients correspond to increase in sales (i.e., lower sales rank). The number of reviews variable corresponds to the log of the number of user-generated reviews for each product and the price variable corresponds to the log of the product controls include the brand of the product, the product category, and the seller of the product. The additional controls include controls for bank holidays. Robust standard errors are reported. Significance levels: \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

### 5.2.2 Search vs Experience Goods

Moreover, to gain a deeper understanding of the heterogeneity effect and further validate the underlying mechanism, we study whether the product classification of search and experience goods moderates the effectiveness of the demand effect of IoT channel. The experience versus search goods classification (Nelson 1970; Nelson 1974) provides important insights into how consumers' purchase behaviors differ for search and experience goods and, hence, one might expect that the IoT channel effectiveness on driving sales growth varies across search and experience goods. As discussed in Section 3.1, if experience goods benefit more from IoT, then this would also further confirm the identified mechanism. Alternatively, if primarily search goods benefit more, then this would nullify the identified mechanism. Table 7 examines this moderating effect of whether a product is more search or experience good (Nelson 1970).<sup>5</sup> Based on

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Since products involve a bundle of search and experience attributes, the literature suggests that search goods are products whose attributes most important to assessing product quality are generally discoverable prior to purchase whereas experience goods are products whose attributes most important to assessing product quality are mostly discoverable only after consuming or experiencing the products (Huang et al. 2009). The products were classified into search and experience goods from three independent research assistants based on 1 (=Purely Experience) to 7 (=Purely Search) Likert scale questions following the extant literature (Huang et al. 2009). We examined the degree of agreement among the three raters with the Krippendorff's Alpha coefficient and we find that there is a high average inter-rater reliability of 0.927.

these results, we find a positive and significant moderating effect of the search -versus experienceclassification on the effectiveness of the IoT channel. Specifically, the analysis suggests that the introduction of IoT technologies as a sales channel is more effective for experience goods. This interesting finding that experience goods, rather than search ones, are benefiting more from the introduction of the IoT channel further empirically verifies the main identified mechanism of increased purchase convenience and reduced purchase effort (see Section 3.1). This finding is also in accordance with prior literature showing that consumers consider more important such reduction of intangible transaction costs when shopping for experience goods (Burke 2002) and are respectively willing to spend more time when shopping for search goods (Huang et al. 2009). This is also supported by the theories of Nelson (1970); Nelson (1974) as well as extant empirical research showing that consumers prioritize website and physical-store features that reduce the shopping time for experience goods rather than search ones (Burke 2002). Besides, this finding is also in compliance with the literature on automaticity as extant research has demonstrated that experience goods typically have lower price elasticity than search goods (Nelson 1970) and consumers face higher switching costs when evaluating experience goods, rather than search ones (Huang et al. 2009), and, thus, they tend to be more loyal to experience goods (Bharadwaj et al. 1993; Dick and Basu 1994). Overall, this finding provides additional empirical support for the main identified mechanism and also unveils important managerial implications for online retailers with regards to how they can strategically leverage IoT technologies since experience goods have traditionally posed a major challenge for online retailers.

Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
0.0236 ***		
-0.0230	-0.0248 ***	-0.0248 ***
(0.0041)	(0.0041)	(0.0040)
-0.4096 ***	-0.4169 ***	-0.4174 ***
(0.0099)	(0.0101)	(0.0101)
0.5428 ***	0.5421 ***	0.5420 ***
(0.0205)	(0.0205)	(0.0205)
-0.1501 ***	-0.1494 ***	-0.1498 ***
(0.0074)	(0.0074)	(0.0074)
0.0740 ***	0.0747 ***	0.0740 ***
	$\begin{array}{c} (0.0230 \\ (0.0041) \\ -0.4096 \\ *** \\ (0.0099) \\ 0.5428 \\ *** \\ (0.0205) \\ -0.1501 \\ *** \\ (0.0074) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{ccccccc} (0.0041) & (0.0041) \\ -0.4096 & *** & -0.4169 & *** \\ (0.0099) & (0.0101) \\ 0.5428 & *** & 0.5421 & *** \\ (0.0205) & (0.0205) \\ -0.1501 & *** & -0.1494 & *** \\ (0.0074) & (0.0074) \end{array}$

Table 7: Heterogeneity of IoT Effect – Search Goods

The average score of the search products was 5.85. The empirical results remain robust to classifying as search (experience) only products that were rated very high (low) (i.e., an average of six or higher (two or lower) instead of above (below) four, which is the median of the scale) in the corresponding scale.

	(0.0221)	(0.0221)	(0.0221)
Erection of colicited reviews		0.5376 ***	0.5383 ***
Fraction of solicited reviews		(0.0781)	(0.0781)
Constant	9.0891 ***	9.0985 ***	9.1005 ***
Constant	(0.0647)	(0.0647)	(0.0647)
Product-market fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional product controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time trends	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional controls	No	No	Yes
R-squared	0.2545	0.2563	0.2563
N. of observations	13,680,370	13,680,370	13,680,370

Notes: Panel data analysis with product-market fixed effects and (linear and non-linear) time trends. The estimation sample includes observations about treated products before and after the treatment in the market they were treated, these products in other markets where they have not been treated, and non-treated products (in the same market) that are similar to treated products as they belong to the same product category and consumers frequently also view them online when viewing one of the treated products. Negative coefficients correspond to increase in sales (i.e., lower sales rank). The number of reviews variable corresponds to the log of the number of user-generated reviews for each product and the price variable corresponds to the log of the product. The product controls include the brand of the product, the product category, and the seller of the product. The additional controls include controls for bank holidays. Robust standard errors are reported. Significance levels: \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

### **5.2.3 Utilitarian vs Hedonic Goods**

Beyond the search versus experience product classification, we extend the heterogeneity analysis of the demand effect of IoT channel by looking into whether utilitarian or hedonic goods are more likely to benefit more from the introduction of such IoT technologies (Dhar and Wertenbroch 2000; Hirschman and Holbrook 1982).<sup>6</sup> This heterogeneity analysis can further help us empirically verify the identified mechanism. In particular, as discussed in Section 3.1, if utilitarian goods benefit more from IoT, then this would further confirm the identified mechanism. Alternatively, if primarily hedonic goods benefit more, then this would nullify the identified mechanism. Table 8 examines the moderating effect of whether a product is more utilitarian -versus hedonic- classification on the effectiveness of the IoT channel. In particular, the analysis suggests that the introduction of IoT technologies as a sales channel is more

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Utilitarian goods are dominantly purchased for their practical uses and are based on the consumers' needs whereas hedonic goods primarily allow the consumer to feel pleasure, fun, and enjoyment from buying the product (Hirschman and Holbrook 1982; Wertenbroch et al. 2005). The products were classified into hedonic and utilitarian goods following the extant literature as described before (Dhar and Wertenbroch 2000). We examined the degree of agreement among the three raters with the Krippendorff's Alpha coefficient and we find that there is a high average inter-rater reliability of 0.941. The average score of the utilitarian products was 5.35. The empirical results remain robust to classifying as utilitarian (hedonic) only products that were rated very high (low) in the corresponding scale.

effective for utilitarian goods; that is, the IoT channel is effective for both hedonic and utilitarian goods with utilitarian products benefiting the most from IoT technologies. Hence, this finding too further supports the main identified mechanism (see Section 3.1) and is also in accordance with the prior literature showing that consumer purchases of utilitarian goods are significantly influenced by convenience and efficiency (Morganosky and Cude 2000; To et al. 2007) as consumers have higher willingness to pay in time for hedonic products and consider more important the reduction of intangible transaction costs for utilitarian goods (Burke 2002; Okada 2005). This finding has also managerial significance as it demonstrates in practice the business value of the increased convenience, time efficiency, and closer connection of consumption and purchase phases IoT technologies offer in retail.

Table 8: Heterogeneity of IoT Effect – Utilitarian Goods				
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	
Dating	-0.0236 ***	-0.0248 ***	-0.0248 ***	
Rating	(0.0041)	(0.0041)	(0.0040)	
Number of reviews (log)	-0.4098 ***	-0.4171 ***	-0.4176 ***	
Number of reviews (log)	(0.0099)	(0.0100)	(0.0100)	
Drice (log)	0.5428 ***	0.5421 ***	0.5420 ***	
Price (log)	(0.0205)	(0.0205)	(0.0205)	
Trastment (IoT aligible)	-0.1160 ***	-0.1142 ***	-0.1152 ***	
Treatment (IoT eligible)	(0.0151)	(0.0151)	(0.0151)	
Trastment (IoT aligible) & Utilitation good	-0.0429 *	-0.0445 *	-0.0437 *	
Treatment (IoT eligible) x Utilitarian good	(0.0212)	(0.0212)	(0.0212)	
Fraction of solicited reviews		0.5378 ***	0.5384 ***	
Fraction of solicited reviews		(0.0781)	(0.0781)	
Constant	9.0895 ***	9.0989 ***	9.1009 ***	
Collstant	(0.0647)	(0.0647)	(0.0647)	
Product-market fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Additional product controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Time trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Additional controls	No	No	Yes	
R-squared	0.2545	0.2562	0.2563	
N. of observations	13,680,370	13,680,370	13,680,370	

Table 8: Heterogeneity of IoT Effect – Utilitarian Goods

Notes: Panel data analysis with product-market fixed effects and (linear and non-linear) time trends. The estimation sample includes observations about treated products before and after the treatment in the market they were treated, these products in other markets where they have not been treated, and non-treated products (in the same market) that are similar to treated products as they belong to the same product category and consumers frequently also view them online when viewing one of the treated products. Negative coefficients correspond to increase in sales (i.e., lower sales rank). The number of reviews variable corresponds to the log of the number of user-generated reviews for each product and the price variable corresponds to the log of the price for each product. The product controls include the brand of the product, the product category, and the seller of the product. The additional controls include controls for bank holidays. Robust standard errors are reported. Significance levels: \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

### 5.2.4 Product Substitutability

In addition, we examine the heterogeneity of the effect of IoT across the level of substitutability (or differentiation) of products. We measure the level of substitutability for each product in each market and time period using a substitutability (differentiation) metric measuring how similar (different) is each product from the rest of available products in the same category, market, and time period based on a textual analysis of the available product information and description (Hoberg and Phillips 2016). For the textual analysis, we utilize the 'Paragraph Vector' approach of Le and Mikolov (2014) that employs a neural network to derive a latent representation for each document and then measure the average pairwise document similarity based on the Euclidean distance; here, each product corresponds to a document in our corpus.<sup>7</sup> Intuitively, the textual description is used to assign each product a spatial location based on the product descriptions generating a Hotelling-like product location space for all available products (Hoberg and Phillips 2016). As discussed in Section 3.1, if more differentiated goods benefit more from IoT, then this would further confirm the identified mechanism. Alternatively, if primarily less differentiated goods benefit more, then this would nullify the identified mechanism. Table 9 presents the corresponding results examining the moderating effect of the level of substitutability (differentiation) of a product on the effectiveness of the IoT channel. Based on the results, we do find a positive and significant effect. That is, substitutable products benefit less from the introduction of the IoT channel whereas more differentiated products benefit more from the IoT channel. This result is also motivated by the extant literature as consumers exhibit higher loyalty levels and switching costs for more differentiated goods (Dick and Basu

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> The employed method for latent space representations and its variants have been thoroughly evaluated in (Le and Mikolov 2014; Mikolov et al. 2013a; Mikolov et al. 2013b) and outperform several other deeplearning methods and architectures including deep convolutional (Collobert and Weston 2008) and recurrent neural networks (Mikolov et al. 2013a; Mikolov et al. 2013c). Note that this method is general and applicable to texts of any length (e.g., phrases, sentences, paragraphs, documents, etc.) and does not require task-specific tuning, nor does it rely on additional methods such as parse trees (Le and Mikolov 2014). In addition, compared to traditional bag-of-words models (e.g., TF-IDF) that only work in terms of discrete units without meaning that have no inherent relationship to one another (Mikolov et al. 2013c), the employed method does not suffer from data sparsity and high dimensionality (Joulin et al. 2016; Le and Mikolov 2014).

1994) and further validates the main identified mechanism as transaction costs are more prominent for such products.

Table 9: Heterogeneity of IoT Effect – Substitutability				
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	
Datina	-0.0233 ***	-0.0245 ***	-0.0245 ***	
Rating	(0.0041)	(0.0041)	(0.0040)	
Normalismon formation (1 )	-0.4118 ***	-0.4192 ***	-0.4196 ***	
Number of reviews (log)	(0.0100)	(0.0101)	(0.0101)	
$\mathbf{D}$	0.5430 ***	0.5422 ***	0.5422 ***	
Price (log)	(0.0206)	(0.0206)	(0.0206)	
$\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{T}}$	-0.2201 ***	-0.2185 ***	-0.2198 ***	
Treatment (IoT eligible)	(0.0228)	(0.0228)	(0.0228)	
	0.1390 ***	0.1375 ***	0.1389 ***	
Treatment (IoT eligible) x Substitutability	(0.0391)	(0.0391)	(0.0391)	
		0.5407 ***	0.5413 ***	
Fraction of solicited reviews		(0.0784)	(0.0784)	
Constant	9.0941 ***	9.1036 ***	9.1055 ***	
Constant	(0.0650)	(0.0650)	(0.0650)	
Product-market fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Additional product controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Time trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Additional controls	No	No	Yes	
R-squared	0.2600	0.2618	0.2619	
N. of observations	13,534,515	13,534,515	13,534,515	

Notes: Panel data analysis with product-market fixed effects and (linear and non-linear) time trends. The estimation sample includes observations about treated products before and after the treatment in the market they were treated, these products in other markets where they have not been treated, and non-treated products (in the same market) that are similar to treated products as they belong to the same product category and consumers frequently also view them online when viewing one of the treated products. Negative coefficients correspond to increase in sales (i.e., lower sales rank). The number of reviews variable corresponds to the log of the number of user-generated reviews for each product and the price variable corresponds to the log of the price for each product. The product controls include the brand of the product, the product category, and the seller of the product. The additional controls include controls for bank holidays. Robust standard errors are reported. Significance levels: \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

# 5.2.5 New vs Existing Customers

We further extend the analysis of the effect of IoT technologies on demand by examining whether the number of new users in the marketplace drives the effect of the IoT sales channel.<sup>8</sup> Table 10 presents the corresponding results examining the moderating effect of the number of new users in the marketplace site. Based on the results, we do not find a significant effect for new users. That is, the increase in demand for treated products is not simply due to new users joining the marketplace. This is an interesting finding as it

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> The additional information of the number of new users in the marketplace site and the percentage of all Internet users who visit the site used in these specifications are from Alexa Internet, Inc.

suggests that the increased demand levels of treated products are mainly due to the existing users in the marketplace and not due to new online consumers or users joining the marketplace abandoning competitive websites. Notably, this finding is also in accordance with the main identified mechanism of increased purchase convenience and reduced purchase effort due to the more direct integration of human actions and the physical world into computer-based purchase systems as prior literature has illustrated that existing users desire convenience and are looking for more time-efficient ways to purchase products compared to new users (Alba and Hutchinson 1987; Avery et al. 2012).

Table 10. Heterogeneity of 101 Effect – New Marketplace Users				
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	
Doting	-0.0232 ***	-0.0243 ***	-0.0243 ***	
Rating	(0.0041)	(0.0041)	(0.0041)	
Number of reviews (log)	-0.4066 ***	-0.4139 ***	-0.4144 ***	
Number of reviews (log)	(0.0102)	(0.0104)	(0.0104)	
Drigg (log)	0.5406 ***	0.5399 ***	0.5399 ***	
Price (log)	(0.0205)	(0.0205)	(0.0205)	
Treatment (IoT aligible)	-0.1386 ***	-0.1379 ***	-0.1384 ***	
Treatment (IoT eligible)	(0.0069)	(0.0069)	(0.0069)	
New users	-0.0004 ***	-0.0004 ***	-0.0008 ***	
Ivew users	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	
Tratmont (IoT aligible) y New years	0.0002	0.0002	0.0004	
Treatment (IoT eligible) x New users	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	
Fraction of solicited reviews		0.5371 ***	0.5378 ***	
Fraction of solicited leviews		(0.0798)	(0.0798)	
Constant	9.0835 ***	9.0926 ***	9.0950 ***	
Constant	(0.0650)	(0.0650)	(0.0650)	
Product-market fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Additional product controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Time trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Additional controls	No	No	Yes	
R-squared	0.2548	0.2565	0.2566	
N. of observations	13,542,038	13,542,038	13,542,038	

Table 10: Heterogeneity of IoT Effect – New Marketplace Users

Notes: Panel data analysis with product-market fixed effects and (linear and non-linear) time trends. The estimation sample includes observations about treated products before and after the treatment in the market they were treated, these products in other markets where they have not been treated, and non-treated products (in the same market) that are similar to treated products as they belong to the same product category and consumers frequently also view them online when viewing one of the treated products. Negative coefficients correspond to increase in sales (i.e., lower sales rank). The number of reviews variable corresponds to the log of the number of user-generated reviews for each product, the price variable corresponds to the log of the number of new users corresponds to the increase in the percentage of all Internet users who visit the marketplace site in the corresponding market during the last seven time periods. The product controls include the brand of the product, the product category, and the seller of the product. The additional controls include controls for bank holidays. Robust standard errors are reported. Significance levels: \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

### **5.2.6 Adoption from Competitive Products**

Finally, to fully understand the observed IoT effect, we also examine the effect of the number of treated products on demand levels for competitive treated and control products. Table 11 presents the corresponding results. Based on the results, we find that an increase in the number of treated products (only slightly) decreases the demand of competitive -treated and control- products; the results remain the same also after repeating the analysis on the subsample of control products. However, the estimated coefficient is not statistically significant. Hence, the economic impact to competitive products might not be economically significant. Taking into consideration also the aforementioned findings, this result is particularly important as it demonstrates that the increase in demand for treated products is not simply due to new users in the marketplace or a decrease in demand of competitive products, further suggesting that it is predominantly driven by an increase in demand from existing customers in the marketplace. This finding too is in accordance with the main identified mechanism and the postulated demand effects (see Section 3.1) and separates even more clearly the main mechanism from the additional mechanism of enhanced automaticity as the IoT sales channel does not have economically significant negative impact on competitive products but enhances the demand for IoT eligible products.<sup>9</sup>

Table 11. Analysis of Effect – Number of Treated Competitive Troducts				
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	
Rating	-0.0231 ***	-0.0243 ***	-0.0243 ***	
	(0.0042)	(0.0042)	(0.0042)	
Number of reviews (log)	-0.4224 ***	-0.4313 ***	-0.4317 ***	
	(0.0103)	(0.0104)	(0.0104)	
Price (log)	0.5566 ***	0.5557 ***	0.5557 ***	
	(0.0214)	(0.0214)	(0.0214)	
Treatment (IoT eligible)	-0.1516 ***	-0.1568 ***	-0.1597 ***	
	(0.0353)	(0.0353)	(0.0353)	
Treated Competitive Products (log)	-0.0013	-0.0005	-0.0005	
	(0.0016)	(0.0016)	(0.0016)	
Treatment (IoT eligible) x Treated	0.0020	0.0029	0.0033	
Competitive Products (log)	(0.0060)	(0.0060)	(0.0060)	

Table 11: Analysis of Effect – Number of Treated Competitive Produc
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<sup>9</sup> Beyond validating the identified mechanism based on econometric analysis, we also examined qualitative data. The identified mechanism finds further support also in the comments of consumers frequently using in their reviews phrases such as "in-home convenience", "super convenience", "ease of purchasing", "so simple", "easy", "value time", "don't have to think at all", "automatically", etc. to describe their experience with the IoT devices. The underlying mechanism is also confirmed after the analyses based on conversations with consumers (Adamopoulos 2013b).

Fraction of solicited reviews		0.5809 ***	0.5815 ***
Fraction of solicited reviews		(0.0784)	(0.0784)
Constant	9.0448 ***	9.0569 ***	9.0589 ***
Constant	(0.0676)	(0.0675)	(0.0675)
Product-market fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional product controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time trends	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional controls	No	No	Yes
R-squared	0.2600	0.2624	0.2625
N. of observations	13,041,502	13,041,502	13,041,502

Notes: Panel data analysis with product-market fixed effects and (linear and non-linear) time trends. The estimation sample includes observations about treated products before and after the treatment in the market they were treated, these products in other markets where they have not been treated, and non-treated products (in the same market) that are similar to treated products as they belong to the same product category and consumers frequently also view them online when viewing one of the treated products. Negative coefficients correspond to increase in sales (i.e., lower sales rank). The number of reviews variable corresponds to the log of the number of user-generated reviews for each product, the price variable corresponds to the log of the price for each product, and the number of treated competitive products corresponds to the number of products that are treated (IoT eligible) by this time period and belong to the same product category. The product controls include the brand of the product, the product category, and the seller of the product. The additional controls include controls for bank holidays. Robust standard errors are reported. Significance levels: \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

### 5.3 Robustness Checks

In this section, we undertake an extensive set of tests to assess the robustness of the results and further strengthen our findings by ruling out competing explanations. The conducted robustness checks include additional alternative identification strategies (Section 5.3.1), alternative explanations and mechanisms (Section 5.3.2), alternative econometric model specifications (Section 5.3.3), and various other checks (Section 5.3.4) as discussed in the following paragraphs. These extensive robustness checks are further supplemented with multiple additional falsification tests presented in Section 5.4.

### **5.3.1 Alternative Identification Strategies**

First, we examine additional identification strategies in order to control for any potentially remaining differences between the treated and non-treated products. In particular, in addition to the difference-in-differences and difference-in-differences identification strategies employed so far (see Sections 5.1.1 and 5.1.2, respectively) and even though there are no significant differences between the treated and control products in our dataset, we also combine propensity-score matching with the difference-in-difference-in-difference-in-differences identification strategy to further account for any remaining differences between treated and control products. For this robustness check, we use one-to-one matching with replacement and a caliper of 0.01 yielding an absolute standardized mean difference of 0.0312 across all the variables (the absolute standardized median is 0.0167), which ensures us that covariate balance has been successfully

achieved as the absolute standardized mean difference is well below the strict criterion for identifying adequate covariance balance of 0.1 (Austin 2011). Additionally, we have also examined density distributions of the propensity scores for both treated and control groups ensuring there is significant overlap and common support. As before, in all our econometric specifications, we also control for various time-varying confounders as well as observed and unobserved heterogeneity at the product-market level by employing product-market-level fixed effects in our model specifications; please see the notes of Table 12 for additional details. Table 12 presents the corresponding results. The results remain highly robust further corroborating the aforementioned findings.

Table 12: Estimation results of fixed-effect models over matched sample – DDD with PSM				
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	
Rating	-0.0199 ***	-0.0213 ***	-0.0211 ***	
	(0.0049)	(0.0049)	(0.0049)	
Number of reviews (log)	-0.3693 ***	-0.3760 ***	-0.3768 ***	
	(0.0121)	(0.0121)	(0.0122)	
Price (log)	0.5349 ***	0.5348 ***	0.5348 ***	
	(0.0200)	(0.0200)	(0.0200)	
Treatment (IoT eligible)	-0.1212 ***	-0.1207 ***	-0.1214 ***	
	(0.0063)	(0.0063)	(0.0063)	
Fraction of solicited reviews		0.5141 ***	0.5154 ***	
		(0.0898)	(0.0899)	
Constant	9.2677 ***	9.2720 ***	9.2674 ***	
	(0.0671)	(0.0671)	(0.0671)	
Product-market fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Additional product controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Time trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Additional controls	No	No	Yes	
R-squared	0.2560	) 0.2577	0.2578	
N. of observations	10,985,758	10,985,758	10,985,758	

Notes: Panel data analysis with product-market fixed effects and (linear and non-linear) time trends. The estimation sample includes observations about treated products before and after the treatment in the market they were treated, these products in other markets where they have not been treated, and non-treated products (in the same market) that are similar to treated products as they belong to the same product category and consumers frequently also view them online when viewing one of the treated products and have the same propensity to be treated. The propensity-score matching was conducted based on the propensity scores utilizing the available observable characteristics of the products in our specifications: rating, number of reviews, price, fraction of solicited reviews, product category, market, and the seller of the product. Negative coefficients correspond to increase in sales (i.e., lower sales rank). The number of reviews variable corresponds to the log of the number of user-generated reviews for each product and the price variable corresponds to the log of the product. The product controls include the brand of the product, the product category, and the seller of the product. The additional controls include controls for bank holidays. Robust standard errors are reported. Significance levels: \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

As an additional robustness check, we further extend the above propensity score model by allowing higher-

order terms of the covariates, interaction terms, and lag sales rank -in addition to the rest of covariates- to

determine the propensity for treatment; this PSM approach yields an absolute standardized mean difference

of 0.0378 (the absolute standardized median is 0.0345). Table A1 in the appendix presents the corresponding results. The results remain highly robust. Similarly, the results are also robust to using nearest neighbor matching with the generalized Mahalanobis distance; this matching approach yields an absolute standardized mean difference of 0.0036 ensuring again that covariate balance has been successfully achieved (the absolute standardized median is 0.0028). The results are also robust to several additional specifications, including considering in the matching process also the time since each product was released.

In addition, to the difference-in-differences, difference-in-difference-in-differences, and PSM identification strategies discussed so far, we also employ an additional alternative identification strategy where, instead of using similar products as controls, we utilize as controls only the exact same products (as the IoT-eligible products) in different markets where they have not become IoT eligible during our observation window; this completely eliminates any potential differences among treated and non-treated control products since all the control products are treated in other markets. In particular, this enhanced identification strategy utilizes the treated products before and after the treatment and these exact products in other markets during the same time period (see Table 3). Table 13 presents the corresponding results based on this additional alternative identification strategy. The results remain highly robust further corroborating our findings.

Table 13: Estimation resu	lts of fixed-effect models	– DiD with identica	l products
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Dating	-0.0027	-0.0005	-0.0005
Rating	(0.0057)	(0.0057)	(0.0057)
Number of mariana (log)	-0.4418 ***	-0.4601 ***	-0.4603 ***
Number of reviews (log)	(0.0141)	(0.0142)	(0.0142)
$\mathbf{Drive}(1,\mathbf{z})$	0.5753 ***	0.5736 ***	0.5736 ***
Price (log)	(0.0319)	(0.0319)	(0.0319)
	-0.1014 ***	-0.0981 ***	-0.0985 ***
Treatment (IoT eligible)	(0.0064)	(0.0064)	(0.0064)
Exection of colligited marianes		0.8511 ***	0.8514 ***
Fraction of solicited reviews		(0.0900)	(0.0900)
Constant	8.8151 ***	8.8393 ***	8.8403 ***
Constant	(0.1013)	(0.1011)	(0.1011)
Product-market fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional product controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time trends	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional controls	No	No	Yes
R-squared	0.2540	0.2564	0.2565

Table 13: Estimation results of fixed-effect models – DiD with identical products

N. of observations	7,749,984	7,749,984	7,749,984
Notes: Panel data analysis with product-market fixed ef	fects and (linear and non-li	near) time trends. The	estimation sample
includes observations about treated products before and at	fter the treatment in the mar	ket they were treated and	l these products in
other markets where they have not been treated. Negative	coefficients correspond to ir	ncrease in sales (i.e., low	er sales rank). The
number of reviews variable corresponds to the log of the nu	umber of user-generated revi	ews for each product and	l the price variable
corresponds to the log of the price for each product. The p		<b>1</b> /	1 0 0
and the seller of the product. The additional controls inc	lude controls for bank holic	days. Robust standard er	rrors are reported.
Significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001			

These robustness checks are further supplemented with several additional checks discussed in the next paragraphs. For instance, even though we have used propensity-score matching in combination with DDD and the same products in other markets as controls, we also replicate the analysis focusing only on a single market, as discussed in Section 5.3.4. Similarly, as discussed in Section 5.3.4, the results are also robust to using observations only from markets that have been established in the literature to be similar in cultural aspects.

# 5.3.2 Ruling Out Additional Alternative Explanations

Furthermore, in addition to employing the aforementioned identification strategies, we conduct various robustness checks to assess alternative explanations and confounders including price and marketing promotions (see Section 5.3.2.1), WOM and novelty effects (see Sections 5.3.2.2 and 5.3.2.3, respectively), other retailers (see Section 5.3.2.4) as well as potentially non-random IoT introduction (see Section 5.3.2.5).

# 5.3.2.1 Price and Marketing Promotion Effects

One might be concerned the results might be driven by price promotions or other advertising effects. We evaluate this possibility by capturing the effect of available product price promotions (see Table 14) as well as advertising expenditures in online and offline media (see Table 15). In particular, we first control for the effect of any price-related marketing promotional activities (e.g., electronic coupons, offers, etc. (Adamopoulos and Todri 2014; Adamopoulos and Todri 2015a)) by explicitly controlling for the level of available price discounts, if any. Table 14 presents the results of this robustness check. Based on the results, our findings remain highly robust alleviating any concerns that the estimated IoT effect is driven by price-related marketing promotion activities. We should also note that the results are also robust to alternative specifications that capture price discounts. For instance, we estimate the percentage of price discounts relative to the regular product price and we find that our results remain, again, highly robust.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Detine	-0.0236 ***	-0.0248 ***	-0.0248 ***
Rating	(0.0041)	(0.0040)	(0.0040)
Number of mariana (100)	-0.4071 ***	-0.4143 ***	-0.4147 ***
Number of reviews (log)	(0.0099)	(0.0100)	(0.0100)
$\mathbf{Drive}(1,\mathbf{z})$	0.5207 ***	0.5202 ***	0. 5202 ***
Price (log)	(0.0206)	(0.0206)	(0.0206)
Treatment (IoT ali aible)	-0.1451 ***	-0.1443 ***	-0.1448 ***
Treatment (IoT eligible)	(0.0070)	(0.0070)	(0.0070)
		0.5258 ***	0.5264 ***
Fraction of solicited reviews		(0.0780)	(0.0780)
Drive discount (les)	-0.0359 ***	-0.0354 ***	-0.0354 ***
Price discount (log)	(0.0031)	(0.0031)	(0.0031)
Constant	9.1476 ***	9.1561 ***	9.1579 ***
Constant	(0.0647)	(0.0647)	(0.0646)
Product-market fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional product controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time trends	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional controls	No	No	Yes
R-squared	0.257	0.2586	0.2587
N. of observations	13,680,37	13,680,370	13,680,370

Table 14: Estimation results of fixed-effect models with pr	rice promotions
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Notes: Panel data analysis with product-market fixed effects and (linear and non-linear) time trends. The estimation sample includes observations about treated products before and after the treatment in the market they were treated, these products in other markets where they have not been treated, and non-treated products (in the same market) that are similar to treated products as they belong to the same product category and consumers frequently also view them online when viewing one of the treated products. Negative coefficients correspond to increase in sales (i.e., lower sales rank). The number of reviews variable corresponds to the log of the number of user-generated reviews for each product and the price variable corresponds to the log of the price for each product. The product controls include the brand of the product, the product category, the seller of the product and the level of product price discounts. The additional controls include controls for bank holidays. Robust standard errors are reported. Significance levels: \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

Moreover, another potential alternative explanation might be that the results are driven by online or offline promotional marketing campaigns that are not reflected in the price of the product (Ghose et al. 2017; Ghose and Todri-Adamopoulos 2016; Todri et al. 2020). In order to capture any marketing promotion activities and empirically evaluate this alternative explanation, we further supplement our dataset with additional information regarding marketing expenditures. More specifically, we have combined our dataset with a proprietary data set from the ad intelligence company Kantar Media. This extended data set includes the advertising expenditures (in dollar amounts) in the United States at the brand-week level during our observation period (i.e., 2015-2017). Table 15 presents the results of the robustness check that explicitly controls for both the offline and online advertising expenditures of the product brands; online advertising in the marketplace is captured by a separate variable. Based on the results, all the findings remain highly robust (see Table 15). The advertising expenditures capture a small portion of the previously identified IoT

effect as the estimated effect slightly decreased to -0.1353 (Model 3) and the fit of our model specifications is further increased; however, as we see the IoT effect is not driven by just the promotional marketing campaigns.

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Table 15: Estimation results of fixed-effect models with advertising expenditures					
	Model 1	Mo	odel 2	]	Model 3
Datina	-0.0294	***	-0.0303 *	***	-0.0303 ***
Rating	(0.0050)		(0.0050)		(0.0050)
North and formed and (10 a)	-0.4557	***	-0.4627 *	***	-0.4636 ***
Number of reviews (log)	(0.0117)		(0.0119)		(0.0119)
	0.6040	***	0.6027 *	***	0.6027 ***
Price (log)	(0.0264)		(0.0263)		(0.0263)
Treatment (IoT aligible)	-0.1374	***	-0.1363 *	***	-0.1353 ***
Treatment (IoT eligible)	(0.0083)		(0.0083)		(0.0083)
Fraction of solicited reviews			0.5784 *	***	0.5796 ***
Fraction of solicited reviews			(0.0964)		(0.0964)
	-0.0050	***	-0.0050 *	***	-0.0049 ***
Online Advertising (log 1000s)	(0.0007)		(0.0007)		(0.0007)
Offling Advertising (log 1000s)	-0.0020	***	-0.0020 *	***	-0.0020 ***
Offline Advertising (log 1000s)	(0.0006)		(0.0006)		(0.0006)
In-Marketplace Advertising (log	-0.0031		-0.0033		-0.0034
1000s)	(0.0018)		(0.0018)		(0.0018)
Constant	9.3961	***	9.4074 *	***	9.4108 ***
Constant	(0.0846)		(0.0845)		(0.0845)
Product-market fixed effects	Yes		Yes		Yes
Additional product controls	Yes		Yes		Yes
Time trends	Yes		Yes		Yes
Additional controls	No		No		Yes
R-squared	0.2	967	0.	2997	0.3001
N. of observations	9,034,	774	9,034	4,774	9,034,774

Notes: Panel data analysis with product-market fixed effects and (linear and non-linear) time trends. The estimation sample includes observations about treated products before and after the treatment in the market they were treated, these products in other markets where they have not been treated, and non-treated products (in the same market) that are similar to treated products as they belong to the same product category and consumers frequently also view them online when viewing one of the treated products. Negative coefficients correspond to increase in sales (i.e., lower sales rank). The number of reviews variable corresponds to the log of the number of user-generated reviews for each product and the price variable corresponds to the log of the product controls include the brand of the product, the product category, the seller of the product, the log of online brand advertising expenditures in USD (in 1000s), the log of brand advertising expenditures in the market place in USD (in 1000s), and the log of offline brand advertising expenditures in USD (in 1000s). The additional controls include controls for bank holidays. Robust standard errors are reported. Significance levels: \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001

# 5.3.2.2 WOM Effects

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Besides, one might be concerned that the estimates regarding the effectiveness of the IoT channel in increasing product sales might be driven by other potential confounders, such as WOM and buzz around IoT technologies (Adamopoulos et al. 2018; Adamopoulos and Todri 2015b). We evaluate this possibility

by capturing the effect of market-specific web search trends regarding IoT using data from Google Trends (see Table 16) (Archak et al. 2011). The results remain highly robust. Based on the results, the web search trends capture a small portion of the previously identified IoT effect as the estimated effect only decreased from 13.28% to 12.92% and the fit of our model specifications is further increased; however, as we see the IoT effect is not driven by just the buzz around IoT.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Dating	-0.0219 ***	-0.0231 ***	-0.0230 ***
Rating	(0.0041)	(0.0040)	(0.0040)
Normalian of maria (100)	-0.4186 ***	-0.4265 ***	-0.4273 ***
Number of reviews (log)	(0.0100)	(0.0101)	(0.0101)
Dries (los)	0.5414 ***	0.5406 ***	0.5406 ***
Price (log)	(0.0204)	(0.0204)	(0.0204)
$\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{T}} = \mathbf{f}_{\mathbf{T}} = $	-0.1392 ***	-0.1382 ***	-0.1383 ***
Treatment (IoT eligible)	(0.0070)	(0.0070)	(0.0069)
Energian of a livit damaismu		0.5530 ***	0.5546 ***
Fraction of solicited reviews		(0.0783)	(0.0784)
	-0.0025 ***	-0.0026 ***	-0.0024 ***
Web search trends (UK)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)
Web as web (see 1. (US)	0.0001	0.0001	0.0004 *
Web search trends (US)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
	-0.0033 ***	-0.0034 ***	-0.0033 ***
Web search trends (Germany)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)
Web and the formula (France)	-0.0026 ***	-0.0027 ***	-0.0026 ***
Web search trends (France)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)
	9.1367 ***	9.1463 ***	9.1418 ***
Constant	(0.0646)	(0.0646)	(0.0646)
Product fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional product controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time trends	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional controls	No	No	Yes
R-squared	0.2616	0.2639	0.2646
N. of observations	13,680,364	13,680,364	13,680,364

 Table 16: Estimation results of fixed-effect models with IoT-related web search trends

Notes: Panel data analysis with product-market fixed effects, (linear and non-linear) time trends, and IoT-related web search trends. The estimation sample includes observations about treated products before and after the treatment in the market they were treated, these products in other markets (non-treated at all time), and non-treated products (in the same market) that are similar to treated products as they belong to the same product category and consumers frequently also view them online when viewing one of the treated products. Negative coefficients correspond to increase in sales (i.e., lower sales rank). The number of reviews variable corresponds to the log of the number of user-generated reviews for each product and the price variable corresponds to the log of the product. The product controls include the brand of the product, the product category, and the seller of the product. The additional controls include controls for bank holidays. Robust standard errors are reported. Significance levels: p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001

The results also remain robust in examining alternative WOM effects. In particular, Table A2 in the appendix presents the results controlling for trends regarding the particular IoT implementation of the

retailer marketplace. The results remain the same after controlling for IoT trends regarding the particular retailer as well. Similarly, the results are the same controlling based on the LexisNexis database for trends regarding the news articles in online and offline media mentioning the particular IoT implementation or IoT technologies in general.

In addition, the results remain the same also after controlling for the number of visitors to the marketplace. Table A3 in the appendix presents the corresponding results.

# 5.3.2.3 Novelty Effects

Similarly, we repeat the analysis excluding observations for products that became IoT eligible in the first introduction wave in the corresponding market (see Table 17); note that products became available in the IoT channel in different time periods. This robustness check evaluates whether the sales growth is driven by just the novelty effect wherein consumers simply purchase these IoT-channel eligible products in response to enthusiasm or interest for this novel technology. Similarly, the results remain very similar, corroborating the above results and further enhancing the robustness of our findings. The results also remain highly robust after excluding additional early adoption waves. The results also remain highly robust after excluding products that became available during the first 60 days of the introduction of the IoT channel or other similar time windows. Besides, the results remain highly robust after including multiple dummies for time since treatment, providing additional evidence that the IoT effect does not vary significantly over time and further alleviating any concerns that the novelty effect might be driving the demand effect of the IoT sales channel (see Figure A6 in the appendix).

products in each market			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Dating	-0.0213 ***	-0.0226 ***	-0.0226 ***
Rating	(0.0042)	(0.0042)	(0.0042)
Number of muieuro (log)	-0.4171 ***	-0.4248 ***	-0.4253 ***
Number of reviews (log)	(0.0101)	(0.0103)	(0.0103)

0.5333 \*\*\*

-0.1406 \*\*\*

0.5489 \*\*\*

(0.0205)

(0.0075)

(0.0784)

0.5341 \*\*\*

-0.1414 \*\*\*

(0.0205)

(0.0075)

0.5333 \*\*\*

-0.1405 \*\*\*

(0.0205)

(0.0075)0.5496 \*\*\*

(0.0784)

Table 17: Estimation results of fixed-effect models excluding observations for the first IoT-eligible

Price (log)

Treatment (IoT eligible)

Fraction of solicited reviews

Constant	9.1499 *** (0.0650)	9.1603 *** (0.0650)	9.1624 *** (0.0650)
Product-market fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional product controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time trends	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional controls	No	No	Yes
R-squared	0.2606	0.2622	0.2623
N. of observations	13,237,571	13,237,571	13,237,571

Notes: Panel data analysis with product-market fixed effects and (linear and non-linear) time trends excluding observations for the first IoT-eligible products in each market. The estimation sample includes observations about treated products before and after the treatment in the market they were treated, these products in other markets where they have not been treated, and non-treated products (in the same market) that are similar to treated products as they belong to the same product category and consumers frequently also view them online when viewing one of the treated products. The estimation sample excludes observations for products that became IoT eligible in the first adoption wave in the corresponding market. Negative coefficients correspond to increase in sales (i.e., lower sales rank). The number of reviews variable corresponds to the log of the number of user-generated reviews for each product, the product category, and the seller of the product. The additional controls include controls include the brand of the product, the product category, and the seller of the product. The additional controls include controls for bank holidays. Robust standard errors are reported. Significance levels: \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

# 5.3.2.4 Competitive Retailers

Moreover, we also assess the possibility that the identified increase in demand is associated with a change in sales of other retailers. We examine this alternative explanation by conducting a series of robustness checks. In order to capture sales of other retailers and empirically evaluate this alternative explanation, we further supplement our dataset with additional information. More specifically, we have combined our dataset with a proprietary dataset from the marketing and analytics company Comscore. This extended dataset includes the sales of other retailers in the United States at the product-retailer-daily level during our observation period. Table 18 presents the results of the robustness check that explicitly controls for the daily sales of each competitive retailer; the competitive retailers are determined based on information from SimilarWeb.com. Based on the results, all the findings are highly robust. The sales of other retailers capture a small portion of the previously identified IoT effect as the estimated effect slightly decreased to -0.1341 (Model 3) and the fit of our model specifications is further increased; however, as we see the IoT effect is not driven by the sales of other retailers. Besides, the results also robust to determining the set of competitive retailers based on information from the Factiva or CapitalIQ databases. Similarly, the results are the same after including all the available retailers in the econometric specifications and not only the competitive ones.

Table 18: Estimation results of fixed-effect models with alternative retailers				
Ν	Aodel 1	Model 2	Model 3	

Detine	-0.0290 ***	-0.0299 ***	-0.0299 ***
Rating	(0.0050)	(0.0049)	(0.0049)
Number of reviews (log)	-0.4559 ***	-0.4628 ***	-0.4636 ***
	(0.0117)	(0.0118)	(0.0118)
$\mathbf{Driss}(1,\mathbf{r})$	0.5979 ***	0.5967 ***	0.5967 ***
Price (log)	(0.0257)	(0.0256)	(0.0257)
Treatment (IoT eligible)	-0.1368 ***	-0.1357 ***	-0.1341 ***
freatment (101 engible)	(0.0083)	(0.0083)	(0.0083)
Fraction of solicited reviews		0.5751 ***	0.5760 ***
Fraction of solicited reviews		(0.0963)	(0.0964)
Alternative retailer A	0.0000 ***	0.0000 ***	0.0000 ***
Alternative letaner A	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Alternative retailer B	0.0001 ***	0.0001 ***	0.0002 ***
Alternative letaner B	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Alternative retailer C	-0.0000 ***	-0.0000 ***	-0.0000 ***
Alternative retailer C	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Alternative retailer D	0.0004 ***	0.0004 ***	0.0004 ***
Alternative letaner D	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Alternative retailer E	-0.0001 ***	-0.0001 ***	-0.0001 ***
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Alternative retailer F	0.0016 ***	0.0016 ***	0.0012 ***
Alternative retailer 1	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Alternative retailer G	0.0001 ***	0.0001 ***	0.0001 ***
Alternative letaner G	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Alternative retailer H	-0.0000 ***	-0.0000 ***	-0.0000 **
Alternative retailer II	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Alternative retailer I	-0.0004 ***	-0.0004 ***	-0.0003 ***
Alternative retailer 1	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Constant	9.3897 ***	9.4001 ***	9.3991 ***
	(0.0823)	(0.0823)	(0.0823)
Product-market fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional product controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time trends	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional controls	No	No	Yes
R-squared	0.3143	0.3174	0.3176
N. of observations	9,176,608	9,176,608	9,176,608

Notes: Panel data analysis with product-market fixed effects and (linear and non-linear) time trends. The estimation sample includes observations about treated products before and after the treatment in the market they were treated, these products in other markets where they have not been treated, and non-treated products (in the same market) that are similar to treated products as they belong to the same product category and consumers frequently also view them online when viewing one of the treated products. Negative coefficients correspond to increase in sales (i.e., lower sales rank). The number of reviews variable corresponds to the log of the number of user-generated reviews for each product, the product category, the seller of the product, and the sales units of other retailers. The alternative retailers' controls include the sales of each competitive retailer in the Comscore data set. The additional controls include controls for bank holidays. Robust standard errors are reported. Significance levels: \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001

The results are also robust to controlling for the total daily sales of same category products in other retailers or other competitive retailers. In addition, the results remain the same when controlling for the daily sales of the same product in other retailers, in general, or across the set of competitive retailers. Nevertheless, we also conduct an additional set of robustness checks where we capture market-specific web search trends for the competitive retailers using data from Google Trends. Table A4 in the online appendix provides the corresponding results. The results remain again highly robust.

## 5.3.2.5 Non-Random Treatment

In addition, even though we have employed multiple alternative identification strategies in the main analyses (see Sections 5.1.1 and 5.1.2) and several robustness tests –including propensity score matching techniques– to rule out alternative explanations and confounders (see, for instance, Section 5.3.1), in order to further alleviate any potentially remaining endogeneity concerns, we conduct the analysis again excluding observations for products that become IoT eligible in more than one market (see Table 19) as these products could have potentially been strategically selected by the retailer. The results remain highly robust to these checks too.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Dating	-0.0232 ***	-0.0244 ***	-0.0244 ***
Rating	(0.0041)	(0.0041)	(0.0041)
Number of reviews (log)	-0.4109 ***	-0.4183 ***	-0.4188 ***
Number of reviews (log)	(0.0101)	(0.0102)	(0.0102)
$\mathbf{Price}(1,\mathbf{z})$	0.5373 ***	0.5365 ***	0.5365 ***
Price (log)	(0.0206)	(0.0205)	(0.0206)
Treatment (IoT eligible)	-0.1428 ***	-0.1420 ***	-0.1424 ***
	(0.0071)	(0.0071)	(0.0071)
Fraction of solicited reviews		0.5351 ***	0.5357 ***
Flaction of solicited leviews		(0.0789)	(0.0789)
Constant	9.1288 ***	9.1382 ***	9.1402 ***
Collstallt	(0.0649)	(0.0649)	(0.0649)
Product-market fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional product controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time trends	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional controls	No	No	Yes
R-squared	0.259	0.2609	0.2610
N. of observations	13,347,44	5 13,347,445	5 13,347,445

 Table 19: Estimation results of fixed-effect models excluding observations for products that were treated in more than one market

Notes: Panel data analysis with product-market fixed effects and (linear and non-linear) time trends for products excluding observations for products that were treated in more than one market. The estimation sample includes observations about treated products before and after the treatment in the market they were treated, these products in other markets (non-treated at all time), and non-treated products (in the same market) that are similar to treated products as they belong to the same product category and consumers frequently also view them online when viewing one of the treated products. Negative coefficients correspond to increase in sales (i.e., lower sales rank). The number of reviews variable corresponds to the log of the number of user-generated reviews for each product and the price variable corresponds to the log of the product. The product controls include the brand of the product, the product category, and the seller of the product. The additional controls include controls for bank holidays. Robust standard errors are reported. Significance levels: \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

Likewise, we also repeat the analysis excluding observations for treated products with an increasing pretreatment sales trend (see Table A5 in the appendix). As shown in the aforementioned tables, all results corroborate our findings, alleviating any remaining endogeneity concerns; all the robustness checks corroborate our findings as the results remain qualitatively and quantitatively the same. We also conduct additional relevant robustness checks, as discussed in the following section.

Finally, we also control for the historical sales performance of products using a lagged dependent variable econometric specification. Table A6 in the appendix presents the corresponding results. The results remain highly robust. Similarly, the results are robust to multiple other robustness checks. Overall, across a wide variety of robustness checks and alternative specifications, the results further corroborate our findings.

## **5.3.3 Alternative Econometric Specifications**

Moreover, we also examine several alternative econometric specifications of our empirical models. For these robustness checks, we repeat the main analysis presented in Section 5.1.2 with the following alternative econometric specifications. First, we replicate the analysis including just a linear time trend allowing for unobserved factors to systematically grow or shrink over time – factors essentially unrelated to the main variables of interest that could potentially induce bias in the results (see Table 20). The results further corroborate our findings.

Table 20: Estimation results of fixed-effect models with linear time trend			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Dating	-0.0215 ***	-0.0227 ***	-0.0227 ***
Rating	(0.0040)	(0.0040)	(0.0040)
Number of mariana (log)	-0.4177 ***	-0.4251 ***	-0.4256 ***
Number of reviews (log)	(0.0098)	(0.0099)	(0.0099)
Dring (log)	0.5427 ***	0.5419 ***	0.5419 ***
Price (log)	(0.0205)	(0.0205)	(0.0205)
Treatment (IoT aligible)	-0.1374 ***	-0.1367 ***	-0.1371 ***
Treatment (IoT eligible)	(0.0069)	(0.0069)	(0.0069)
		0.5481 ***	0.5489 ***
Fraction of solicited reviews		(0.0783)	(0.0783)
Constant	9.0292 ***	9.0397 ***	9.0405 ***
Constant	(0.0647)	(0.0647)	(0.0647)
Product-market fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional product controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time trend (linear)	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional controls	No	No	Yes
R-squared	0.254	9 0.2565	0.2566

Table 20: Estimation results of fixed-effect models with linear time trend

# N. of observations13,680,37013,680,37013,680,370Notes: Panel data analysis with product-market fixed effects and linear time trend. The estimation sample includes observations

Notes: Panel data analysis with product-market fixed effects and linear time trend. The estimation sample includes observations about treated products before and after the treatment in the market they were treated, these products in other markets where they have not been treated, and non-treated products (in the same market) that are similar to treated products as they belong to the same product category and consumers frequently also view them online when viewing one of the treated products. Negative coefficients correspond to increase in sales (i.e., lower sales rank). The number of reviews variable corresponds to the log of the number of user-generated reviews for each product and the price variable corresponds to the log of the product. The product controls include the brand of the product, the product category, and the seller of the product. The additional controls include controls for bank holidays. Robust standard errors are reported. Significance levels: \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

Then, we repeat the analysis including year-month fixed effects (see Table A7 in the appendix) allowing for alternative non-linear trends that could potentially bias the results while capturing additional seasonality effects. Furthermore, the results remain robust to employing time fixed effects at more granular levels too, such as daily level fixed effects. Moreover, we further control for domain-specific and product-category-specific non-linear time trends allowing for more flexible patterns in the time trends that could vary across countries and product categories, respectively (see Tables A8 and A9 in the appendix). All the results corroborate our findings. The results are also robust to including separate product, market, and time-period (i.e., day) fixed effects (see Table A10 in the appendix).

### 5.3.4 Additional Robustness Checks

Furthermore, we also conduct additional robustness checks to further assess the possibility the aforementioned findings are capturing other factors instead of the effect of the IoT channel on demand levels. As part of these robustness checks, we repeat the analysis including only observations with a product price less than or equal to \$100 in order to examine the robustness of results to outliers in terms of product price and pricing mistakes (see Table A11 in the appendix). The product price in these results does not need to be log-transformed as before (Chen et al. 2004; Gu et al. 2012; Oestreicher-Singer and Sundararajan 2012a; Oestreicher-Singer and Sundararajan 2012b) due to the limited price range here. The results remain highly robust as shown in Table A11. Similarly, the results are robust to also excluding any products with a price lower than \$10; in addition to pricing mistakes and outliers, this also alleviates any concerns regarding accidental purchases driving the estimated effect (see also Section 3). The results are also robust to variable transformations too. We have also conducted an additional robustness check by transforming all the prices from the local currencies into US dollars. Table A12 in the appendix presents the results of the aforementioned robustness check. The results remain highly robust further corroborating our findings.

In addition, we also control for non-linear effects of product ratings by employing dummy variables for different ranges of product ratings (see Table A13), instead of average consumer ratings (Forman et al. 2008; Mudambi and Schuff 2010). The baseline level corresponds to products with no ratings and, hence, this specification also controls for products that might not have any consumer reviews. The results remain highly robust again.

Moreover, in order to explicitly capture any heterogeneity across markets, we build a random coefficients model. Table A14 in the appendix presents the results of the aforementioned random coefficients model. We notice that the effect of the IoT sales channel remains robust after accounting for the heterogeneity of the treatment effect across markets. Similarly, the results are robust to multiple other robustness checks too. For instance, we conduct a subsample analysis by focusing on countries that have been established in the literature to be similar in cultural aspects (i.e., United States and Canada) (Foerster and Karolyi 1993). Finally, we also replicate the analysis focusing only on a single market (i.e., US) in order to enhance the homogeneity of the dataset (see Table A15 in the appendix). All the robustness checks corroborate our findings as the results remain qualitatively and quantitatively the same.

## **5.4 Falsification Tests**

To further assess the robustness of the aforementioned findings, we conduct various falsification tests ("placebo" studies) using the same econometric models as above (in order to maintain consistency) but randomly indicating: i) which products were eligible for purchase via the IoT channel (i.e., random product), ii) when they became eligible (i.e., random time period), and iii) where they became eligible (i.e., random market), as well as iv) examining the impact of the actual treatment on an outcome that should be theoretically unaffected by the treatment (i.e., "placebo" outcome). The results of these falsification tests are shown in Tables A16-A20 in the appendix. Specifically, Table A16 shows the results of the falsification test randomly indicating which products were treated in which market and what time period; Table A17 shows the results of the falsification test randomly indicating for treated products in which market and what time period each product was treated (i.e., random market and time period); Table A18 shows the results of the falsification test randomly indicating for treated products and the time period they were treated in which market they were treated (i.e., random market); Table A19 shows the results of the falsification test

randomly indicating for treated products in the market they were treated what time period they were treated (i.e., random time period before the actual treatment, if any); Table A20 shows the results of the falsification test examining the impact of the actual treatment in one of the markets with treated products (see Table 1) on the corresponding outcome in the market of Canada, which should be theoretically unaffected as no product was treated there (i.e., "placebo" outcome). We see that, under these extensive falsification checks, the corresponding effects are not statistically significant, indicating that our previous findings are not a statistical artifact of the econometric specifications and further validating that we have indeed estimated the actual demand effects of the Internet of Things sales channel.

# 6 Discussion and Implications

The "Internet of Things" (IoT) is rapidly becoming one of the most popular emerging technologies in business and society. Given the unprecedented opportunities IoT generates for brands and retailers, it is important to glean timely insights regarding the business value of IoT and understand whether the introduction of an IoT technology into the set of available purchase channels for consumers affects the sales of physical products. In this study, using empirical data from a multi-national online retailer who introduced an IoT sales channel and utilizing a quasi-experimental research design, we examine the effect of the introduction of the IoT technology on product sales and demonstrate the demand effects of IoT. Besides, we conduct additional analyses of the IoT effect and also delve into the effect heterogeneity examining various important moderating effects on the impact of IoT and empirically validating the underlying mechanism of the effect of the IoT sales channel. All the findings of the conducted econometric analyses are highly robust and have survived a wide range of alternative identification strategies, robustness checks, and falsification tests. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to study the impact of IoT on product sales.

Our research makes several important contributions to the extant literature. First, this work has important theoretical contributions for the literature on sales channels. The impact of IoT technologies still has not been investigated despite the distinct characteristics of IoT technologies and their potential to transform consumers' behavior. Our paper is the first to study the effect of the introduction of the IoT as a sales channel and demonstrates that the adoption of such a technology enhances the sales of eligible products in

the marketplace. Besides, the findings of this study inform future literature of the heterogeneity of the demand effects of the IoT adoption. Our findings reveal, among others, that less expensive and more differentiated products as well as experience and utilitarian goods can accrue higher benefits leveraging more effectively novel IoT technologies. The heterogeneity of the effect of IoT has also not been examined in prior literature, similarly to the main effect. In addition, certain dimensions of heterogeneity have not been discussed in prior literature on other sales channels too. For instance, to the best of our knowledge, prior literature has not investigated the moderating effect of the level of product differentiation on the impact of the introduction of a new sales channel. Beyond the extant literature on sales channels, our results also have implications for the literature on mental accounting theory. For instance, our results posit that a technological development affecting the efficiency, ease, and speed at which products can be purchased lowering intangible transaction costs- could be a useful means of adjusting mental accounting of consumers and, thus, changing consumers' consumption patterns as depicted on product demand levels. This underlying mechanism has been empirically validated in multiple ways. Moreover, the impact of mental accounting can be heterogeneous across levels of product differentiation as illustrated through the demand effects of IoT. To the best of our knowledge, prior literature has not examined such effects. The implications of this research also extend beyond the IoT channel as the findings also inform the literature on firm and retailer competition. For instance, our findings suggest that lowering the purchase effort and increasing the purchase convenience integrating human actions and the physical world into computer-based purchase systems through the IoT sales channel increase product demand, similarly to a reduction in tangible costs. Hence, the streams of literature examining retailer competition and competition on marketplaces -vis-à-vis traditional price and location competition- should also examine competition of retailers across the intangible dimensions of convenience and effort enabled by novel technological developments and IT artifacts.

Beyond the aforementioned theoretical contributions, the findings of this study have also important managerial implications. For instance, we find that IoT technologies have a positive effect on sales growth. This effect is both statistically and economically significant. In addition, it is an important and timely finding for managers as we are still in the early stages of deployment of IoT technologies and knowledge of the effect of the IoT channel is important for determining the attractiveness of investments in IoT

technologies. Our findings show the potential of such IoT investments and suggest retailers and marketers should invest in IT because of the significant positive impact of these technologies on product sales.

Similarly, the additional analyses of the demand effects we examined in this study contribute to additional insights into consumer behavior and a more detailed understanding of the heterogeneity of the effectiveness of introduction of IoT technologies in the retail industry. Such moderating effects are also important for managers as they provide actionable insights and help businesses further understand which products would accrue the highest benefit from such innovations and which would benefit the least. Therefore, the results of this study showcase to digital retailers how they can better capitalize on the novel IoT technologies. For instance, the results of this study illustrate that IoT technologies can be effectively used to promote sales of experience goods, which can be a major hurdle for online retailers (Klein 1998; Nelson 1970). In addition, these findings can contribute to more accurate product sales predictions for retailers leading to more efficient supply chain operations.

Beyond the aforementioned managerial implications, the examined IoT channel and the corresponding findings of this study can inform several other managerial decisions and practices regarding future embodiments of IoT and other relevant technologies enhancing convenience and largely automating the purchase process. More specifically, the examined IoT technology allows the collection of data at the time of usage of physical products. Such granular information can enable retailers and platforms to tap into consumption analytics (Adamopoulos 2013a; Adamopoulos and Tuzhilin 2013; Adamopoulos and Tuzhilin 2015b) moving beyond just purchase analytics and better address the evolving needs of consumers while exploiting additional revenue opportunities. In particular, the information of when products are used and in what combinations can allow for accurate early prediction and further automation of product replacement, upgrade, replenishment, or bundling of products based on their exact usage patterns. Similarly, rich product usage knowledge based on IoT devices can further facilitate time-sensitive cross-selling marketing including advertisements and promotions at the time of consumption of physical products. Finally, such IoT devices can also issue health or security alerts based on patterns of consumption of products (e.g., when a product is consumed after the expiration date or beyond recommended limits) (Natarajan and High 2017). Nevertheless, there are several actions retailers may take to fully realize the potential of IoT. Specifically,

retailers might need to implement security and encryption protocols to effectively protect any sensitive information of the consumers. Similarly, retailers may employ integrated information systems and increase security by not requiring consumers to provide again any sensitive information already available in other purchase channels. In the same fashion, in order to entirely harness the potential of the IoT channel, retailers should foster trust in consumers by adapting their policies to the new channel. For instance, retailers might offer free returns for products purchased through IoT. Lastly, to maximize the returns on IoT, retailers can also offset any potential IoT barriers by offering the option for consumers to directly get fully preconfigured IoT devices as well as by effectively communicating the usefulness and ease of use of the IoT sales channel (Pavlou and Fygenson 2006).

Finally, beyond the discussed theoretical and managerial implications, this study has also the potential to seed several new interesting research directions. For instance, future research can examine additional moderating effects on the relationship of IoT and sales growth to further enrich our understanding regarding the impact of IoT technologies on retailing. Moreover, future research can examine the business value of IoT technologies in other industries and verticals as well as specific cross-channel effects of IoT. Lastly, given the significant impact of the IoT sales channel on the product demand, it would be interesting for future research to further investigate the impact of other technological artifacts on consumer behavior, including additional Internet-connected devices. Due to short lifecycle of high-tech products and the constructive destruction practices of companies (Levitt 1965; Lu and Marjot 2008), current IoT devices are superseded by newer interface-free models and services including voice-activated ones. Given the theoretical foundations of this study and the conducted empirical analyses, the findings should generalize well to other IoT devices that adjust the mental accounting of consumers by decoupling purchases and payments -making payments less salient- and enhancing the efficiency, ease, and speed at which products can be purchased –lowering intangible transaction costs by enhancing the convenience and reducing the effort of making a purchase- while we hope our research will seed new exciting research directions for devices with alternative characteristics (Alba et al. 1997; Lauterborn 1990; Verhoef et al. 2007).

While this paper takes important steps towards studying the demand effects of IoT technologies in retailing, we acknowledge that there are several limitations in our analysis, mostly emerging from data availability

issues. One of the limitations of this study is that we have access to data corresponding to a single multinational online marketplace. Another limitation of our data set is that some of the products are not available in all markets. Our dataset is also limited to aggregate daily data and not at a more granular level. Similarly, due to privacy concerns, we do not have access to consumer-level statistics. Despite these limitations, our contributions inform the current literature in important ways and may also be widely relevant to managers, while also seeding a number of new directions for future research. Our hope is that these limitations will pave the way for future research.

# 7 Conclusions

In this study, using empirical data from a multi-national online retailer that introduced an Internet-of-Things sales channel and utilizing a quasi-experimental research design, we study the effect of the introduction of the IoT on product sales and demonstrate the business value of IoT for retailers and brands. Our analyses reveal a statistically and economically significant increase in sales due to the introduction of the IoT technology as a sales channel.

Besides, we conduct additional analyses of the IoT effect and also delve into the effect heterogeneity examining important moderating effects on the impact of IoT channel, such as the price of the product and whether the product is more a search or experience good as well as whether it is a hedonic or utilitarian good; the corresponding analyses also empirically validate the underlying mechanism supported by the mental accounting theory. Our findings reveal that less expensive products and more differentiated as well as experience and utilitarian goods, rather than search or hedonic goods, can accrue the highest benefits leveraging more effectively the novel IoT channel. Our findings also show that the increase in demand is mainly because of increased demand levels from the existing customer base of the retailer marketplace.

We also conduct an extensive set of robustness checks and falsification tests to further validate our analysis. All the results corroborate our findings further strengthening our contribution.

To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to study the impact of an IoT technology on product sales drawing significant theoretical and managerial implications while seeding future research directions for devices and technologies largely automating the purchase process.

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# **Online Appendix**

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Dating	-0.0144 *	-0.0171 *	-0.0170 *
Rating	(0.0069)	(0.0069)	(0.0069)
Number of reviews (loc)	-0.4420 ***	-0.4560 ***	-0.4563 ***
Number of reviews (log)	(0.0147)	(0.0149)	(0.0150)
$\mathbf{Price}(1,\mathbf{z})$	0.9076 ***	0.9042 ***	0.9044 ***
Price (log)	(0.0335)	(0.0334)	(0.0334)
Treatment (IoT eligible)	-0.1123 ***	-0.1117 ***	-0.1121 ***
	(0.0070)	(0.0070)	(0.0070)
Exaction of colligited accience		0.6813 ***	0.6817 ***
Fraction of solicited reviews		(0.0964)	(0.0964)
Constant	8.0378 ***	8.0743 ***	8.0757 ***
Constant	(0.1083)	(0.1082)	(0.1082)
Product-market fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional product controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time trends	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional controls	No	No	Yes
R-squared	0.1608	0.1649	0.1650
N. of observations	6,438,574	6,438,574	6,438,574

# Table A1: Estimation results of fixed-effect models over matched sample – DDD with PSM (Nonlinearities in the Propensity Model)

Notes: Panel data analysis with product-market fixed effects and (linear and non-linear) time trends. The estimation sample includes observations about treated products before and after the treatment in the market they were treated, these products in other markets where they have not been treated, and non-treated products (in the same market) that are similar to treated products as they belong to the same product category and consumers frequently also view them online when viewing one of the treated products and have the same propensity to be treated. The propensity-score matching was conducted based on the propensity scores utilizing the available observable characteristics of the products in our specifications: rating, number of reviews, price, fraction of solicited reviews, product category, market, the seller of the product and lagged dependent variable while the propensity model allowed for nonlinearities by introducing higher-order terms of the covariates, such as quadratic terms, as well as interaction terms. Negative coefficients correspond to increase in sales (i.e., lower sales rank). The number of reviews variable corresponds to the log of the number of user-generated reviews for each product, the price variable corresponds to the log of the product, and the lag dependent variable corresponds to the average value of the dependent variable three months ago. The product controls include the brand of the product, the product category, and the seller of the product. The additional controls include controls for bank holidays. Robust standard errors are reported. Significance levels: \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\*

trends				
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	
Dating	-0.0234 ***	-0.0246 ***	-0.0246 ***	
Rating	(0.0041)	(0.0040)	(0.0040)	
Number of reviews (log)	-0.4115 ***	-0.4190 ***	-0.4195 ***	
Number of reviews (log)	(0.0099)	(0.0100)	(0.0100)	
$\mathbf{D}$ mine (log)	0.5425 ***	0.5418 ***	0.5417 ***	
Price (log)	(0.0205)	(0.0205)	(0.0205)	
Treatment (IoT aligible)	-0.1430 ***	-0.1422 ***	-0.1426 ***	
Treatment (IoT eligible)	(0.0070)	(0.0070)	(0.0069)	
Enortion of colicitod nonione		0.5416 ***	0.5423 ***	
Fraction of solicited reviews		(0.0782)	(0.0782)	

# Table A2: Estimation results of fixed-effect models with retailer-specific IoT-related web search

Web search trends (UK)	-0.0004	-0.0004	-0.0005 *
	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
Web search trends (US)	-0.0012 ***	-0.0012 ***	-0.0012 ***
	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Web search trends (Germany)	-0.0016 ***	-0.0016 ***	-0.0016 ***
	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
Web search trends (France)	-0.0015 ***	-0.0015 ***	-0.0016 ***
	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)
Constant	9.0983 ***	9.1080 ***	9.1100 ***
Constant	(0.0647)	(0.0646)	(0.0646)
Product-market fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional product controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time trends	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional controls	No	No	Yes
R-squared	0.2542	0.2560	0.2561
N. of observations	13,680,364	13,680,364	13,680,364

Notes: Panel data analysis with product-market fixed effects, (linear and non-linear) time trends, and IoT-related web search trends. The estimation sample includes observations about treated products before and after the treatment in the market they were treated, these products in other markets (non-treated at all time), and non-treated products (in the same market) that are similar to treated products as they belong to the same product category and consumers frequently also view them online when viewing one of the treated products. Negative coefficients correspond to increase in sales (i.e., lower sales rank). The number of reviews variable corresponds to the log of the number of user-generated reviews for each product and the price variable corresponds to the log of the product. The product controls include the brand of the product, the product category, and the seller of the product. The additional controls include controls for bank holidays. Robust standard errors are reported. Significance levels: \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Dating	-0.0214 ***	-0.0225 ***	-0.0223 ***
Rating	(0.0041)	(0.0041)	(0.0041)
Number of reviews (log)	-0.4173 ***	-0.4225 ***	-0.4267 ***
Number of reviews (log)	(0.0100)	(0.0101)	(0.0101)
Drive (log)	0.5424 ***	0.5416 ***	0.5416 ***
Price (log)	(0.0205)	(0.0205)	(0.0205)
Treatment (IoT aligible)	-0.1408 ***	-0.1398 ***	-0.1402 ***
Treatment (IoT eligible)	(0.0069)	(0.0069)	(0.0069)
Fraction of solicited reviews		0.5607 ***	0.5633 ***
Fraction of solicited leviews		(0.0785)	(0.0785)
Marketplace reach (per million)	-0.0000 ***	-0.0000 ***	-0.0000 ***
Marketplace reach (per million)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Constant	9.2025 ***	9.2210 ***	9.2328 ***
Constant	(0.0668)	(0.0668)	(0.0669)
Product-market fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional product controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time trends	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional controls	No	No	Yes
R-squared	0.2484	0.2497	0.2492
N. of observations	13,680,370	13,680,370	13,680,370

#### Table A3: Estimation results of fixed-effect models with user visit trends

Notes: Panel data analysis with product-market fixed effects, (linear and non-linear) time trends, and number of user visits trends. The estimation sample includes observations about treated products before and after the treatment in the market they were treated, these products in other markets (non-treated at all time), and non-treated products (in the same market) that are similar to treated products as they belong to the same product category and consumers frequently also view them online when viewing one of the

treated products. Negative coefficients correspond to increase in sales (i.e., lower sales rank). The number of reviews variable corresponds to the log of the number of user-generated reviews for each product and the price variable corresponds to the log of the price for each product. The product controls include the brand of the product, the product category, and the seller of the product. The additional controls include controls for bank holidays. The number of user visits trends correspond to the percentage of all Internet users who visit the marketplace site in the corresponding market. Robust standard errors are reported. Significance levels: \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001

Table A4: Estimation results of fixed-effect models with alternative retailers trends			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Dating	-0.0245 ***	-0.0257 ***	-0.0256 ***
Rating	(0.0040)	(0.0040)	(0.0040)
Number of reviews (loc)	-0.4136 ***	-0.4210 ***	-0.4212 ***
Number of reviews (log)	(0.0099)	(0.0100)	(0.0100)
$\mathbf{Drive}(1 \circ \mathbf{r})$	0.5422 ***	0.5414 ***	0.5414 ***
Price (log)	(0.0205)	(0.0205)	(0.0205)
Treastreast (IoT ali sible)	-0.1396 ***	-0.1389 ***	-0.1388 ***
Treatment (IoT eligible)	(0.0069)	(0.0069)	(0.0069)
Exection of colicitod reviews		0.5418 ***	0.5426 ***
Fraction of solicited reviews		(0.0783)	(0.0783)
	0.0369 ***	0.0370 ***	0.0363 ***
Alternative retailer A	(0.0010)	(0.0010)	(0.0011)
	0.0043 ***	0.0044 ***	0.0053 ***
Alternative retailer B	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0003)
	-0.0027 ***	-0.0027 ***	-0.0025 ***
Alternative retailer C	(0.0004)	-0.0027 *** -( (0.0004) (0	(0.0004)
	-0.0015	-0.0013	-0.0037 **
Alternative retailer D	(0.0014)	(0.0014)	(0.0014)
	0.0290 ***	(0.0002) -0.0027 *** (0.0004) -0.0013 (0.0014) 0.0289 *** (0.0016)	0.0299 ***
Alternative retailer E	(0.0016)	(0.0016)	(0.0016)
	-0.0090 ***	-0.0090 ***	-0.0066 ***
Alternative retailer F	(0.0015)	(0.0015)	(0.0017)
	-0.0017 ***	-0.0017 ***	-0.0011 **
Alternative retailer G	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0004)
	-0.0012 ***	-0.0012 ***	-0.0019 ***
Alternative retailer H	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0003)
	-0.0031	-0.0032	-0.0031
Alternative retailer I	(0.0021)	(0.0021)	(0.0021)
	9.1672 ***	9.1754 ***	9.1717 ***
Constant	(0.0656)	(0.0655)	(0.0656)
Product-market fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional product controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time trends	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional controls	No	No	Yes
R-squared	0.2660	0.2677	0.2675
N. of observations	13,680,370	13,680,370	13,680,370

Notes: Panel data analysis with product-market fixed effects and (linear and non-linear) time trends. The estimation sample includes observations about treated products before and after the treatment in the market they were treated, these products in other markets where they have not been treated, and non-treated products (in the same market) that are similar to treated products as they belong to the same product category and consumers frequently also view them online when viewing one of the treated products. Negative coefficients correspond to increase in sales (i.e., lower sales rank). The number of reviews variable corresponds to the log of the number of user-generated reviews for each product and the price variable corresponds to the log of the product. The product controls include the brand of the product, the product category, the seller of the product,

and the sales units of other retailers. The alternative retailers' trends include market-specific web search trends of competitive retailers using data from Google Trends. The additional controls include controls for bank holidays. Robust standard errors are reported. Significance levels: p<0.05, p<0.01, p<0.01.

	increasing pre-treatment sales trend			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	
Detine	-0.0239 ***	-0.0250 ***	-0.0250 ***	
Rating	(0.0041)	(0.0041)	(0.0041)	
Number of muierus (10 c)	-0.4063 ***	-0.4131 ***	-0.4135 ***	
Number of reviews (log)	(0.0101)	(0.0102)	(0.0102)	
$\mathbf{Drive}(1 \circ \mathbf{r})$	0.5333 ***	0.5327 ***	0.5327 ***	
Price (log)	(0.0203)	(0.0203)	(0.0203)	
Treatment (IoT eligible)	-0.1390 ***	-0.1384 ***	-0.1389 ***	
	(0.0072)	(0.0072)	(0.0072)	
Fraction of solicited reviews		0.5001 ***	0.5007 ***	
Flaction of solicited leviews		(0.0800)	(0.0800)	
Constant	9.1142 ***	9.1226 ***	9.1246 ***	
Collstallt	(0.0643)	(0.0643)	(0.0643)	
Product-market fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Additional product controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Time trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Additional controls	No	No	Yes	
R-squared	0.2548	8 0.2564	0.2565	
N. of observations	13,392,827	7 13,392,827	13,392,827	

Table A5: Estimation results of fixed-effect models excluding observations for products with
increasing pre-treatment sales trend

Notes: Panel data analysis with product-market fixed effects and (linear and non-linear) time trends excluding observations with increasing pre-treatment sales trend. The estimation sample includes observations about treated products before and after the treatment in the market they were treated, these products in other markets where they have not been treated, and non-treated products (in the same market) that are similar to treated products as they belong to the same product category and consumers frequently also view them online when viewing one of the treated products. The estimation sample excludes observations for treated products with increasing pre-treatment sales trend. Negative coefficients correspond to increase in sales (i.e., lower sales rank). The number of reviews variable corresponds to the log of the number of user-generated reviews for each product and the price variable corresponds to the log of the product. The product controls include the brand of the product, the product category, and the seller of the product. The additional controls include controls for bank holidays. Robust standard errors are reported. Significance levels: \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01.

#### Table A6: Estimation results of fixed-effect models with lagged dependent variable

	Model 1		Mode	el 2	Mode	el 3
Rating	-0.0118	***	-0.0128	***	-0.0128	***
Katilig	(0.0031)		(0.0031)		(0.0031)	
Number of reviews (log)	-0.3565	***	-0.3642	***	-0.3642	***
Number of reviews (log)	(0.0074)		(0.0075)		(0.0075)	
Price (log)	0.4418	***	0.4411	***	0.4412	***
rice (log)	(0.0168)		(0.0168)		(0.0168)	
Treatment (IoT aligible)	-0.1099	***	-0.1090	***	-0.1091	***
Treatment (IoT eligible)	(0.0074)		(0.0074)		(0.0074)	
Fraction of solicited reviews			0.4964	***	0.4964	***
Flaction of solicited leviews			(0.0561)		(0.0561)	
	0.3339	***	0.3336	***	0.3336	***
Lagged DV	(0.0044)		(0.0044)		(0.0044)	
Constant	5.9176	***	5.9176	***	5.9176	***

	(0.0642)	(0.0642)	(0.0	0642)
Product-market fixed effects	Yes		Yes	Yes
Additional product controls	Yes		Yes	Yes
Time trends	Yes		Yes	Yes
Additional controls	No		No	Yes
Log-likelihood	-11,666,	901	-11,666,786	-11,665,981
N. of observations	11,817,	578	11,817,578	11,817,578

Notes: Panel data analysis with product-market fixed effects and (linear and non-linear) time trends and lagged dependent variable. The estimation sample includes observations about treated products before and after the treatment in the market they were treated, these products in other markets where they have not been treated, and non-treated products (in the same market) that are similar to treated products as they belong to the same product category and consumers frequently also view them online when viewing one of the treated products. Negative coefficients correspond to an increase in sales (i.e., lower sales rank). The number of reviews variable corresponds to the log of the number of user-generated reviews for each product and the price variable corresponds to the log of the product. The product controls include the brand of the product, the product category, the seller of the product, and the lagged dependent variable. The lag dependent variable corresponds to the average value of the dependent variable three months ago. The additional controls include controls for bank holidays. Robust standard errors are reported. Significance levels: \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

### Table A7: Estimation results of fixed-effect models with year-month fixed-effects

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Datina	-0.0236 ***	-0.0248 ***	-0.0248 ***
Rating	(0.0041)	(0.0040)	(0.0040)
Number of reviews (log)	-0.4155 ***	-0.4231 ***	-0.4230 ***
Number of reviews (log)	(0.0100)	(0.0101)	(0.0101)
$\mathbf{Drive}(1,\mathbf{z})$	0.5428 ***	0.5421 ***	0.5421 ***
Price (log)	(0.0205)	(0.0204)	(0.0205)
Treatment (IoT aligible)	-0.1469 ***	-0.1463 ***	-0.1464 ***
Treatment (IoT eligible)	(0.0071)	(0.0071)	(0.0071)
Fraction of solicited reviews		0.5453 ***	0.5453 ***
Fraction of solicited reviews		(0.0782)	(0.0782)
Constant	9.0846 ***	9.0950 ***	9.0945 ***
Constant	(0.0644)	(0.0644)	(0.0644)
Product-market fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional product controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year-Month fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional controls	No	No	Yes
R-squared	0.2557	0.2574	0.2574
N. of observations	13,680,370	13,680,370	13,680,370

Notes: Panel data analysis with product-market fixed effects and year-month fixed effects. The estimation sample includes observations about treated products before and after the treatment in the market they were treated, these products in other markets where they have not been treated, and non-treated products (in the same market) that are similar to treated products as they belong to the same product category and consumers frequently also view them online when viewing one of the treated products. Negative coefficients correspond to increase in sales (i.e., lower sales rank). The number of reviews variable corresponds to the log of the price for each product. The product controls include the brand of the product, the product category, and the seller of the product. The additional controls include controls for bank holidays. Robust standard errors are reported. Significance levels: \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\*

### Table A8: Estimation results of fixed-effect models with market-specific non-linear time trends

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Rating	-0.0204 ***	-0.0214 ***	-0.0213 ***
	(0.0041)	(0.0041)	(0.0041)

Number of reviews (log)	-0.4331 ***	-0.4424 ***	-0.4430 ***
Number of reviews (log)	(0.0103)	(0.0105)	(0.0105)
$\mathbf{Drive}(1 \circ \mathbf{r})$	0.5410 ***	0.5401 ***	0.5401 ***
Price (log)	(0.0204)	(0.0204)	(0.0204)
Treastment (IoT aligible)	-0.1251 ***	-0.1241 ***	-0.1246 ***
Treatment (IoT eligible)	(0.0070)	(0.0070)	(0.0070)
Exection of colicited accelerate		0.5946 ***	0.5955 ***
Fraction of solicited reviews		(0.0795)	(0.0795)
Constant	9.1412 ***	9.1539 ***	9.1562 ***
Constant	(0.0647)	(0.0647)	(0.0647)
Product-market fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional product controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time trends (market-specific)	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional controls	No	No	Yes
R-squared	0.2483	0.2508	0.2509
N. of observations	13,680,370	13,680,370	13,680,370

Notes: Panel data analysis with product-market fixed effects and market-specific (linear and non-linear) time trends. The estimation sample includes observations about treated products before and after the treatment in the market they were treated, these products in other markets where they have not been treated, and non-treated products (in the same market) that are similar to treated products as they belong to the same product category and consumers frequently also view them online when viewing one of the treated products. Negative coefficients correspond to increase in sales (i.e., lower sales rank). The number of reviews variable corresponds to the log of the number of user-generated reviews for each product and the price variable corresponds to the log of the product. The product controls include the brand of the product, the product category, and the seller of the product. The additional controls include controls for bank holidays. Robust standard errors are reported. Significance levels: \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001

	trends		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Detine	-0.0239 ***	-0.0251 ***	-0.0251 ***
Rating	(0.0041)	(0.0041)	(0.0041)
Number of reviews (log)	-0.4046 ***	-0.4138 ***	-0.4142 ***
Number of reviews (log)	(0.0101)	(0.0102)	(0.0102)
$\mathbf{Drive}(1,\mathbf{z})$	0.5426 ***	0.5419 ***	0.5419 ***
Price (log)	(0.0204)	(0.0204)	(0.0204)
Treatment (IoT eligible)	-0.1370 ***	-0.1363 ***	-0.1368 ***
	(0.0070)	(0.0070)	(0.0070)
Fraction of solicited reviews		0.5359 ***	0.5366 ***
Fraction of solicited reviews		(0.0780)	(0.0781)
Constant	9.0837 ***	9.0931 ***	9.0951 ***
Constant	(0.0645)	(0.0645)	(0.0645)
Product-market fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional product controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time trends (category-specific)	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional controls	No	No	Yes
R-squared	0.2508	0.2526	0.2527
N. of observations	13,680,370	13,680,370	13,680,370

# Table A9: Estimation results of fixed-effect models with product-category-specific non-linear time transfer

Notes: Panel data analysis with product-market fixed effects and product-category-specific (linear and non-linear) time trends. The estimation sample includes observations about treated products before and after the treatment in the market they were treated, these products in other markets where they have not been treated, and non-treated products (in the same market) that are similar to treated products as they belong to the same product category and consumers frequently also view them online when viewing one of the treated products. Negative coefficients correspond to increase in sales (i.e., lower sales rank). The number of reviews

variable corresponds to the log of the number of user-generated reviews for each product and the price variable corresponds to the log of the price for each product. The product controls include the brand of the product, the product category, and the seller of the product. The additional controls include controls for bank holidays. Robust standard errors are reported. Significance levels: \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Dating	-0.0101	-0.0120	-0.0120
Rating	(0.0072)	(0.0072)	(0.0072)
Number of reviews (log)	-0.5986 ***	-0.6015 ***	-0.6015 ***
Number of reviews (log)	(0.0138)	(0.0139)	(0.0139)
$\mathbf{Price}(1,\mathbf{z})$	0.9196 ***	0.9195 ***	0.9195 ***
Price (log)	(0.0330)	(0.0330)	(0.0330)
Treatment (IoT eligible)	-0.2023 ***	-0.2026 ***	-0.2026 ***
	(0.0103)	(0.0104)	(0.0104)
Fraction of solicited reviews		0.6063 ***	0.6063 ***
Fraction of solicited reviews		(0.0982)	(0.0982)
Constant	6.1543	6.1516	6.1572
Constant	(22.8630)	(20.7157)	(23.9934)
Product fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Market fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Daily fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional controls	No	No	Yes
Log-likelihood	-19,106,925	-19,100,680	-19,100,680
N. of observations	13,680,370	13,680,370	13,680,370

Notes: Panel data analysis with separate product, market, and daily fixed effects and (linear and non-linear) time trends. The estimation sample includes observations about treated products before and after the treatment in the market they were treated, these products in other markets where they have not been treated, and non-treated products (in the same market) that are similar to treated products as they belong to the same product category and consumers frequently also view them online when viewing one of the treated products. Negative coefficients correspond to increase in sales (i.e., lower sales rank). The number of reviews variable corresponds to the log of the number of user-generated reviews for each product and the price variable corresponds to the log of the product. The product controls include the brand of the product, the product category, and the seller of the product. The additional controls include controls for bank holidays. Robust standard errors are reported. Significance levels: \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001

price of \$100			
Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	
-0.0249 ***	-0.0262 ***	-0.0261 ***	
(0.0041)	(0.0041)	(0.0041)	
-0.4119 ***	-0.4192 ***	-0.4197 ***	
(0.0101)	(0.0101)	(0.0101)	
0.0281 ***	0.0281 ***	0.0281 ***	
(0.0007)	(0.0007)	(0.0007)	
-0.1434 ***	-0.1426 ***	-0.1431 ***	
(0.0070)	(0.0070)	(0.0070)	
	0.5343 ***	0.5350 ***	
	(0.0782)	(0.0782)	
10.0164 ***	10.0244 ***	10.0264 ***	
(0.0268)	(0.0268)	(0.0268)	
Yes	Yes	Yes	
	Model 1           -0.0249 ***           (0.0041)           -0.4119 ***           (0.0101)           0.0281 ***           (0.0007)           -0.1434 ***           (0.0070)           10.0164 ***           (0.0268)	Model 1Model 2 $-0.0249$ *** $-0.0262$ *** $(0.0041)$ $(0.0041)$ $-0.4119$ *** $-0.4192$ *** $(0.0101)$ $(0.0101)$ $0.0281$ *** $0.0281$ *** $(0.0007)$ $(0.0007)$ $-0.1434$ *** $-0.1426$ *** $(0.0070)$ $(0.0070)$ $0.5343$ *** $(0.0782)$ $10.0164$ *** $10.0244$ *** $(0.0268)$ $(0.0268)$	

# Table A11: Estimation results of fixed-effect models with observations with a maximum product price of \$100

Additional product controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time trends	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional controls	No	No	Yes
R-squared	0.2453	0.2470	0.2471
N. of observations	13,475,494	13,475,494	13,475,494

Notes: Panel data analysis with product-market fixed effects and (linear and non-linear) time trends. The estimation sample includes observations about treated products before and after the treatment in the market they were treated, these products in other markets where they have not been treated, and non-treated products (in the same market) that are similar to treated products excluding observations with product price larger than \$100. The price is not log-transformed. Negative coefficients correspond to increase in sales (i.e., lower sales rank). The number of reviews variable corresponds to the log of the number of user-generated reviews for each product. The product controls include the brand of the product, the product category, and the seller of the product. The additional controls include controls for bank holidays. Robust standard errors are reported. Significance levels: \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001

Table A12: Estimation results of fixed-effect models with product prices in USD				
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	
Datina	-0.0246 ***	-0.0258 ***	-0.0258 ***	
Rating	(0.0041)	(0.0040)	(0.0040)	
Number of reviews (log)	-0.4069 ***	-0.4141 ***	-0.4146 ***	
Number of reviews (log)	(0.0099)	(0.0101)	(0.0101)	
$\mathbf{Drise}(1,\mathbf{z})$	0.5265 ***	0.5255 ***	0.5253 ***	
Price (log)	(0.0197)	(0.0197)	(0.0197)	
Treatment (IaT aligible)	-0.1472 ***	-0.1464 ***	-0.1469 ***	
Treatment (IoT eligible)	(0.0070)	(0.0070)	(0.0070)	
Emotion of solicited reviews		0.5268 ***	0.5274 ***	
Fraction of solicited reviews		(0.0781)	(0.0781)	
Constant	9.1545 ***	9.1645 ***	9.1671 ***	
Constant	(0.0619)	(0.0619)	(0.0619)	
Product-market fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Additional product controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Time trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Additional controls	No	No	Yes	
R-squared	0.2525	5 0.2542	0.2543	
N. of observations	13,680,370	13,680,370	13,680,370	

 Table A12: Estimation results of fixed-effect models with product prices in USD

Notes: Panel data analysis with product-market fixed effects and (linear and non-linear) time trends. The estimation sample includes observations about treated products before and after the treatment in the market they were treated, these products in other markets where they have not been treated, and non-treated products (in the same market) that are similar to treated products as they belong to the same product category and consumers frequently also view them online when viewing one of the treated products. Negative coefficients correspond to increase in sales (i.e., lower sales rank). The number of reviews variable corresponds to the log of the number of user-generated reviews for each product and the price variable corresponds to the log of the price for each product; the product price has been converted to USD according to the daily exchange ratios between USD and the corresponding currencies (i.e., GBP, CAD, EUR) published by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The product controls include the brand of the product, the product category, and the seller of the product. The additional controls include controls for bank holidays. Robust standard errors are reported. Significance levels: \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001.

#### Table A13: Estimation results of fixed-effect models with non-linear rating effect

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
$1 \leq \text{Pating} \leq 2$	0.2651 ***	0.2700 ***	0.2699 ***
$1 \leq \text{Rating} < 2$	(0.0713)	(0.0716)	(0.0716)
$2 \leq \text{Poting} \leq 2$	0.0894 **	0.0870 **	0.0871 **
$2 \leq \text{Rating} < 3$	(0.0300)	(0.0301)	(0.0301)
$3 \leq \text{Rating} < 4$	0.0103	0.0026	0.0026

	(0.0225)	(0.0224)	(0.0224)
	-0.1031 ***	-0.1099 ***	-0.1098 ***
$4 \leq \text{Rating} \leq 5$	(0.0200)	(0.0200)	(0.0200)
	-0.4111 ***	-0.4181 ***	-0.4186 ***
Number of reviews (log)	(0.0102)	(0.0103)	(0.0103)
	0.5434 ***	0.5427 ***	0.5427 ***
Price (log)	(0.0205)	(0.0205)	(0.0205)
$\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{T}} = \mathbf{f}_{\mathbf{T}} = $	-0.1424 ***	-0.1416 ***	-0.1421 ***
Treatment (IoT eligible)	(0.0070)	(0.0070)	(0.0070)
		0.5380 ***	0.5386 ***
Fraction of solicited reviews		(0.0784)	(0.0784)
Constant	9.0712 ***	9.0808 ***	9.0828 ***
Constant	(0.0646)	(0.0646)	(0.0646)
Product-market fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional product controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time trends	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional controls	No	No	Yes
R-squared	0.2571	0.2588	0.2588
N. of observations	13,680,370	13,680,370	13,680,370

Notes: Panel data analysis with product-market fixed effects, (linear and non-linear) time trends, and non-linear product rating effects. The estimation sample includes observations about treated products before and after the treatment in the market they were treated, these products in other markets where they have not been treated, and non-treated products (in the same market) that are similar to treated products as they belong to the same product category and consumers frequently also view them online when viewing one of the treated products. Negative coefficients correspond to increase in sales (i.e., lower sales rank). The number of reviews variable corresponds to the log of the number of user-generated reviews for each product and the price variable corresponds to the log of the product. The product controls include the brand of the product, the product category, and the seller of the product. The additional controls include controls for bank holidays. Robust standard errors are reported. Significance levels: \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

	markets		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Dating	-0.0232 *	-0.0244 **	-0.0244 **
Rating	(0.0093)	(0.0090)	(0.0090)
Number of reviews (log)	-0.4122 ***	-0.4196 ***	-0.4200 ***
Number of reviews (log)	(0.0316)	(0.0311)	(0.0313)
Price (log)	0.5425 ***	0.5418 ***	0.5417 ***
Price (log)	(0.0455)	(0.0451)	(0.0451)
Treatment (IoT eligible)	-0.1804 ***	-0.1816 ***	-0.1838 ***
Treatment (101 engible)	(0.0386)	(0.0387)	(0.0373)
Fraction of solicited reviews		0.5422 ***	0.5429 ***
Fraction of solicited reviews		(0.0742)	(0.0746)
Constant	8.7239 ***	8.7245 ***	8.7256 ***
Collstallt	(0.2279)	(0.2294)	(0.2296)
Var (Treatment (IoT eligible): Country)	0.0043 ***	0.0045 ***	0.0044 ***
	(0.0027)	(0.0030)	(0.0028)
Product-market effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional product controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time trends	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional controls	No	No	Yes
Log-likelihood	-15,285,844	-15,281,070	-15,279,303

# Table A14: Estimation results of random coefficients model - Heterogeneity of treatment across

# N. of observations 13,680,370 13,680,370 13,680,370

Notes: Panel data analysis with random coefficients model. The estimation sample includes observations about treated products before and after the treatment in the market they were treated, these products in other markets where they have not been treated, and non-treated products (in the same market) that are similar to treated products as they belong to the same product category and consumers frequently also view them online when viewing one of the treated products. Negative coefficients correspond to increase in sales (i.e., lower sales rank). The number of reviews variable corresponds to the log of the number of user-generated reviews for each product and the price variable corresponds to the log of the product. The product controls include the brand of the product, the product category, and the seller of the product. The additional controls include controls for bank holidays. Robust standard errors are reported. Significance levels: \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001.

Table A15: Estimation results of fixed-effect models with observations in a single market			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Detine	-0.0293 ***	-0.0303 ***	-0.0302 ***
Rating	(0.0050)	(0.0050)	(0.0050)
Number of muieuro (100)	-0.4553 ***	-0.4623 ***	-0.4632 ***
Number of reviews (log)	(0.0117)	(0.0118)	(0.0119)
Dring (log)	0.6038 ***	0.6024 ***	0.6025 ***
Price (log)	(0.0264)	(0.0263)	(0.0263)
Treatment (IoT eligible)	-0.1379 ***	-0.1367 ***	-0.1367 ***
	(0.0083)	(0.0083)	(0.0083)
Enantian of colisited nonious		0.5747 ***	0.5759 ***
Fraction of solicited reviews		(0.0963)	(0.0964)
	9.3734 ***	9.3842 ***	9.3880 ***
Constant	(0.0844)	(0.0843)	(0.0844)
Product fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional product controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time trends	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional controls	No	No	Yes
R-squared	0.2956	0.2988	0.2990
N. of observations	9,034,774	9,034,774	9,034,774

N. of observations 9,034,774 9,034,774 9,034,774 9,034,774 Notes: Panel data analysis with product fixed effects and (linear and non-linear) time trends in the US market. The estimation sample includes observations about treated products before and after the treatment in the US market and non-treated products in the same market that are similar to treated products as they belong to the same product category and consumers frequently also view them online when viewing one of the treated products. Negative coefficients correspond to increase in sales (i.e., lower sales rank). The number of reviews variable corresponds to the log of the number of user-generated reviews for each product and the price variable corresponds to the log of the product. The product controls include the brand of the product, the product category, and the seller of the product. The additional controls include controls for bank holidays. Robust standard errors

#### Table A16: Falsification Test (Pseudo-Treatment – Random IoT-eligible product)

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
Deting	-0.0227	***	-0.0240	***	-0.0239	***
Rating	(0.0041)		(0.0041)		(0.0041)	
Number of reviews (log)	-0.4123	***	-0.4197	***	-0.4202	***
Number of reviews (log)	(0.0099)		(0.0101)		(0.0101)	
Drize (log)	0.5444	***	0.5437	***	0.5436	***
Price (log)	(0.0205)		(0.0205)		(0.0205)	
Decudo Treatmont (Decudo product)	-0.0127		-0.0130		-0.0136	
Pseudo-Treatment (Pseudo product)	(0.0112)		(0.0112)		(0.0112)	
			0.5425	***	0.5431	***
Fraction of solicited reviews			(0.0782)		(0.0782)	
Constant	9.0909	***	9.1004	***	9.1024	***

are reported. Significance levels: \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

	(0.0648)	(0.0647)	(0.0647)
Product-market fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional product controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time trends	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional controls	No	No	Yes
R-squared	0.2540	0.2557	0.2557
N. of observations	13,680,370	13,680,370	13,680,370

Notes: Falsification test based on panel data analysis with product-market fixed effects and (linear and non-linear) time trends. The estimation sample includes observations about treated products before and after the treatment in the market they were treated, these products in other markets where they have not been treated, and non-treated products (in the same market) that are similar to treated products as they belong to the same product category and consumers frequently also view them online when viewing one of the treated products. Negative coefficients correspond to increase in sales (i.e., lower sales rank). The number of reviews variable corresponds to the log of the number of user-generated reviews for each product and the price variable corresponds to the log of the product. The pseudo-treatment variable randomly indicates which products were treated in which market and what time period. The product controls include the brand of the product, the product category, and the seller of the product. The additional controls include controls for bank holidays. Robust standard errors are reported. Significance levels: \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

## Table A17: Falsification Test (Pseudo-Treatment – Random market and time period)

Table A17. Faisincation Test (1 seudo-Treatment – Kandom market and time period)			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Rating	-0.0227 ***	-0.0239 ***	-0.0239 ***
	(0.0041)	(0.0041)	(0.0041)
Number of reviews (log)	-0.4124 ***	-0.4198 ***	-0.4202 ***
	(0.0099)	(0.0101)	(0.0101)
$\mathbf{Princ}(1,\mathbf{r})$	0.5444 ***	0.5436 ***	0.5436 ***
Price (log)	(0.0205)	(0.0205)	(0.0205)
Pseudo-Treatment (Pseudo market and	0.0015	0.0004	-0.0006
time period)	(0.0134)	(0.0134)	(0.0134)
Fraction of solicited reviews		0.5424 ***	0.5430 ***
		(0.0782)	(0.0782)
Constant	9.0909 ***	9.1003 ***	9.1023 ***
	(0.0648)	(0.0647)	(0.0647)
Product-market fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional product controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time trends	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional controls	No	No	Yes
R-squared	0.254	0 0.2557	0.2557
N. of observations	13,680,37	0 13,680,370	) 13,680,370

Notes: Falsification test based on panel data analysis with product-market fixed effects and (linear and non-linear) time trends. The estimation sample includes observations about treated products before and after the treatment in the market they were treated, these products in other markets where they have not been treated, and non-treated products (in the same market) that are similar to treated products as they belong to the same product category and consumers frequently also view them online when viewing one of the treated products. Negative coefficients correspond to increase in sales (i.e., lower sales rank). The number of reviews variable corresponds to the log of the number of user-generated reviews for each product. The pseudo-treatment variable randomly indicates for treated products in which market each product was treated and what time period (i.e., random market and time period). The product controls include the brand of the product, the product category, and the seller of the product. The additional controls include controls for bank holidays. Robust standard errors are reported. Significance levels: \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01

## Table A18: Falsification Test (Pseudo-Treatment – Random market)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Rating	-0.0227 ***	-0.0240 ***	-0.0239 ***
	(0.0041)	(0.0041)	(0.0041)

Number of reviews (log)	-0.4124 ***	-0.4198 ***	-0.4202 ***
	(0.0099)	(0.0101)	(0.0101)
Price (log)	0.5444 ***	0.5436 ***	0.5436 ***
	(0.0205)	(0.0205)	(0.0205)
Describe Tractment (Describe mentret)	-0.0012	-0.0005	-0.0005
Pseudo-Treatment (Pseudo market)	(0.0123)	(0.0123)	(0.0123)
Enertian of colisited nerviews		0.5424 ***	0.5430 ***
Fraction of solicited reviews		(0.0782)	(0.0782)
Constant	9.0909 ***	9.1003 ***	9.1023 ***
Constant	(0.0648)	(0.0647)	(0.0647)
Product-market fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional product controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time trends	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional controls	No	No	Yes
R-squared	0.2540	0.2557	0.2557
N. of observations	13,680,370	13,680,370	13,680,370

Notes: Falsification test based on panel data analysis with product-market fixed effects and (linear and non-linear) time trends. The estimation sample includes observations about treated products before and after the treatment in the market they were treated, these products in other markets where they have not been treated, and non-treated products (in the same market) that are similar to treated products as they belong to the same product category and consumers frequently also view them online when viewing one of the treated products. Negative coefficients correspond to increase in sales (i.e., lower sales rank). The number of reviews variable corresponds to the log of the number of user-generated reviews for each product and the price variable corresponds to the log of the price for each product. The pseudo-treatment variable randomly indicates for treated products and the time period they were treated in which market they were treated (i.e., random market). The product controls include the brand of the product, the product category, and the seller of the product. The additional controls include controls for bank holidays. Robust standard errors are reported. Significance levels: p<0.05, \*\*p<0.01, \*\*\*p<0.001

### Table A19: Falsification Test (Pseudo-Treatment – Random time period)

Table A19: Faisincation Test (Fseudo-Treatment – Kandoin time period)			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Rating	-0.0227 ***	-0.0240 ***	-0.0239 ***
	(0.0041)	(0.0041)	(0.0041)
Number of reviews (log)	-0.4124 ***	-0.4198 ***	-0.4202 ***
	(0.0099)	(0.0101)	(0.0101)
Price (log)	0.5444 ***	0.5436 ***	0.5436 ***
	(0.0205)	(0.0205)	(0.0205)
Pseudo-Treatment (Pseudo time	0.0063	0.0060	0.0062
period)	(0.0087)	(0.0087)	(0.0087)
Fraction of solicited reviews		0.5423 ***	0.5429 ***
		(0.0782)	(0.0782)
Constant	9.0908 ***	9.1003 ***	9.1022 ***
	(0.0648)	(0.0647)	(0.0647)
Product-market fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional product controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time trends	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional controls	No	No	Yes
R-squared	0.253	9 0.2557	0.2557
N. of observations	13,680,370	0 13,680,370	13,680,370

Notes: Falsification test based on panel data analysis with product-market fixed effects and (linear and non-linear) time trends. The estimation sample includes observations about treated products before and after the treatment in the market they were treated, these products in other markets where they have not been treated, and non-treated products (in the same market) that are similar to treated products as they belong to the same product category and consumers frequently also view them online when viewing one of the treated products. Negative coefficients correspond to increase in sales (i.e., lower sales rank). The number of reviews variable corresponds to the log of the number of user-generated reviews for each product and the price variable corresponds to

the log of the price for each product. The pseudo-treatment variable randomly indicates for treated products in the market they were treated what time period they were treated (i.e., random time period). The product controls include the brand of the product, the product category, and the seller of the product. The additional controls include controls for bank holidays. Robust standard errors are reported. Significance levels: \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001

Table A20: Falsification Test ("Placebo" Outcome)			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Rating	0.0778 *	0.0744	0.0744
	(0.0377)	(0.0381)	(0.0381)
Number of reviews (log)	-0.2999 ***	-0.2826 ***	-0.2826 ***
	(0.0561)	(0.0597)	(0.0598)
Price (log)	0.0903	0.0918	0.0918
	(0.0475)	(0.0474)	(0.0474)
Treatment (IoT eligible)	0.0255	0.0252	0.0251
	(0.0138)	(0.0138)	(0.0138)
Fraction of solicited reviews		-0.4203	-0.4203
		(0.4294)	(0.4294)
Constant	10.4136 ***	10.3553 ***	10.3548 ***
	(0.2766)	(0.2814)	(0.2815)
Product-market fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional product controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time trends	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional controls	No	No	Yes
R-squared	0.0551	0.0550	0.0550
N. of observations	1,024,521	1,024,521	1,024,521

Notes: Panel data analysis with product-market fixed effects, (linear and non-linear) time trends and a placebo outcome (i.e., the sales rank of the exact same product in Canada where the IoT technology was not adopted at all for any product). The estimation sample includes observations about treated products before and after the treatment in the market they were treated and non-treated products (in the same market) that are similar to treated products as they belong to the same product category and consumers frequently also view them online when viewing one of the treated products. Negative coefficients correspond to an increase in sales (i.e., lower sales rank). The number of reviews variable corresponds to the log of the number of user-generated reviews for each product and the price variable corresponds to the log of the product. The product controls include the brand of the product, the product category, and the seller of the product. The additional controls include controls for bank holidays. Robust standard errors are reported. Significance levels: \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001




Figure A1: Schematic representation of the product purchase process via the IoT channel.




Figure A2: Schematic representation of the main components of the IoT device chip.




Figure A3: Schematic representation of the different types of observations in our dataset for three markets (A, B, and C) and two –similar to each other– products one of which became eligible for purchase via the IoT channel in two markets (product 1 became eligible in market A at time t<sub>1</sub>, un market B at a later time t<sub>2</sub>, and did not become eligible in market C) while the other (product 2) did not become available in this channel in any market.




Figure A4: Time series of average sales rank in the pre-treatment era for Treated and Control product groups.




Figure A5: Time series of average sales rank in the pre-treatment era for Treated and Control product groups in the US.




Figure A6: Longitudinal shifts in product sales after the release of the IoT technology.