M A R K E T I N G S C I E N C E I N S T I T U T E

Social Alliances: Company/Nonprofit Collaboration

Minette E. Drumwright
Peggy H. Cunningham
Ida E. Berger

WORKING PAPER • REPORT NO. 00-101 • 2000

W O R K I N G P A P E R S E R I E S

The authors thank the Marketing Science Institute, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, and research grant programs at The University of Texas at Austin and Queen's University for their support of this work.

Social Alliances: Company/ Nonprofit Collaboration

Minette E. Drumwright, Peggy H. Cunningham, and Ida E. Berger

More and more companies are supporting social causes while advancing their business goals. Likewise, nonprofit organizations are increasingly reaching beyond their traditional sources and modes of support to tap corporate coffers. Some collaborative efforts between companies and nonprofit organizations have moved beyond cause marketing and strategic philanthropy to encompass close, mutually beneficial, long-term relationships designed to accomplish strategic goals for each partner. Drumwright, Cunningham, and Berger label these partnerships "social alliances."

Social alliances can create and enhance financial capital, human capital, and social capital for both partners; however, even the best alliances can experience problems, usually the result of an organization's inexperience in working with the other sector.

The authors investigate 11 social alliances involving 26 organizations in order to identify and discuss these predictable problems, recommend solutions to overcome or at least mitigate them, explicate best practice and its distinguishing characteristics, and finally, discuss the potential payoffs of social alliances.

Findings and Managerial Implications

Many social alliance problems are rooted in cultural differences between the sectors—some of which are real, some perceived. There are six categories of predictable problems: misconceptions, misallocation of costs and benefits, misuses of power, mismatches, misfortunes of time, and mistrust. There is no single prescription for preempting such problems. However, they can be anticipated and mitigated through a consideration of (1) the fit between the company, the nonprofit, and its cause, and (2) the structural characteristics of the nonprofit, the company, and the social alliance itself. Both may be influenced through the choice of partners.

The best social alliances involve intensive educational efforts and demand considerable learning on the part of both partners. Nonprofits have opportunities to learn business skills from companies, and companies have opportunities to learn how to motivate and energize people, manage volunteer efforts, and allocate charitable donations more effectively. Commitment to the social alliance must be diffused through both the company and the nonprofit organization. Networks of engagement within both organizations facilitate this process. Mobilization occurs through various forms of adaptation on the parts of both partners. This requires matched structures, aligned processes, compatible performance measures, and integrated managements.

Finally, if there is anything universal about successful social alliances, it is that entrepreneurship abounds. Nonprofits as well as companies have substantial entrepreneurial obligations, and "social alliance entrepreneurs" are needed within both organizations. These individuals must be both boundary spanners and boundary protectors, and most importantly, they must discern when to play these quite different roles.

Minette E. Drumwright is Assistant Professor, College of Communication, The University of Texas at Austin, Peggy H. Cunningham is Associate Professor, School of Business, Queen's University, and Ida E. Berger is Associate Professor, School of Business, Queen's University.

Contents

Introduction

An unmistakable trend is afoot, and a confluence of trends assures that it will continue. More and more companies are supporting social causes while advancing their business goals. Likewise, more and more nonprofit organizations are reaching beyond their traditional sources and modes of support to tap corporate coffers. Increasingly, corporate social responsibility appears on the agenda of blue chip companies as they compete in a global marketplace. The websites of more than 80 percent of Fortune 500 companies address social responsibility (Esrock and Leichty 1998). Surveys attest to the positive effects of corporate social initiatives on consumer buying behavior (e.g., *Cone/Roper Study* 1993; *Cone/Roper Cause-Related Marketing Trends Report* 1997). A recent experiment suggests that socially responsible actions on the part of firms, such as donating to charities, buying national goods, and supporting community activities, legitimize organizations and result in greater consumer support (Handleman and Arnold 1999). Other academic studies suggest that socially responsible actions on the part of companies can enhance consumer attitudes (Brown and Dacin 1977; Creyer and Ross 1997; Ellen, Mohr, and Webb 1997). Think tanks such as the Aspen Institute have formed venues and forums for examining corporate social responsibility in general, and corporate marketing initiatives in particular.

Corporate support of nonprofit activities is increasingly important since government funding has decreased dramatically. Rivalry and competition among nonprofits has increased, spurred, in part, by a proliferation of new nonprofits. In response, nonprofit managers are adopting and adapting business management techniques. Called "professionalization" by their advocates and "businessification" by their detractors, these trends nonetheless prompt nonprofits to consider nontraditional ways of raising revenues.

Company/nonprofit collaborative efforts have been heralded as a new philanthropic paradigm (Smith 1994; Andreasen 1996). These practices have variously been labeled as social marketing for business, cause marketing, cause-related marketing, corporate issue promotion, corporate social marketing, and corporate societal marketing (Andreasen 1996; Bloom, Hussein, and Szykman 1995; Drumwright and Murphy forthcoming; Sarner and Nathanson 1996; Varadarajan and Menon 1988). Some of these initiatives have evolved beyond cause marketing or philanthropy to encompass close, mutually beneficial, long-term partnerships designed to accomplish strategic goals for both entities. They involve the sharing of resources, knowledge, and capabilities. Such partnerships between companies are called "strategic alliances" (Spekman et al. 1995; Varadarajan and Cunningham 1995). When these partnerships span the for-profit/nonprofit boundary, we label them "social alliances."[1] Social alliances are distinguished from strategic alliances by at least two characteristics. First, they involve at least one nonprofit partner. Second, in addition to traditional economic objectives, social alliances include one or more of what has been identified as "noneconomic" objectives focused on improving social welfare (Drumwright 1994, 1996).

For businesses, social alliances can represent a melding of corporate strategy and social responsibility. For nonprofits, they can provide access to resources that go far beyond cash contributions to include managerial advice, technological and communications support, and a skilled volunteer workforce. Additional resources, in turn, enable new strategic approaches for nonprofit organizations.

Despite the growth of social alliances, there has been little formal research about them. The objectives of this research are multiple. First, we identify the predictable problems that plague social alliances, after which we elaborate on how they can be preempted or mitigated. We then describe best practice. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of the various types of capital resources created by social alliances. A discussion of the background and a description of our methods precede the findings.

Background

Two ongoing dialogues are germane to this research. One involves company marketing initiatives with a social dimension that are variously labeled as social marketing for business, cause marketing, cause-related marketing, corporate issue promotion, corporate social marketing, and corporate societal marketing (e.g., Andreasen 1996; Bloom, Hussein, and Szykman 1995; Drumwright and Murphy forthcoming; Sarner and Nathanson 1996; Varadarajan and Menon 1988).[2] The other dialogue involves the application and adaptation of commercial marketing techniques to the social sector, which is typically referred to as social marketing (e.g., Andreasen 1994, 1995; Bloom and Novelli 1981; Kotler and Zaltman 1971; Rangan, Karim, and Sandberg 1996; Rothschild 1969, 1999).

Research on company marketing initiatives with a social dimension has focused primarily on communications programs, most commonly cause-related marketing and advertising with a social dimension (e.g., Berger, Cunningham, and Kozinets 1998; Sen and Bhattacharya 1999; Creyer and Ross 1997; Drumwright 1996; Webb and Mohr 1998; Morton 1999; Strahilevitz and Myers 1998; Varadarajan and Menon 1988). Cause-related marketing and advertising are typically short-term efforts. Though these efforts may be a part of a longer-term collaborative effort between a company and a nonprofit such as a social alliance, very little work has focused on the partnership itself. In addition, existing work predominately has examined consumers' reactions rather than managerial concerns.[3]

Work on the application and adaptation of commercial marketing techniques to the social sector has been focused largely on what marketing approaches nonprofits and governmental agencies should use and how they should manage their marketing functions and tasks (e.g., Andreasen 1994, 1995; Fine 1981; Kotler and Andreasen 1996; Rothschild 1999; Stout and Sego 1995). It has also been fraught with debates over domains and definitions (see Andreasen 1994) and ethics (see Cunningham 1996). There has been much less emphasis given to collaborative efforts between companies and nonprofits. A notable exception is a *Harvard Business Review* article by Andreasen (1996) that identifies the various forms that cross-sector endeavors take.

Methods

When the research objective is to understand complex interactions, diffuse processes, and perceptions, beliefs, and values that are often tacit, field-based approaches and elite interviews are particularly appropriate. Since such understanding was our primary goal, elite interviews are our primary data source. They are especially useful when one cannot be sure what interpretation, code, norm, affect, or rule is guiding the actors (Dexter 1970; Fielding and Fielding 1986; Marshall and Rossman 1989; Miles and Huberman 1994; Strauss 1990). In the social science literature, the term “elite interviews” is commonly used to refer to interviews of decisionmakers as opposed to consumers, an electorate, or a mass population (Dexter 1970). Elite interviews or “long” interviews (Holstein and Gubrium 1995; McCracken 1988) are different from highly structured survey research interviews. The latter are useful for predicting behavior and generalizing to populations about behavior; the former are designed to ascertain the decisionmakers’ understanding. Elite interviewing is a particularly useful tool when one wants to understand the meaning of events and actions to the actors. It stresses the informant’s definition of the situation, encourages the informant to structure the account of the situation, and allows the informant to reveal his or her notions of what is relevant (Dexter 1970; King 1994; McCracken 1988; Schwartzman 1993).

To qualify as a research site, partnerships had to meet the criteria specified by our definition of social alliances. Specifically, both the company and the nonprofit had to have strategic goals for the partnership, and both had to embrace a noneconomic objective focused on improving social welfare. In addition, the relationships had to involve a long-term commitment and had to have evolved well beyond the initial phases of strategic philanthropy or cause-related marketing. We required that the partnerships be at least four years in age. Eleven social alliances involving 26 organizations were examined: 10 companies,[4] 11 nonprofits, and 5 consulting organizations (advertising agencies, public relations firms, and business consultants). The consulting organizations were identified by informants at our research sites as playing important roles in their social alliances. The social alliances ranged in age from 4 to 14 years. The companies ranged in revenues from $800 million to more than $100 billion and represented a variety of industries. The nonprofits ranged from $6 million to more than $900 million in income, and they represented a variety of causes.

At each site, we interviewed multiple informants in an attempt to get as complete an understanding of the social alliance as possible. Sixty-nine indepth personal interviews were conducted with representatives of the companies, nonprofit organizations, and consulting organizations involved in the 11 social alliances. The study was also informed by 21 additional interviews with people involved in company/nonprofit relationships that did not qualify as a social alliance. Anonymity was provided to all informants and organizations to increase frankness and to mitigate against biases related to social desirability and posturing. The interviews were recorded and transcribed, except in a few situations in which recording was infeasible.

The interview protocol is shown in the appendix. It was developed based on preliminary interviews with 15 experts, including professors with expertise in marketing, advertising, management, or qualitative methods and practitioners with experience with company/nonprofit collaborative efforts. It was pretested with a manager from a company, the head of a foundation, and a manager from a nonprofit organization, all of whom have been involved in social alliances.

Data also were collected from eight other sources to enable triangulation: (1) participant observation when we were invited to attend meetings or other forums in which we had an opportunity to watch the partners interact, (2) internal documents (e.g., reports, memos, briefing papers), (3) communications between the partners (e.g., memos, proposals), (4) internal publications (e.g., employee magazines, newsletters), (5) documents for external distribution (e.g., print advertisements, press releases, brochures), (6) articles from newspapers and magazines, (7) videos of commercials and broadcast news stories, and (8) videos of presentations by executives (e.g., press conferences, speeches, presentations at sales meetings).

The data were analyzed systematically and intensively using standard qualitative data analytic methods (Strauss 1990; Spiggle 1994; Drumwright 1994, 1996). The three authors analyzed the data independently. The results presented are those that were identified and agreed upon by all three. Quotations are used extensively to add transparency in addition to depth of understanding. When used, quotations are representative of what was expressed by a number of informants unless otherwise noted.

Findings

Predictable Problems

> People are talking in different languages. They have different primary objectives. . . .The nonprofit sector is based more generally on process and principle, and the profit sector is based on products and profit. . . . It's like sleeping with the devil. (I 67)[5]

Even the best social alliances can be fraught with problems that can significantly impede or undermine them completely. Many of the problems are predictable and can be preempted or at least mitigated if they are anticipated and dealt with appropriately. Many of these problems are rooted in cultural differences between the sectors—some of which are real, some perceived. Often they result from an organization's inexperience in working with the other sector, and little has been written to guide intersector collaboration. We discuss six categories of predictable problems: misconceptions, misallocation of costs and benefits, misuses of power, mismatches, the misfortunes of time, and mistrust.

Misconceptions

Misconceptions encompass a broad set of phenomena, ranging from macro-level misunderstandings of the context within which a partner operates to micro-level misperceptions of each other's objectives for the social alliance. They tend to occur most frequently in the early phases of the social alliance lifecycle. Here we focus on a few that were mentioned frequently and that are suggestive of other types of misconceptions.

It is common for both partners to have simplistic understandings of the other's endeavors and contexts. Company managers often have little understanding of the nonprofit cause or how to have an impact on it systematically. For example, it typically comes as a surprise to company managers that causes have complicated politics and that people within a given cause community have dramatically different ideas about how resources should be employed.[6] Companies can become mired in the unfamiliar politics of a cause, which can be devastating for an alliance. One informant, whose company received harsh criticism in the newspaper, reported:

> So we had this front page [critical news story], and they were yelling at us. They were angry at us! And here we were trying to do this good thing! . . . I really didn't know about the others until I read it in the [newspaper]. Like, who are these people? Why are they so angry? I didn't even know their side . . . the politics of it. . . . So it was quite a surprise to me that there were people who didn't want the money to go to research. . . . We jumped in too fast. . . . We didn't do enough homework. (I 19)

Likewise, nonprofit managers typically have little sophistication in their understanding of the company's business. This can lead to various problems including expectations and requests that the company managers view as inappropriate, which can become self-defeating for the alliance. For example, one company alliance manager spoke of having to explain repeatedly to nonprofit managers why the company's "local level sales representatives can't devote 30 hours a week to their program. . . . [The nonprofit] forgets that our representatives do in fact sell [the company's] products to make money. . . . That's something I look to manage all the time" (I 38).

Both players often have misconceptions about their partner's objectives. Even when the overall, joint objective for the alliance is clarified, a player's individual objectives may go unspoken and unspecified. At times, the partners themselves do not have well-formulated objectives. One senior nonprofit manager, who is experienced in multiple company partnerships, asserted that "50 percent of the corporations don't have a clue about what they want to accomplish" when contemplating an alliance (I 69). Partners often are uncomfortable probing each other regarding objectives and measures of success, especially measures. Of course, if objectives are unclear, subsequent discussions about what constitutes success and how it will be measured are destined for disaster.

Partners frequently have mistaken ideas regarding what social alliances can accomplish and the time and complexity involved in addressing social issues. This can lead to wildly unrealistic expectations. Companies may expect social alliances to be quick fixes for image problems—typically an impossible assignment. Nonprofits may try to sell the benefits of forming an alliance using a "formula-driven" approach rather than taking the time to develop a customized program based on a deep understanding of the company's business.

Misconceptions can result from the speed with which the partnership is conceived and implemented and/or the intensity of the desire to get the partnership launched. Often, alliances are initiated under time pressure, which typically is imposed by the company. We repeatedly heard from company informants that they had underestimated the time and effort required to launch the alliance.

Misallocation of Costs and Benefits

Not unlike a strained marriage, often one or both parties come to perceive a misallocation of costs and benefits, especially in relation to their partner's. This often is the core issue that underlies many and varied problematic symptoms of partnership breakdown. Predictably, some companies were concerned that their resources would be overly exploited for minimal gain. Surprisingly, this same concern permeated the nonprofit domain. Social alliances can quickly become overly taxing for the nonprofit partner, which typically has fewer resources and tighter constraints than the company. A nonprofit informant expressed her frustration with the added burden that the social alliance had created:

> Who is it that does "the thing" [social alliance]? So we were in essence (the company's) promotion agency. It was horrendous because . . . it

> became my full-time job. . . . We never have enough time. There is never enough time; no matter how early we start, there is never enough time to do it. (I 54)

Another complained that company managers “often ask for things without thinking of the time and resources it takes us to accomplish the task. They don’t think of the costs to us” (I 66).

At times, nonprofits perceive that their company partners not only make unreasonable demands, but they also fail to give the social alliance the priority it deserves. While a social alliance may be *the* prime marketing opportunity for a nonprofit, it is typically only one of many promotional programs undertaken by their corporate partners. As one manager from a prominent nonprofit organization asserted:

> I think the biggest problem . . . is that we’re never first on their [the company’s] plate. We always come, I would say, almost last. . . . I’m always being pushed back further and further and further (I 36).

The inattention is commonly accompanied by insufficient resources. In one company, a social alliance manager reported that she “went around with a tin cup” and pleaded with various managers to designate funding from their budgets so the alliance could continue (I 22).

Companies often tend to perceive that the benefits of the social alliance are too low. For example, companies typically expect nonprofits to exercise initiative in bringing value to the alliance. This demands a level of entrepreneurship and enterprise uncommon in many nonprofits. Because of limited financial resources, nonprofits tend to be conservative, and are thus uncomfortable with the level of risk that entrepreneurial initiatives require. Too little initiative on a nonprofit’s part can end a partnership, as one company informant explained regarding an aborted attempt:

> I felt the [nonprofit] was ineffective in providing us with partnership opportunities. . . . And I don’t think that they ever really came back to us with creative ideas . . . and the relationship began to break down horribly. (I 41)

It is common for the nonprofit’s contribution to be undervalued. Sometimes this is because the nonprofit managers do not themselves understand their own organization’s strengths or how to leverage them to create value. At other times, it is because company managers do not understand or appreciate the nonprofit’s contribution or know how to measure it. A consultant intimately involved in a social alliance observed:

> I think that the culture of many corporations is such that they may place a very limited value on [the social contribution of the alliance]. It’s too amorphous, and it’s flimsy for them to quantify the value. They really don’t have a way to measure what they’re getting. And unless they’re validated by press reports or something else that is in a currency that they understand, they don’t stick with it. And that is a continuing problem. (I 68)

Companies often have what nonprofit managers perceive to be an insatiable appetite for favorable publicity about the alliance, despite their claims that the social alliance is not a public relations effort. As one company manager expressed:

> It's hard to get the recognition. . . . I think of my boss. . . . What he wants to see is recognition. I think that is the most frustrating thing for him. . . . "Are we getting enough recognition?" We have done some good work, and sometimes it seems like other companies are getting more recognition. . . . He wants to see more recognition. . . . So that is my biggest challenge right now. (I 14)

Not only can the appetite for publicity unduly stress the alliance, but it also can distract it from the relationship building tasks at hand.

After the excitement of the new venture has worn off, companies can come to perceive their responsibilities and duties to the social alliance as burdensome and costly. Often they become concerned about the level of dependence that the non-profit is developing and anxious about having to provide what they fear will be an excessive amount of support in the future. A company informant made the following comment regarding a failed social alliance:

> I wish that they [the nonprofit] had . . . evolved to . . . understanding that self-sufficiency is a goal here, and that we can't be counted on from now to eternity. And that to have a secure financial future for this program involves a broad base of funders, not just a single funder. . . . And I have said this to them, . . . "I cannot go forward for the rest of my life with as many sleepless nights as I've had worrying about not raising enough money to keep you all going." (I 38)

Misuses of Power

Social alliances are often characterized by imbalances in power. We had expected companies to be the more powerful partners, but in two social alliances, the non-profit actually wielded more power. Power, of course, is closely correlated with the assets that a partner brings to the table. As one nonprofit informant observed, "If the [nonprofit] organization isn't sure what it offers then it makes it difficult to see that they have any power in the relationship" (I 67). The more powerful partner could and often did dominate, intentionally or unintentionally, often with the best of intentions but typically with less than the best outcomes. The result was that the weaker partner sometimes was treated in a patronizing and dismissive manner, which is demoralizing and enervating.

Manifestations of dominance often involve issues of ownership and exclusivity. It is not unusual for an alliance to be branded using only the company's name; the nonprofit receives credit in small print. For example, a walk to raise money for cardiac research is likely to become the ACME Walk for Heart Health Research. Typically, there are arrangements, formal or informal, regarding exclusivity:

> We have no arrangement with any of our not-for-profit organizations that have non-compete clauses in them, but certainly there are

> some understandings of how our relationship needs to be protected in a world that's very, very competitive. (I 38)

Such an "understanding" precludes the nonprofit from working with a company that could even be remotely considered one of the company's competitors. Ironically, the company felt free to work with two "competing" nonprofits aligned with the same cause. Such arrangements, whether formal or informal, enable a company to "own" a position by associating itself with the cause, but it can limit the total amount of funding the nonprofit can access. The nonprofit may have to forfeit opportunities to work with a large category of companies whose constituents are likely to be sympathetic to the cause.

Dominance by a company was often perceived as intrusive and inappropriate. The company can easily be perceived as dictatorial. As one company manager explained:

> So there was some struggle. . . . We [the company] were . . . like, "This is the program. This is how it's going to work. This is what we've got to do, and let's just do it because we don't have a lot of time." Whereas, they [the nonprofit] weren't quite that . . . style. . . . I think we started realizing that we were losing some elements of creativity, some elements of teambuilding by imposing . . . that style. (I 22)

A nonprofit informant spoke of "a lot more hands-on management" that became "a power struggle that was growing" and developed into "a micromanagement issue that went on and on" (I 9). Other nonprofit managers reported company managers who meddled in the nonprofit's core activities, even the ones in which they felt they had the most expertise and in which the company manager had the least. Typically, the stronger partner assumes that its timelines, priorities, structures, and processes should take precedence, which can result in what its partner perceives to be unreasonable demands. An informant described with dismay the sense of entitlement that characterizes some of her for-profit partners. She lamented the fact that no matter how busy she is, company managers always want and feel entitled to immediate attention because of the resources they are providing:

> You know this is a priority phone call; it doesn't matter what you are doing, . . . the tone is, "Stop what you are doing and help us because you have an obligation to . . . because we funded you to do this." . . . And it's not a nice thing to hear . . . how money in the end is the thing that could make you sit up and take note and respond . . . and make them more important than another call or another project that you have on your plate. (I 66)

Interestingly, in the two cases in which the nonprofits were the more powerful partners, complaints did not center on misuses of power but on the excessive bureaucracy and inflexibility of the nonprofit partner.

Mismatches

There are numerous dimensions upon which a company and a nonprofit can experience a mismatch. These dimensions run the gamut from the relational to the structural, from what the organization does to how it does it. A company informant referred to both organizational and personal factors in examining a failed social alliance:

> [The senior executive] got on the [nonprofit] board, and he saw how the organization functioned and realized that it's really a very heavy-duty lobbying organization and [he] just didn't really hit it off from a chemistry perspective with the people who ran the [nonprofit]. (I 41)

There may be a mismatch of decisionmaking styles, which is sometimes reflected in and reinforced by structural differences. Companies, which typically have more formal hierarchy, may have faster, more authoritarian approaches to decision-making, while nonprofits, which typically have flatter organizational structures, may have slower, more participative approaches. A mismatch may also exist between the constituencies of the two organizations, which may be debilitating. For example, in one social alliance the company's rural, white, conservative employees had difficulty relating to the nonprofit's progressive cause and its urban, minority constituency. In another, a retailer with a majority of female employees was harshly criticized by its male employees for forming a social alliance serving a female-related health cause.

Misfortunes of Time

> I've described it [the social alliance] to people recently like a marriage. And we've been married now, six, seven years. And in any marriage, it's like, O.K., how can we make it exciting? And that's exactly where I feel like we are with [the nonprofit]. . . . It's like we've got to rework this to keep it going. (I 41)

A lifecycle in any relationship is inevitable, and the consequences are often harsh. The honeymoon ends; the novelty wears off. More tangibly, key people change jobs. Any relationship—a marriage, a strategic alliance, or a social alliance—needs to be refreshed and renewed, which requires the committed and continual efforts of both partners. Ironically, just as partners are learning to live together and deal with relational problems, they begin to face new pressures. Not only is it difficult to create a feeling of novelty internally, but the external benefits often become more difficult to achieve. Given the importance of recognition to companies, the passing of time places additional stress on individual social alliances to produce. The newsworthiness of the alliance typically diminishes. Partners rack their brains for the next breakthrough concept or event, which may drain time and resources from other alliance tasks. At a more aggregate level, as social alliances proliferate, the effects of wear out and "commodification" become more pronounced. As of this writing, more than 70 corporations now have significant partnerships with the breast cancer cause. Such proliferation makes it even more difficult to break through the clutter with a social alliance message.

Problems of a maturing alliance are not all so relational or exceptional. Some are mundane and common to any business venture, such as the failure to plan an exit strategy. For some reason, however, partners in social alliances do not seem to anticipate them. A prime example, though one can imagine many others, is the turnover of key people. It is one of the most predictable problems. Businesses know that they have to prepare for turnover in other endeavors, but when it comes to the alliance, both partners seem to ignore this fact of organizational life. Social alliance champions may be board members, senior managers, designated alliance managers, brand managers, department directors, or others. When one of these key individuals resigns, retires, or even gets promoted, alliances may become vulnerable. As one nonprofit informant explained:

> I didn't see it coming, frankly, I really didn't. The individual who was spearheading it [the social alliance] happened to sit on our board. He retired. Big blow to us, and a lesson to us not to count too much on one individual, but to spread it around a bit. . . . When he left, all of a sudden there was nobody championing our cause. (I 63)

In many cases, turnover is more pronounced in firms. When the primary champion within the company is a brand manager, the social alliance is particularly vulnerable because brand managers frequently have a tenure of only two or three years.

Mistrust

The preceding sets of problems often culminate in mistrust. When mistrust exists, it can result in covert behavior, opportunism, and further breakdowns in communication, which compound the other problems. As in relationship marketing (Morgan and Hunt 1994), social alliances cannot be successful without trust, which must undergird commitment to the relationship.

Anticipating and Preempting Predictable Problems

There is no single prescription for preempting predictable problems. However, predictable problems can be anticipated and mitigated through a consideration of two sets of issues, which can be influenced to at least some degree through the choice of partners. The first involves the fit between the company and the nonprofit. The second involves structure—the nonprofit's structural characteristics, the company's structural characteristics, and the structural characteristics of the social alliance itself.

Company/Nonprofit Fit

We discuss seven dimensions of fit between the company and the nonprofit and its cause, which are summarized in Table 1. Fit on these dimensions can favorably affect a number of predictable problems—not just those related to mismatches.

Table 1. Company/Nonprofit Fit

Mission Fit	Attention, priority, share of mind	Is involvement in the social alliance an expression of the company's mission or vision? Is the social alliance cause at the core of the mission of the nonprofit?
Management Fit	Managerial engagement and support	Do the leaders of the two organizations have personal chemistry? Do strong personal bonds exist among counterparts at multiple levels?
Workforce Fit	Enhancing organizational identification, providing volunteer support	Is there a fit between the company's workforce and the cause such that they have or will develop an affinity for the cause and become involved in grassroots efforts?
Target Market Fit	Creating differential advantage, providing volunteer support	Is there a demographic, geographic, and/or psychographic fit between the members of the target market such that they have or will develop an affinity for the cause? Are the nonprofit's constituents opinion leaders or key purchase influencers vis-à-vis the company's product?
Product/Cause Fit	Creating value through co-branding	Can an endorsement by the nonprofit be construed? Is there a compatible positioning between the company and the nonprofit organization, which is based on an element of strategic similarity?
Cycle Fit	Timing congruence	Do the business cycle of the firm and the fundraising cycle of the nonprofit align? Do the schedules of the two organizations coincide enough to permit collaboration on key tasks?
Cultural Fit	Ease of implementation and management	Has the nonprofit adopted business practices? Does the company have a participative management style? Are people valued in the same way by both organizations?

Mission Fit. Mission fit refers to a connection between the mission of an organization, whether company or nonprofit, and the social alliance. The attention that a company gives to a social alliance is substantially higher when the alliance is an expression of the company's vision or mission rather than merely another way to seek a competitive advantage. A company informant explained the strong connection between his company's mission and the alliance:

> The [company] vision is lofty. We want to be recognized by [customers] around the world as the company that's committed to their needs. . . . We're trying to redefine in a sense [through the social alliance] what [company name] is all about and create a compelling image. It's [the social alliance] basically a platform for developing this broader image of [company name] being committed to [customers]. (I 4)

Likewise, if the cause adopted by the social alliance is central to the mission of the nonprofit or the area in which strategic growth is planned, the social alliance is more likely to receive high priority. When nonprofits represent multiple causes, mission alignment can be much more challenging.

Management Fit. Compatibility on a personal level among the leaders of the two organizations can be helpful, especially in launching a social alliance. Ideally, strong personal bonds develop at multiple levels. It is critical, however, that linkages are forged between the most senior managers and the managers who work with the social alliance on a day-to-day basis and their counterparts in the partner organization. Such a bond is facilitated if company managers have had salient, personal experiences with the cause. For example, North American managers who travel regularly to Third World countries described how their repeated exposure to problems related to poverty and insufficient health care enable them to relate to nonprofit managers and the work they do. Others spoke of increased appreciation for a cause that they had developed through the experiences of friends or relatives. Notably, some of the most committed and effective social alliance managers, whether in companies or nonprofits, have had work experience in the other sector. These individuals appear to traverse more easily the boundaries between the two sectors.

Workforce Fit. The fit between the company's workforce and the cause refers to the affinity that company employees have for the cause. A high degree of workforce fit provides two ways through which the value of the alliance can be increased. First, corporate social initiatives have the potential of increasing organizational identification among employees (Drumwright 1996). Organizational identification is the degree to which employees define themselves by the same characteristics with which they define their work organization. It is shaped by two images: (1) what employees themselves think about the organization, and (2) what employees perceive that others think about the organization (Dutton, Dukerich, and Harquail 1994). Social alliances can affect both images. A high degree of organizational identification can result in job satisfaction, organizational commitment, and desirable work-related behaviors such as intraorganizational cooperation and higher retention (Chatman 1991; Dutton, Dukerich, and Harquail 1994; O'Reilly and Chatman 1986; O'Reilly, Chatman, and Caldwell 1991). Second, when there is a workforce fit, employees are much more likely to become involved with the cause in their communities, which increases support for the nonprofit.

Target Market Fit. A high degree of fit between a cause and a company's target market can take two forms. One occurs when a company's customers have a genuine affinity for a cause, viewing it both as important and relevant. The other is when a nonprofit's constituents are opinion leaders with respect to the product or key influencers in business-to-business purchase decisions.

Target market fit enables the value of an alliance to be leveraged through two routes. First, companies typically hope to achieve a differential advantage through their association with the cause, giving customers a reason to prefer their offerings. This is much more likely to occur when customers have a genuine affinity for the cause or when the nonprofit's constituency includes respected opinion leaders vis-à-vis the product. Second, when customers have an affinity for the cause, the social alliance is much more likely to be successful in engaging them in grassroots efforts on behalf of the cause, increasing support for the nonprofit. Grassroots efforts can redound to a company's benefit as well. They can provide companies with an additional venue for positive, meaningful interactions with their customers and potential customers.

The degree of fit with a target market must be examined in terms of three dimensions: demographics, geography, and psychographics. The greater the fit on all, the better. Demographic fit often encompasses gender but is stronger when it encompasses socioeconomic factors as well. For example, in one alliance a women's health issue that is high on the national agenda was selected because of the company's predominately female customer base. However, the fit was strengthened because of the socioeconomic match between the cause and the target customers, who were underserved medically and thus particularly vulnerable to having the disease go undetected. The potential for geographic fit is also important. In social alliances with good geographic fit, the nonprofits have operating units or initiatives in the areas in which the customer base is concentrated. These provide visibility for the cause and offer venues for consumer involvement at a grassroots level. One company informant referred to such a fit as a program with "local legs" (I 22). Psychographic mismatches, while difficult to describe without revealing identities of companies and causes, tend to occur with more controversial causes, around which people polarize, such as aspects of diversity and social justice. Significant segments of the target market find the cause largely irrelevant or even repugnant because it does not fit with their lifestyles and values.

Product/Cause Fit. The fit of the company's products or services with a cause has a great deal to do with the value that company managers perceive from a social alliance. This type of fit takes two forms. The first is co-branding through which the association of the nonprofit's name with the company's name can be construed as a meaningful implied endorsement.[7] A health-related nonprofit associating its name with a consumer food product that is marketed as healthy on the dimensions relevant to the nonprofit's cause is a credible endorser. The second form involves a compatible positioning between the company and the cause that is based on an element of strategic similarity, such as a company that wants to target urban consumers and an urban cause, or a company with a reputation for providing international merchandise and an international cause. At times, these associations can provide an indirect, but not necessarily less meaningful, form of implied endorsement. For example, a company operating in developing nations can benefit from an association with a nonprofit involved in Third World concerns because of inferences that people may make regarding the caliber of the company's operations with respect to ethics and human rights. There is some evidence that this type of more indirect fit is particularly advantageous because the company's motivations are not perceived to be as self-serving as when the fit is more direct (Drumwright 1996; Ellen, Mohr, and Webb 1997).

Though product/cause compatibility typically increases the value of the alliance to a company, it can be a mixed blessing. The potential for a meaningful implied endorsement can increase the apprehensiveness and anxiety among nonprofit managers regarding their organization's role in collaborative efforts in general and the use of its name in particular. As a result, nonprofit managers may be more likely to operate at "arm's length" in partnership endeavors. Such a modus operandi can prevent the social alliance from flourishing and fulfilling its potential, even when it endures over time for strategic reasons.

Cycle Fit. An element of fit between the cycles of the two organizations can be highly advantageous. This often involves a congruence of timing and a complementarity of seasonality. For example, nonprofit managers in one social alliance went on vacation during the period when their company counterparts most needed to collaborate with them in the course of their company's planning cycle. In another alliance, the seasonality of the company, a retailer, and the nonprofit perfectly correspond. Traffic in the retail stores peaks during the season in which the nonprofit's major initiative occurs. Nonprofits often fundraise during specific seasons; corporations set aside certain periods to do their planning and budgeting. If these efforts are ongoing at a time when key alliance tasks have to be accomplished, failure may lurk around the corner.

Cultural Fit. Some corporate cultures are certainly more compatible with the values of nonprofits than others, particularly in the manner in which they value individuals—their employees and customers. They often have flatter organizational structures that encourage employee participation and more consensual decisionmaking. From the other side, some nonprofits have organizational cultures that are more businesslike than others, and thus, are more compatible with companies. Some nonprofits have hired, and are even led by, individuals with professional degrees, typically in business or law, and/or significant work experience in the for-profit sector. Company managers repeatedly expressed more comfort and confidence in working with more businesslike nonprofits. These organizations reflect recent trends in nonprofit management related to adopting and adapting business approaches and techniques. A nonprofit informant described such an organization:

> Fundraising is a business. . . . [Our] offices [are] broken down into industry categories. . . . We have to operate like a business here. We have to have an organization chart—you're in charge of this. We report back progress against goals. . . . We're all on performance-related appraisals every year. All of those things have infiltrated our office. (I 63)

Structure

The belief that "businesslike structures" for nonprofits and "employee-friendly, participative" structures in business facilitate alliances is intuitive. But more fundamental structural properties of nonprofits, companies, and the social alliances themselves matter more and often in different ways than we expected. Nonprofits and companies vary in structural characteristics, and there are pros and cons associated with these variations. What is the best structural configuration of a partner for one company or nonprofit might not be the same for the next. Understanding this in advance can be useful when choosing a partner or in helping to predict what problems are more likely to arise given the structure. Even more important is the structure of the alliance itself. We turn now to an examination of the relationship between structure and challenges. Brevity demands that only certain aspects be discussed. We provide a few examples in an attempt to suggest how to think about these variations.

Nonprofit Structural Characteristics. Nonprofits vary on five structural dimensions that are likely to affect a company's experience in the nonprofit world. These factors are summarized in Table 2.

- Programmatic vs. Grant-making. A programmatic nonprofit uses resources primarily to run programs for its constituents. A typical charity is the prototype, and it usually deals only with selected aspects of a cause. In contrast, rather than running programs of its own, a grant-making nonprofit raises money to give to other nonprofits, which do run programs. In a sense, it is an umbrella organization in that its affiliates typically represent various aspects of a single cause or even multiple causes. When companies give to programmatic organizations, they almost by definition are giving to some aspect(s) of a cause to the exclusion of others, which can lead to political difficulties. A grant-making organization can lessen a company's exposure to political problems within the cause community since funds are dispersed to a wider base. However, when alliance funds are re-granted to many organizations, it becomes much more difficult for the company to tie its name to the money as it goes to work in communities, despite agreements to do so. One company informant referred to the "battle" to get nonprofit managers to understand that "[the company name] does need to get mentioned" (I 23).

  While companies can and do try to influence grant-making criteria, our data suggest that the temptation to micromanage is greater when the alliance involves a programmatic organization whose programs become closely identified with the company name. Finally, the possibilities for company employees to become engaged with the cause at a grassroots level are often greater with a programmatic organization, which typically is running programs that rely on volunteer workers, than with a grant-making organization. Grassroots involvement is generally, but not always, positive.

- Autonomy vs. Central Control. Company managers often assume that because a nonprofit has a national headquarters, the regional and local units are subject to headquarters control. The reality is that nonprofits often are confederations of largely autonomous units that view headquarters-initiated programs as "suggestions" rather than mandates. When a nonprofit partner is composed of largely autonomous units, program cohesiveness is more difficult to achieve, and implementing a nationwide program is more challenging. Because companies typically have a fair amount of central control, nonprofits with more central control tend to be more compatible with a company's operations and culture. Central control also can lessen the level of managerial complexity, as one company informant commented:

Table 2. Nonprofit Structural Characteristics: Pros and Cons from a Company's Perspective

	Programmatic	**Grant-making**
Pros	Easier to tie the company's name to the funds Greater opportunities for company employees to become engaged in grassroots efforts on behalf of the cause	Mitigate political difficulties by dispersing funds to a wider base of initiatives Less temptation to micromanage
Cons	Political difficulties from choosing one aspect of the cause Greater temptation to micromanage programs	Difficulty of tying the company's name to the funds
	Autonomy	**Central Control**
Pros	Possibility for greater innovation Possibility for greater customization	Easier to implement nationwide programs Greater program cohesiveness Lower management complexity Compatibility with the company's structure
Cons	Difficulty of achieving program cohesiveness Difficulty of implementing nationwide programs Possibility that key nonprofit units will opt out of the social alliance or even collaborate with one of the company's competitors	Perhaps lower customization Perhaps lower innovation
	Big, Well-Established	**Small, Entrepreneurial**
Pros	Higher name recognition and "brand equity"	Flexible, eager, energetic More malleable More willing to accept risk
Cons	More formidable Inflexible, bureaucratic	Lower name recognition and "brand equity"
	Revenue-generating Products or Services	**None**
Pros	Additional revenue source Forces entrepreneurship on the nonprofit Conduit for transfer of business expertise from the company to the nonprofit	No product-related concerns Lower demand on company management resources
Cons	Product management concerns (e.g., quality) Greater demand on company management resources	No additional source of revenue More difficult to transfer business expertise No mechanism to force entrepreneurship
	Inherent Cross-sector Collaboration	**None**
Pros	Nonprofit as a catalyst for partnership Nonprofit experienced with partnerships Fewer cultural barriers to partnering	More likely to negotiate exclusivity
Cons	Little possibility for exclusivity because nonprofit has multiple private-sector partners	Greater cultural barriers to partnering

> One of the benefits of working with [nonprofit name] is that we can work with one strong management team and not have to work with 6, 10, 20 different locations. (I 54)

However, autonomous units can exert more initiative in customizing the social alliance to individual vicinities and be more innovative in doing so. The most innovative, cutting edge program in one social alliance was conceived in a geographically remote unit in which nonprofit managers did not have the typical biases and preconceptions of those more mainstream in their organization. The program became a model that was broadly adopted.

- Big, Well-Established vs. Small, Entrepreneurial. Big, well-established nonprofits have higher name recognition than smaller, more entrepreneurial ones. Name recognition and "brand equity" are assets that companies understand and appreciate, which makes big, well-established nonprofits attractive to companies. However, they are also more likely to be formidable, and at times, may be the dominant partner in the alliance, creating a less than favorable context for the company. Company informants complained that the two big and well-established nonprofits in our sample were inflexible and bureaucratic. In contrast, the smaller, more entrepreneurial nonprofits, while low in name recognition and brand equity, typically were seen as more flexible, eager, and energetic. They also appear to be more accommodating to the company, more malleable, and more willing to accept risk.

- Revenue-generating Products or Services. Revenue-generating products or services not only raise money, which helps to ameliorate company fears of dependency by the nonprofit, they often force entrepreneurship on the part of the nonprofit. They also provide logical venues for company engagement. Companies can become involved in distribution, inventory management, and information systems, which they understand and in which they are likely to have expertise. Perhaps more importantly, efforts to generate revenue can serve as conduits through which the nonprofit can be infused with the company's capabilities and core competencies, which begin with but are not limited to the revenue-producing aspects of the nonprofit. For the product or service to serve as a conduit, it must be "owned" at least in part by the nonprofit. That is, the nonprofit must be actively involved in its creation and management; it cannot be merely a product produced by the company and used in a cause-related marketing initiative. This finding parallels Andreasen's (forthcoming) observation that the transfer of marketing skills from the commercial sector to the nonprofit sector is facilitated when social marketing more closely resembles commercial marketing.

  For all their benefits, however, nonprofit products typically prompt a host of product-related concerns among companies. For example, company informants often fear that the nonprofit product will reflect poorly upon the company because it does not meet their quality standards. While these concerns can serve to prompt involvement with the nonprofit, the involvement itself can become overly demanding on company resources.

- Inherent Cross-sector Collaboration. Increasingly, nonprofits are founded on the premise of fostering corporate partnerships. If a nonprofit has cross-sector collaboration inherent in its background as a part of its founding premise or core strategy, then it typically is both more amenable to partnerships with companies and more experienced at them. The chief executive of a nonprofit that was founded on the premise of working with companies elaborated on how he and his colleagues serve as catalysts for corporate partnerships:

> Part of our [nonprofit's] mission is to make it part of their [company's] mission. So it's catalytic. A part of our goal is to essentially be—it's almost like a physics metaphor or chemical. You go in there and you rematrix. You create a demand for something that they didn't know they wanted. (I 43)

However, nonprofits with inherent cross-sector collaboration often already have multiple corporate partners, and a company may be less likely to be able to negotiate an exclusivity agreement of any type.

Company Structural Characteristics. Four structural dimensions of companies that are likely to affect a nonprofit's experience are discussed below and summarized in Table 3.

- Flat vs. Hierarchical. Companies with flat organizational structures have relatively few management layers, encourage teamwork, and enable a more participative form of decisionmaking. In contrast, companies with a more traditional hierarchical structure typically have more layers of management and a more formal leadership style. The differences in these management structures are well known. Companies with flatter structures tend to more closely approximate nonprofit structures, which lowers cultural barriers. However, the typical benefits of hierarchical structures, such as decisiveness and quick action by powerful people, can accrue to nonprofits when they form social alliances with these organizations.

- Broad Consumer Market vs. Specific Target Market. In any business, it generally is more difficult to connect with and engage a large and diffuse mass consumer market than a more focused and specific target market such as intermediaries or business-to-business customers. When a company's primary target is a mass market, there is often a constant and urgent pursuit of novelty with the hope of achieving breakthrough communication messages, which are difficult to attain in any context. Achieving awareness alone in a consumer market is hard enough, not to speak of engagement and action. This is true for social alliances as well. In contrast, if the target is a more focused group with which the company already has a relationship, awarenesss of and engagement with the cause are more attainable, especially if the constituent group has or can develop an affinity for the cause. However, broad consumer markets are supported by hefty marketing and advertising budgets, which are often attractive to nonprofits considering social alliances. In addition, the potential power of a broad-based consumer market, if mobilized for a cause, can be most alluring because of its sheer size.

Table 3. Company Structural Characteristics: Pros and Cons from a Nonprofit's Perspective

	Flat	Hierarchical
Pros	More closely approximates nonprofit structure, lowering cultural barriers	Potential for decisiveness and quick action
Cons	Potential delays from consensual decision making	Very different from nonprofit structure, increasing cultural barriers
	Broad Consumer Market	**Specific Target Market**
Pros	Potential access to large, consumer marketing and advertising budget Potential impact of a large consumer group, if mobilized for the cause	Opportunity to leverage company's existing relationship with target Easier to engage in grassroots effort Less pressure to achieve novelty continually
Cons	Constant urgency to achieve novelty and breakthrough advertising Difficulty of connecting with a large, diffuse mass consumer market Difficulty of prompting grassroots engagement	Perhaps not as much funding available
	Direct Salesforce/Retail Presence	**Business-to-Business**
Pros	Increased company commitment to social alliance because of its potential to increase organizational identification and to create a differential advantage in recruiting and hiring Reasonable cost when compared to expenditures on salesforce incentives Additional avenue for approaching customers Increased awareness for nonprofit because of opportunities for consumer interaction	Fewer communications challenges Lower management complexity
Cons	Challenges of communication with a large and often dispersed group Increased management complexity	Lower exposure of nonprofit cause to end-consumers
	Preeminent Brand	**Less-eminent Brand**
Pros	Financial viability, stability, greater resources Credibility	More flexible, more eager, more malleable
Cons	More formidable	Fewer resources Lower credibility

- Direct Salesforce or Retail Presence vs. Business-to-Business. Companies with direct interaction with end-consumers can increase exposure for the cause, facilitating awareness and engagement. Being the bearers of a cause-related message can also provide retailers and direct salesforce representatives with an additional avenue through which to approach customers. Compared to the large sums that companies spend on salesforce incentives, alliance funding can even seem reasonable. Motivating service workers is of prime importance in companies with a direct salesforce or retail presence. Because social alliances can be mechanisms for increasing organizational identification, these companies provide fertile ground for social alliances, assuming there is a fit between the workforce and the cause, as discussed above. In addition, some company managers report that social alliances can create a differential advantage in recruiting and hiring. However, without widespread buy-in throughout a large direct saleforce or retail network, the social alliance is not likely to be successful. Creating buy-in can be difficult and typically presents continual challenges of communication for both partners. Such challenges can increase the management complexity and the demands made on the nonprofit.

- ❏ Preeminent vs. Less-eminent Brands. Companies with preeminent brands typically can bring greater resources to the alliance because of their credibility, stability, and financial viability. However, preeminent brands are also a source of power, and the companies that own them may be formidable partners prone to power abuses. As brands decrease in eminence, so does their attractiveness, but the managers that work with them are often more flexible, malleable, and eager to make a social alliance work than their counterparts who manage preeminent brands.

Social Alliance Structural Characteristics. Predictable problems can be mitigated and perhaps even preempted through choices made regarding the structure of the social alliance itself. Typically, the more powerful partners, most often companies, get to make these choices. Nonprofits then must understand the ramifications of structural choices in advance so that they can look for company partners who are willing to structure an alliance in some ways rather than others. Six structural factors upon which social alliances vary are summarized in Table 4.

- ❏ Brand- vs. Company-level Alliance. If the association is at the company level, the nonprofit typically has easier access to the company's top management, and greater opportunities for expanding its relationship within the company. However, managing a company-wide alliance involves a high level of management complexity and places greater demands on the nonprofit's management resources. In contrast, associations at the brand level demand fewer resources and have a lower level of management complexity. It is, however, more difficult for them to migrate to different parts of the company, and they may get little or no attention from top management. In addition, they are typically vulnerable to frequent changes in brand management.

- ❏ Dedicated Alliance Manager Position. A dedicated position for a social alliance manager provides the social alliance a fulltime champion, commanding more attention and receiving a greater share of mind. It also provides greater continuity in leadership than when responsibility is rotated among managers. As a company alliance manager explained:

  > I represent . . . the keeper of the flame—someone [who] watches over it to make sure that it happens and that it's not going away. And when other people come to me from other companies and say, "How do you make this successful," I say, "You have to have someone who owns it." (I 41)

  Fulltime company alliance managers can, however, become territorial and protective of their turf, which typically lessens the opportunity that nonprofit personnel have to network within the company. They can also become marginalized within the company, which can compromise the alliance's viability. In contrast, "volunteer" champions often are zealous and evangelical advocates, who facilitate the expansion and institutionalization of the alliance. Their "volunteer" status can even provide credibility.

Table 4. Social Alliance Structural Characteristics

	Brand-level Alliance	**Company-level Alliance**
Pros	Fewer resources needed	Easier access to top management
	Lower level of management complexity	Greater opportunities for expanding relationships within company
Cons	May get little attention from top management	Higher level of management complexity
	May be more difficult to migrate to different parts of the company	Greater demands on nonprofit's resources
	Dedicated Alliance Manager Position	**None**
Pros	Fulltime champion who can give and command attention	"Volunteer" as zealous, credible champion
	Continuity of leadership	
Cons	Can become territorial and protective of turf	Potential for lack of continuity in leadership
	Can become marginalized within company	Potential for lower share of mind and attention
	Dedicated Alliance Marketing Budget	**None**
Pros	Less competition for company resources	Flexible funding, which may be expanded on an ad hoc basis
Cons	Set or "capped" funding	Continual competition for funding
	Fixed Donation	**Variable Donation**
Pros	Reduced risks and uncertainty for nonprofit	Increased funding if company fortunes fare well
	Greater similarity to other nonprofit funding sources	Reduced risks for company
Cons	Greater risk for company, especially if sizeable commitment	Greater risk and uncertainty for nonprofit, which makes planning difficult
	Potential ethical problems, especially if the company suffers a downturn	Potential ethical issues, depending upon how costs are construed
	Few Marketing Initiatives	**Many Marketing Initiatives**
Pros	Fewer demands on both parties	Greater exposure to consumers
		Higher involvement of company employees
Cons	Less opportunity for exposure and engagement	May become overwhelming and overly taxing for both parties
	Venues for Grassroots Engagement of Company Employees and Customers	**None**
Pros	Greater opportunity for unique bonds to develop between organizations	Fewer demands on nonprofit management
	Greater potential for increasing organizational identification	
	Greater potential for increasing social capital	
Cons	Greater demands on nonprofit management	More difficult to achieve organizational identification and social capital
	Potential to distract company employees from job-related tasks	

- Dedicated Alliance Marketing Budget. When a company has a dedicated budget for an alliance's marketing initiatives from year to year, the social alliance often is on solid footing. It does not have to compete internally with other marketing initiatives to the same degree as when funding must be reallocated yearly from the general marketing or advertising budget. The downside—its budget is set and is perhaps less likely to be expanded on an ad hoc basis. In addition, some managers perceive that continual internal competition for funding actually strengthens an alliance in the long term.

- Fixed vs. Variable Donation. The structure of the company's donation to a nonprofit can have far-reaching implications for a social alliance. In particular, the donation may be fixed in that the company commits to provide funding at a certain level during a certain time frame, or variable in that it is tied to sales or profits in some manner (e.g., a percentage of sales or profits from a cause-related marketing product). When the donation is both sizeable and fixed, the company takes on a considerable risk if its fortunes are not as positive as anticipated when the commitment was made. Say, for example, the company loses money and is forced to lay off employees at the same time it has committed to a substantial donation to its social alliance partner. Andreasen and Drumwright (forthcoming) point to a number of potential ethical issues that can arise. For example, is it fair to employees who are being laid off to keep the commitment to the nonprofit? Is it fair to the nonprofit, which has counted on and planned for the donation, to forego or postpone the contribution? The company's risks are certainly reduced when the donation varies with sales and profits, but the nonprofit's are increased, which can create a level of uncertainty that is both uncomfortable and operationally difficult for the nonprofit. When donations are variable, it can matter whether they are stated as a percentage of revenues or profits. Contributions that are stated in terms of profits can be affected greatly by the manner in which costs are construed, which can also raise ethical issues if people are deceived regarding the level of a company's contribution.

- Few vs. Many Marketing Initiatives. When companies envision a social alliance with many marketing initiatives, the demands of the partnership and the complexity of managing it can increase substantially. Too many initiatives can become burdensome and overwhelming for both partners, but especially for the nonprofit. However, when alliances encompass multiple marketing initiatives, generally the exposure to the cause is greater both among workers and customers, enhancing the possibilities that they will become genuinely engaged with and supportive of the cause.

- Venues for Grassroots Engagement of Company Employees and Customers. When a social alliance provides venues for the grassroots engagement of a company's employees and customers with a nonprofit's volunteers and members, there is increased potential to develop unique bonds, as a company informant testified:

> They were able to say, "Come out and join us; come serve." And that was really the link that created this synergy between the two organizations. (I 41)

When a company's constituents become actively and personally committed to the cause, the social alliance is afforded greater tolerance and more latitude. Some companies have formal service programs through which events are organized; employees may even be given paid time off for volunteer work. Others merely inform employees of service opportunities. Likewise, some companies have venues for engaging customers, both consumers and business-to-business customers, in volunteer activities. As positive as these initiatives can be, some company informants expressed concern that volunteer initiatives can become excessively distracting, diverting employees' attention from important job-related tasks.

Nonprofits typically welcome an increase in their volunteer pool, especially white-collar volunteers who can provide important professional skills as well as grassroots labor. However, companies often want service events tailored for their purposes, which can become taxing and burdensome for nonprofits.

Best Practice

We now turn to a best case scenario for successful social alliances. But what is success? Certainly, longevity is one indicator, but it, in itself, is insufficient. One of the longest social alliances we studied was among the most contentious and most dysfunctional. Successful social alliances also have a degree of integration and relational harmony that is unique. To some degree, success is not only in the eye of the beholder but also in the hands of the evaluator, who selects and interprets measures. Ultimately, the degree to which social alliances have achieved the objectives of the partners, creating various kinds of value or "capital" for them, determines success. What follows are characteristics present in the most successful alliances.

Organizational Learning

The best social alliances involve intensive educational efforts and demand considerable learning on the part of both partners. Nonprofits have opportunities to learn business skills from companies, and companies have opportunities to learn how to motivate and energize people, manage volunteer efforts, and allocate charitable donations more effectively. These skills largely represent what Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) refer to as explicit knowledge, or knowledge that can be "transmitted in formal language, including grammatical statements, mathematical expressions, specifications, manuals, and so forth" (p. viii). Less obvious but particularly compelling is the degree to which both companies and nonprofits have opportunity to acquire knowledge that Nonaka and Takeuchi describe as "tacit." Tacit knowledge is deeply rooted in actions and experience as well as in ideals, values, or emotions; it is experiential learning. One company informant referred to the social alliance as a "learning laboratory" (I 38).

Nonprofits have opportunities to learn the skills that embody the best of the free enterprise system—resourcefulness, innovation, and the ability to "think outside the box"—from their corporate partners. For example, one nonprofit developed and pilot-tested two new revenue-generating services and a new product line with its company partner. The nonprofit's chief executive characterized the company as "a creative partner that we constantly get to take new risks with" (I 43).

Companies can inject their cultures and their workforces with a sense of ultimate meaning and purpose that transcends the day-to-day business of commerce that they observe in their nonprofit partners. They want to instill a sense of idealism, of making a difference that matters.

Organizational Diffusion and Mobilization

In the most successful cases, awareness and commitment to the social alliance is diffused through both organizations in a manner that is mobilizing. Typically, diffusion is the result of building networks of engagement, but it must start with individuals. One informant referred to this as "stratified engagement," that is, engagement between the organizations at multiple levels, often between counterparts (e.g., directors of management information services). A company manager explained:

> They [the nonprofit] knew that they couldn't just have contact with me. They had contact with my staff; they had contact with my boss, my boss's boss. I mean all that was done incredibly well. Sometimes organizations sort of say, "Yea, you're great; you're the one managing the program, but I want to get higher in the organization." I mean, they never did that. They basically managed the relationship. I think that is a very key portion of . . . competency that nonprofits need to develop . . . the ability to, you know, do account development, the same way a corporation would in their sales division. (I 30)

Diffusion and networking are particularly important because of company turnover. As one nonprofit informant explained:

> Everybody that we worked with on that campaign is gone from the company. . . . It's up to us to make lateral relationships. (I 29)

The network of engagement can extend to encompass third parties—suppliers or business-to-business customers of the company, who can provide additional sources of funding. Though companies typically provide the entrée, it is incumbent on the nonprofit to cultivate these relationships. In critiquing her organization's performance, a nonprofit informant admitted, "There were third party connections that we could have solidified more" (I 29).

A social alliance becomes mobilized through various forms of adaptation on the parts of both partners. Mobilization requires (1) matching structures, (2) adapting processes, (3) expanding performance measures, and (4) integrating managements. When structures are matched, one or both partners make changes to facilitate stratified engagement. For example, in an alliance in which a company has national and regional headquarters, the nonprofit must develop a structure for interacting at both levels. If a nonprofit is composed of largely autonomous units, the company must create a structure for interacting with the key nonprofit units.

Both partners must adapt processes to accommodate the other. Decisionmaking styles, time frames, planning horizons, and approval processes often differ in the two sectors. For example, decisionmaking in companies is often more hierarchical, while decisionmaking in nonprofits is often more consensual and participative. What is considered expeditious and action-oriented in a company may be perceived as impetuous and authoritarian in a nonprofit. What is considered prudent by a nonprofit may be perceived as slow and bureaucratic by a company. Unless both partners are flexible in adapting processes, the social alliance is likely to be a source of continual frustration.

Each partner must expand its own set of performance measures to encompass measures that matter to the other partner. This typically requires that each partner embrace multiple bottom lines. For example, typically the publicity and recognition that the company receives become an important measure for the nonprofit. Companies adopt some cause measures, which often extend beyond the amount of money raised to encompass indicators of the number of people served. One company even began to consider the amount of government funding that the cause receives as an important indicator.

Finally, the management of the alliance becomes integrated in that the core competency of each organization is drawn upon and utilized. For example, a company redesigned a nonprofit's information systems, inventory management, and distribution systems. A nonprofit created a volunteer service program for a company. But this integration is not limited to the social alliance. It extends into other areas of both partners' operations as they are able to draw on each other's core competencies in other areas as well. For example, a company redesigned and simplified the nonprofit's grant-making process. A nonprofit led team-building workshops and leadership training for its company partner's workforce.

Social Alliance Entrepreneurs. If there is anything universal about the successful social alliances, it is that entrepreneurship abounds. Nonprofits as well as companies have substantial entrepreneurial obligations. Thus, social alliance entrepreneurs[8] are needed within both companies and nonprofits. At times, consultants fill this role, at least temporarily. Individuals, who initiate and shepherd the social alliance, have many of the same characteristics as new business entrepreneurs. They are innovative, resourceful, and have a high energy level. Like new business entrepreneurs, they often incur substantial risk—personal career risk and organizational risk. The alliance is not just any assignment, however; it is one to which they typically bring a sense of moral commitment. As one company social alliance entrepreneur explained:

> I was really committed to becoming as involved with this issue as I could possibly be, bringing as much of my personal commitment and dedication to this as I possibly could. And this was not another corporate assignment for me. . . . I'm just so strongly vested in this program, and I think it is absolutely the right thing to do. (I 38)

The most effective social alliance entrepreneurs report an intense emotional bonding among key players in the partner organizations.

Social alliance entrepreneurs are organizational boundary spanners. They enter the partner organization as immigrants, who must willingly embrace the host culture and encourage their co-workers to do so as well. They become catalysts for the integration of the two cultures and worlds. A nonprofit social alliance entrepreneur asserted, "You try to turn every [nonprofit] employee into as deep as possible an integrator of understanding of the company" (I 43). A company social alliance entrepreneur explained, "I try to get people to believe in this [the cause] more than they believe in anything else" (I 38). However, social alliance entrepreneurs must play another role that at times seems contradictory. They must also learn to be boundary protectors. They are also emigrants who must recognize what is valuable in their own cultures and guard it. Most importantly, they must discern when to span and when to protect boundaries.

Social alliance entrepreneurs must become bilingual in that they understand the thought processes and languages of both worlds, achieving fluency in both. They must learn to trade in multiple currencies, which is both particularly important and particularly difficult. The two worlds value and measure different things and often are ignorant or simplistic in their understanding of the other's currency. When social alliance entrepreneurs embrace their partner's currencies, they typically initiate programs that are most appreciated by the partner. For example, in one social alliance, the nonprofit entrepreneur crafted and implemented a "reinforcement campaign," which provided affirmation, recognition, and publicity that the company valued. In another alliance, a company entrepreneur organized an impressive lobbying effort on behalf of the cause.

Discussion

We are accustomed to evaluating all forms of social enterprise in terms of their ability to contribute to society's stock of capital resources. These resources may be human capital, financial capital, or social capital. Through the integration of disparate organizations and the mobilization of support for social causes, social alliances have the potential to create all three kinds of capital.

We saw in our data that often the individuals involved in these alliances are themselves altered by the activity. Their lives are enriched through their engagement with new people and from the challenge of solving "out of the ordinary" problems. It is not a coincidence that many informants were lively, engaged, engaging, creative, motivated people. They spoke of being involved in thinking "outside the box," of learning new ways of dealing with people, of developing new skills, and of having a different perspective on their lives. Nonprofit workers developed a greater understanding for the methods, processes, and issues that drive the for-profit world. For-profit workers learned ways of motivating colleagues and market partners, such as customers and suppliers, beyond rational, economic factors. We found examples of participants on both sides of the partnerships who either "crossed" or were considering "crossing" to the other side. It appears that those who become deeply involved in social alliance activities can improve their problem-solving skills, people management skills, personal confidence, feelings of empowerment, and their personal and job satisfaction. These attitudes, skills, and perceptions represent additions to the stock of human capital available to the organizations directly involved and the communities in which they operate.

The organizations involved in these activities are also often altered. Both the for-profit and the nonprofit organizations are enabled in terms of their ability to move, generate, or use resources. For the partnership to last, the organizations need to develop flexibility; they need to learn new ways of mobilizing employees and market partners. They need to develop new bases of commitment other than contracts. Because these activities need to be closely tied to organizational mission, they force organizations to integrate more closely their missions into everyday activities. Social alliances highlight the core values of organizations, providing ways and models of "living" those values on a daily basis. The social alliance activities also provide models of behavior that focus on reciprocity, trust, and collective concern. These experiences change organizational norms from ones that focus on the self or the individual to ones that focus more on the "other" and the collectivity. These observations suggest that over time, organizations involved in social alliances will be more flexible; their mission and values will be more transparent and diffused; they will demonstrate norms of reciprocity and collective care; they will consist of less hierarchical networks of relationships between employees with less turnover and easier recruitment. These organizational changes should serve to increase the financial capital of the alliance partners. Alliance activities may increase memberships and donations for the nonprofit. Similarly, motivated by the differential advantage created by the social alliance or through the increased productivity of a more motivated workforce, sales (and therefore financial resources) of the corporate partner should likewise increase.

In the best of cases, yet another type of capital is created—social capital. Social capital refers to the features of social organization that facilitate cooperation and collaboration for mutual benefit (Putnam 1995b). Social capital is thought to exist in networks of relationships characterized by extensive obligations, expectations, and trustworthiness; rich, multiplexed,[9] information channels; and norms of reciprocity and collective interest (Coleman 1990). The concept of social capital has received substantial attention in the media and in academic circles through the work of Robert Putnam (1994, 1995a,b). Using the metaphor of "bowling alone," Putnam argues that there has been a precipitous decline in civic engagement in America since World War II. As participation in civic organizations has declined, so has the resource that enables social actors to work together to pursue shared goals and objectives (Coleman 1990; Putnam 1995a,b). While controversy exists over various aspects of Putnam's work, most experts agree that social capital is a highly desirable asset. Some experts assert that the patterns of civic engagement are not so much declining as shifting away from neighborhoods and into work organizations (e.g., Poarch 1997). Thus, the workplace may be a very fertile venue for the cultivation and growth of social capital.

Our data suggest that social alliances can provide a workplace mechanism for creating social capital as workers and customers become engaged at a grassroots level with a nonprofit organization, its cause, and the community that it serves. This engagement creates important by-products for both organizations. It provides the company with new ways to interact with customers, suppliers, or channel members. In essence, it creates "extra-market" relations with market partners. Likewise, "extra-workplace" relations are created between a company and its workers. From the other side, the social alliance can provide a nonprofit with a new arena in which to interact with its constituents—"extra-philanthropic" relations are established. Thus, a social alliance can create enhanced opportunities for the development of multiplexed relationships that can enhance trust, relational norms, and information flow.

At a societal level, the existence of social alliances and the creation of social capital enhances society's ability to solve more macro social problems. Through these alliances between sectors, society develops the resources to deal with issues that affect all sectors but are beyond the capability of any one sector to solve. The trust that is developed between the for-profit and the nonprofit organization allows each to reconsider previously held stereotypes of the other. Each better recognizes the potential contribution that the other sector can make. The relationships set up systems of obligations and expectations that can be relied on in their efforts to deal with problems. Furthermore, the activities can enhance social norms of collective action.

What we find in the best case is that the social alliances can result in the creation of a new entity, which represents the integration of formerly separate sectors—commercial and nonprofit. This entity has characteristics of both participating partners, but it is a clone of neither. It is vibrant and entrepreneurial. It is a catalyst and a laboratory for learning. It mobilizes both organizations. Most importantly, it has multiple bottom lines—bottom lines for individuals, organizations, and society at large. In short, a social alliance can result in enriched lives, enabled organizations, and an enhanced capacity for productive problem solving within the larger society.

Appendix. Interview Protocol

Initiation

1. How did this relationship get started?

   How did you select a partner? Who initiated the relationship? Who played lead roles in getting this partnership off the ground, and what were those roles? (Note levels in the organization—corporate, business unit, functional, tactical.) Did you have criteria that a partner should fulfill?

   Can you identify critical meetings? What were they? What was the first critical meeting like? Who attended? What was accomplished? What were your concerns? Did you voice these concerns? What do you think the other partner was thinking? What do you think their concerns were? Were these concerns expressed? What were you feeling? What do you think your partner was feeling? What was the atmosphere of the meeting like?

   What were the primary problems/challenges? Did you have difficulty communicating? Were there cultural differences? Did the operating styles of the two organizations differ? Did the values of the two organizations differ? Was there conflict?

Motivation

2. Why did you enter into the partnership, and what did you hope to accomplish?

   What were your goals? How were these goals formulated? Who participated in your organization? Did outside consultants participate? Did your partner participate? Did you consider these to be strategic objectives?

   What did your organization bring to the table? What did your partner bring to the table?

3. Why did your partner enter the relationship, and what was your partner trying to accomplish?

   What were your partner's goals for the partnership? How were these formulated? Who participated in formulating these objectives? Were outside consultants involved? Did your organization participate? Were these strategic objectives?

4. What made you think that this was a viable strategy for your organization?

   Probe for antecedents and environmental factors (e.g., increasing competitiveness; declining performance; personal values of senior management).

Lifecycle Stages

5. How has this relationship evolved over time? Can you describe some of the differences?

   <u>Have there been any distinct phases in the partnership?</u> What did it encompass initially? What does it encompass now? What would you say have been the milestones? Have the goals evolved? Has the organizational structure evolved? Have the key people involved changed?

6. How do you run the partnership on a day-to-day basis?

   <u>How has the relationship been maintained?</u> How often do you interact? How do you interact? What mechanisms/approaches do you use (e.g., meetings, executives in residence, etc.)?

   <u>Who maintains the relationship?</u> Who is involved, and what roles do they play? Who/what functions drive this initiative in your organization? In your partner's?

7. What have been the biggest challenges/problems?

8. What do you foresee as the future of this social alliance?

   <u>Have you thought about if or how you would end the alliance?</u> What would be the best way to end an alliance? Have you had other social alliances that you have ended?

Success/Failure

9. I am going to ask you two things. First think of a joint project or initiative that was successful. Now think of an initiative that was disappointing. Tell me about the successful initiative.

   <u>Why was it successful?</u> How did you determine that the initiative was successful? What were the root causes underlying its success?

   Did your partner see this initiative in the same light? If no, why not?

10. Now tell me about the disappointing initiative.

    <u>Why was it disappointing?</u> How did you determine that the initiative was less than successful? What were the root causes underlying the disappointment?

    Did your partner see this initiative in the same light? If no, why not?

11. When you compare these two initiatives, what do you think distinguishes them?

12. From your perspective, what three factors do you think are most critical to successful social alliances?

13. Based on your experience, what three factors do you think are most likely to lead to unsatisfactory alliances?

14. Overall, how would you assess the effectiveness of your alliance?

    What criteria are you using? Do others in your organization see it the same way? Does your partner see it the same way?

Benefit/Organizational Learning

15. What benefits has your organization derived from the partnership?

    Are these benefits widely recognized among your organization's stakeholders (managers, employees, customers, community at large)?

    Is this what you expected?

16. What, if anything, have you learned from the partnership?

    What have you learned from your partner? What have you learned from the process or experience? How did this learning occur?

17. What benefits has your partner derived from the relationship?

    Are these benefits widely recognized among your partner's constituents (managers, employees, customers, community at large)?

    Is this what your partner expected?

18. What, if anything, has your partner learned from the partnership?

    What has your partner learned from you? From the process or experience? How did this learning occur?

19. If you had things to do over again, what would you do differently?

    Different approach? Different process? Different partner?

Comparison with Philanthropy

20. How is the social alliance different from philanthropy?

    For company: Is there a connection between the corporate philanthropy and the social alliance? Do the people who handle corporate donations get involved? What is the role of philanthropy in your company? Has it always been this way? If not, how and why have things changed? How do you expect them to change in the future?

    For nonprofit: How is the social alliance different from fund raising? Who is involved in the social alliance who is not typically involved in fund raising? What do you see as the future trends in fund raising?

Comparison with Traditional Strategic Alliances

21. What are the differences between social alliances and traditional strategic alliances between companies?

    Are there differences in the objectives and motivations; in the way social alliances are organized or managed; in the skills of managers involved; in the types of conflicts and challenges; in the stages or evolution?

Notes

1. For an excellent set of readings on public-private partnerships or "social partnerships" see Waddock (1986, 1988, 1989, 1991). Waddock noted that social partnerships could also include those between companies and nonprofits.

2. For an examination of the forms that corporate societal marketing initiatives take, see Drumwright and Murphy (forthcoming) in *The Handbook of Marketing and Society.*

3. Two notable exceptions that focus on managerial concerns are Drumwright (1996) and Varadarajan and Menon (1988).

4. One company had had two social alliances, both of which were included in the sample.

5. I 67 indicates that this quote was taken from the informant to whom we assigned the identification number of 67.

6. Take, for example, the AIDS cause. People who believe that AIDS should be prevented by abstinence would choose to make different expenditures from those who feel that finding an AIDS vaccine should be of highest priority. Cause politics are not limited to "controversial" causes, especially when it comes to expenditures.

7. Though nonprofits typically claim that they are not endorsing any aspect of a company when they enter into partnerships and "co-brand" with companies in some manner, evidence suggests that consumers do make such inferences (Abelson 1999).

8. This is a phenomenon similar to what Varadarajan (1992) referred to as an "enviropreneur" and what Drumwright (1994, 1996) referred to as a "policy entrepreneur." Enviropreneurs and policy entrepreneurs are company employees who champion corporate social initiatives, while social alliance entrepreneurs can be employees of companies, nonprofits, or consulting firms.

9. "Multiplexity" refers to overlapping social networks in which the same people are linked together across different roles. In organizations, for instance, the same individuals may be co-workers, neighbors who commute to work together, members of the same sports team, and volunteers for the same nonprofit (Portes 2000).

References

Abelson, Reed (1999), "Sales Pitches Tied to Charities Attract Scrutiny." *New York Times* (May 3), 1.

Andreasen, Alan R. (1994), "Social Marketing: Its Definition and Domain." *Journal of Public Policy and Marketing* 13 (Spring), 108-14.

______ (1995), *Marketing Social Change: Changing Behavior to Promote Health, Social Development, and the Environment*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

______ (1996), "Profits for Nonprofits: Find a Corporate Partner." *Harvard Business Review* 74 (November/December), 47-59.

______ (forthcoming), "Social and Nonprofit Marketing: History and Recent Developments." In *Handbook of Marketing and Society*, eds. Paul N. Bloom and Gregory Gundlach. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

______ , and Minette E. Drumwright (forthcoming), "Alliances and Ethics in Social Marketing." In *Ethical Issues in Social Marketing*, ed. Alan R. Andreasen. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.

Berger, Ida E., Peggy H. Cunningham, and Robert V. Kozinets (1998), "Consumer Persuasion Through Cause-Related Advertising." *Advances in Consumer Research* 26 (October), 1-7.

Bloom, Paul N., Pattie Yu Hussein, and Lisa Szykman (1995), "Benefiting Society and the Bottom Line." *Marketing Management* 4 (Winter), 8-15.

______ , and William D. Novelli (1981), "Problems and Challenges in Social Marketing." *Journal of Marketing* 45 (Spring), 79-88.

Brown, Tom J., and Peter A. Dacin (1997), "The Company and the Product: Corporate Associations and Consumer Product Responses." *Journal of Marketing* 61 (January), 68-84.

Chatman, Jennifer A. (1991), "Matching People and Organizations: Selection and Socialization in Public Accounting Firms." *Administrative Science Quarterly* 36 (September), 459-84.

Coleman, James (1990), *Foundations of Social Theory*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Cone/Roper Cause-Related Marketing Trends Report (1997). Boston: Cone Communications.

Cone/Roper Study: A Benchmark Survey of Consumer Awareness and Attitudes Toward Cause-Related Marketing (1993). Boston: Cone Communications.

Creyer, Elizabeth H., and William T. Ross (1997), "The Influence of Firm Behavior on Purchase Intention: Do Consumers Really Care About Business Ethics." *Journal of Consumer Marketing* 14 (6), 421-32.

Cunningham, Peggy H. (1996), "Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don't: Understanding Ethical Pitfalls in Cause-Related Marketing." *Essays on Philanthropy*, vol. 22. Indianapolis: Indiana University, Center on Philanthropy.

Dexter, Lewis Anthony (1970), *Elite and Specialized Interveiwing*. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.

Drumwright, Minette E. (1994), "Socially Responsible Organizational Buying: Environmental Concern as a Noneconomic Buying Criterion." *Journal of Marketing* 58 (July), 1-19.

______ (1996), "Company Advertising with a Social Dimension: The Role of Noneconomic Criteria." *Journal of Marketing* 60 (October), 71-88.

______ , and Patrick Murphy (forthcoming), "Corporate Societal Marketing." In *The Handbook of Marketing and Society*, eds. Paul N. Bloom and Gregory Gundlach. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Dutton, Jane E., Janet M. Dukerich, and Celia V. Harquail (1994), "Organizational Images and Member Identification." *Administrative Science Quarterly* 39 (June), 239-63.

Ellen, Pam Scholder, Lois A. Mohr, and Deborah J. Webb (1997), "Can Retailers Benefit from Cause Marketing?" Atlanta: Georgia State University,Working Paper.

Esrock, Stuart L., and Greg B. Leichty (1998), "Social Responsibility and Corporate Web Pages: Self-Presentation or Agenda-Setting?" *Public Relations Review* 24 (3), 305-19.

Fielding, Nigel G., and Jane L. Fielding (1986), *Linking Data*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.

Fine, Seymour (1981), *The Marketing of Ideas and Social Issues*. New York: Praeger.

Handleman, Jay M., and Stephen J. Arnold (1999), "The Role of Marketing Actions with a Social Dimension: Appeals to the Institutional Environment." *Journal of Marketing* 63 (July), 33-48.

Holstein, J. A., and J. F. Gubrium (1995), *The Active Interview*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

King, Nigel (1994), "The Qualitative Research Interview." In *Qualitative Methods in Organizational Research: A Practical Guide*, eds. Catherine Cassell and Gillian Symon. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Kotler, Phillip, and Alan R. Andreasen (1996), *Strategic Marketing for Nonprofit Organizations*, 5th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.

______ , and Gerald Zaltman (1971), "Social Marketing: An Approach to Planned Social Change." *Journal of Marketing* 35 (July), 3-12.

Lambert, Douglas M., Margaret A. Emmelhainz, and John T. Gardner (1996), "So You Think You Want a Partner?" *Marketing Management* 5 (Summer), 25-41.

Marshall, Catherine, and Gretchen B. Rossman (1989), *Designing Qualitative Research*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.

McCracken, Grant (1988), *The Long Interview*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.

Miles, Matthew S., and A. Michael Huberman (1994), *Qualitative Data Analysis*, 2nd ed. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.

Morgan, Robert M., and Shelby D. Hunt (1994), "The Commitment-Trust Theory of Relationship Marketing." *Journal of Marketing* 58 (July), 20-38.

Morton, Cynthia R. (1999), "Corporate Social Advertising's Effect on Audience Attitudes Toward Company and Cause." Austin: The University of Texas at Austin, Doctoral dissertation.

Nonaka, Ikujiro, and Hirotaka Takeuchi (1995), *The Knowledge-Creating Company*. New York: Oxford University Press.

O'Reilly, Charles, and Jennifer Chatman (1986), "Organizational Commitment and Psychological Attachment: The Effects of Compliance, Identification and Internalization on Prosocial Behavior." *Journal of Applied Psychology* 71 (August), 492-9.

______ , Jennifer Chatman, and David F. Caldwell (1991), "People and Organizational Culture: A Profile Comparison Approach to Assessing Person-Organization Fit." *Academy of Management Journal* 34 (September), 487-516.

Poarch, Maria T. (1997), "Civic Life and Work: A Qualitative Study of Changing Patterns of Sociability and Civic Engagement in Everyday Life." Boston: Boston University, Doctoral dissertation.

Portes, Alejandro (2000), "Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology." In *Knowledge and Social Capital: Foundations and Applications*, ed. Eric L. Lesser, 43-67. Boston: Butterworth Heineman.

Putnam, Robert D. (1994), *Making Democracy Work*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

______ (1995a), "Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital." *Current* 373 (June), 3-7.

______ (1995b), "Tuning In, Tuning Out: The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital in America." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 27 (December), 664-83.

Rangan, Kasturi V., Sohel Karim, and Sheryl K. Sandberg (1996), “Do Better at Doing Good.” *Harvard Business Review* 74 (May-June), 4-11.

Ross, John K. III, Mary Ann Stutts, and Larry Patterson (1991), “Tactical Considerations for the Effective Use of Cause-Related Marketing.” *Journal of Applied Business Research* 7 (Spring), 58-65.

_______ , Larry T. Patterson, and Mary Ann Stutts (1992), “Consumer Perceptions of Organizations that Use Cause-Related Marketing.” *Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science* 20 (Winter), 93-7.

Rothschild, Michael L. (1969), “Marketing Communications in Non Business Situations or Why It’s So Hard to Sell Brotherhood Like Soap.” *Journal of Marketing* 43 (Spring), 11-20.

Rothschild, Michael L. (1999), “Carrots, Sticks and Promises: A Conceptual Framework for the Management of Public Health and Social Issue Behaviors.” *Journal of Marketing* 63 (October), 24-37.

Sarner, Mark, and Janice Nathanson (1996), *Social Marketing for Business*. Toronto: Manifest Communications.

Schwartzman, Helen B. (1993), *Ethnography in Organizations*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.

Sen, Sankar, and C. B. Bhattacharya (1999), “Does Doing Good Always Lead to Doing Better? Consumer Reactions to Corporate Social Responsibility.” Boston: Boston University, Working paper.

Smith, Craig (1994), “The New Corporate Philanthropy.” *Harvard Business Review* 72 (May-June), 105-16.

Spekman, Robert E., Theodore M. Forbes III, Lynn A. Isabella, and Thomas C. MacAvoy (1995), “Alliance Management: A View from the Past and a Look to the Future.” Cambridge, MA: Marketing Science InstituteWorking Paper, Report No. 95-119.

Spiggle, Susan (1994), “Analysis and Interpretation of Qualitative Data in Consumer Research.” *Journal of Consumer Research* 21 (December), 491-503.

Stout, Patricia A., and Trina Sego (1995), “Response to Threat Appeals in Public Service Advertisements.” In *Proceedings of the 1995 Conference of the American Academy of Advertising*, ed. Charles S. Madden. Waco, TX: Baylor University.

Strahilevitz, Michal, and John G. Myers (1998), “Donations to Charity as Purchase Incentives: How Well They Work May Depend on What You Are Trying to Sell.” *Journal of Consumer Research* 24 (March), 434-46.

Strauss, Anselm L. (1990), *Qualitative Analysis for Social Scientists*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Varadarajan, P. Rajan (1992), "Marketing's Contribution to Strategy." *Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science* 20 (Fall), 335-43.

______ , and Margaret H. Cunningham (1995), "Strategic Alliances: A Synthesis of Conceptual Foundations." *Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science* 23 (Fall), 282-96.

______ , and Anil Menon (1988), "Cause-Related Marketing: A Coalignment of Marketing Strategy and Corporate Philanthropy." *Journal of Marketing* 52 (July), 58-74.

Waddock, Sandra A. (1986), "Public-Private Partnership as Social Product and Process." *Research in Corporate Social Performance and Policy* 8, 273-300.

Waddock, Sandra A. (1988), "Building Successful Social Partnerships." *Sloan Management Review* 29 (Summer), 17-23.

Waddock, Sandra A. (1989), "Understanding Social Partnerships: An Evolutionary Model of Parnership Organizations." *Administration & Society* 21 (May), 78-100.

Waddock, Sandra A. (1991), "A Typology of Social Partnership Organizations." *Administration & Society* 22 (February), 480-515.

Webb, Deborah, and Lois Mohr (1998), "A Typology of Consumer Responses to Cause-Related Marketing: From Skeptics to Socially Concerned." *Journal of Public Policy and Marketing* 17 (Fall) (2), 226-38.